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The search for a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the European Union and 




Notwithstanding the development of an impressive framework of cooperation – 
based on regular meetings, initiatives and dialogues – the EU-China “Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership” seems to be still in search of a truly strategic dimension. In 
assessing the obstacles and prospects of the Partnership, the thesis offers -through the lens 
of a pluralist and post-positivist epistemological/hermeneutical approach - an interpretive 
“fil rouge” which seeks to break the logic that has often insulated the EU-China relations 
in the “comfort zone” offered by the architecture and institutional logic of their bilateral 
interaction. On this basis some crucial ideational elements which shape the identity, the 
historical-cultural background and the actorness of the two strategic partners are analyzed 
in order to better understand not only the persistent “conceptual gaps” but also an 
increasing normative divergence affecting the strategic dimension of the relationship. In 
this perspective the thesis focuses on the degree of convergence/divergence between 
Brussels and Beijing by considering the influence of these ideational factors in areas - 
such as human rights and the approach to multilateralism - which are key test beds for 
evaluating the structural strategic dimension of the EU-China Partnership. In analyzing 
the conceptual, normative and operational divergence of key components of the EU-
China Partnership the thesis assesses its impact also in terms of policy implications, in 
particular problematizing the traditional EU’s approach of “constructive engagement”. In 
a complex framework in which European national China policies coexist with new 
Chinese initiatives aimed at individual European countries, the thesis not only 
deconstructs key tenets of the Partnership such as “constructive engagement” and 
“multipolar world” but also problematizes possible new paradigms by underlying that 
their coherence and sustainability is challenged by the increasingly diverging dynamics 
affecting the Partnership in the broader process of change which characterizes 21st century 
international relations. In this context of complex interaction the strategic dimension of 
the Partnership and its future potential role is thus assessed for its significance in the 
framework of a “strategic triangle” in which the United States continues to be an 





There is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more 




Foreign Policy is an integral part of culture as a whole and reflects its theory and 
practice. Hence it is only through the analysis of the general philosophy of a given time 
that it is possible to understand the foreign policy of this particular time. 
      Hans Morgenthau 
 
 
China is the other pole of the human experience, a total contrast and a complete 
otherness,  allowing Europeans to better understand their own identity and to grasp 
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1.1 Rationale and contribution of the research  
The subject of the strategic relations between the European Union and the 
People’s Republic of China has been widely researched over the years, in parallel to the 
development of an increasingly structured and multifaceted interaction between two of 
the main actors of the 21st century international system. The increasing salience of this 
interaction led to the establishment in 2003 of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership which has been chosen as the subject of this research in an analytical 
perspective addressing the key aspects that at present constrain its strategic dimension 
and its prospects of development.  
Even though the Sino-European relations had developed in a significant way also 
prior to 2003, the specific focus of the thesis on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
is motivated by the fact that, with its establishment, The European Union and the PRC 
have characterized their relationship as a fully strategic one. In this sense the 
establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership formalized the two partners’ 
ambitions of upgrading the complex set of their relations to the level of a “primary 
relationship” in strategic terms. For this reason a specific focus on the period from the 
establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership onwards seems to be 
particularly functional in order to investigate this strategic dimension. 
The interest for further analyzing a subject whose main aspects have been 
constantly investigated in Europe and China is motivated by the evolution of the EU-
China relationship which has reached an inflection point, driven by unresolved internal 
dynamics and new external factors of context: this process is bringing about a significant 
paradigm shift not only in the conceptual and operational interaction between the two 
partners but also in their assessment of the Partnership’s role in an evolving international 
system. This means that the significance and the future development of the EU-China 
Partnership as a “primary relationship” is under close scrutiny in a phase of stronger 
strategic competition, especially given the evolution of the respective “primary” relations 
that the EU and China have with the United States. This evolving context has accelerated 
and amplified some crucial existing dynamics within the EU-China Partnership which 
has been characterized by a degree of substantial divergence between the two strategic 




The study of the roots of this increasing divergence has been developed in the 
thesis by focusing, first and foremost, on the ideational dimension which – through the 
ramifications stemming from the two partners’ identity, actorness, historical and cultural 
background – continues to affect the Partnership in a way which could make the premises 
on which it was established in 2003 a “false promise”.1 
Even though the debate on the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has often 
focused on the need of a “reset”, the thesis argues that the gradual recognition of this 
divergence has not led so far to a coherent re-conceptualization and re-operationalization 
of the contentious issues directly affecting the strategic dimension of the EU-China 
relations, nor has it led the Union to a thorough re-assessment of the perspectives and 
potential of the Partnership itself, which for Brussels is the most formalized and structured 
relationship of this kind thus far.   
The theoretical and practical perimeter of the subject has been therefore delineated 
by this research in a way which aims not only at clarifying the main factors which have 
made the strategic dimension of the EU-China relations “elusive” but also the complex 
internal and external elements of novelty which are going to influence its further 
development. In this perspective the thesis addresses the fundamental challenge for the 
EU and China of defining a new paradigm of interaction in a phase which has increasingly 
exposed the partial inadequacy of the main tenets on which the partnership was 
established in 2003. To this end the thesis has developed an interpretive approach  which 
seeks to overcome the basic disconnect between the growing  recognition of this 
conceptual and normative divergence and the paucity of the action taken so far by the two 
partners to bridge this significant gap.  
From a theoretical point of view, the original contribution that the thesis tries to 
bring to the analysis of the obstacles and prospects of the Partnership in its present phase 
is based on the need to set the existing material and ideational problems not only in a 
post-positivist epistemological context but also in a theoretical framework conducive to 
a hermeneutical approach aimed at linking theory to praxis, interpretation to application.  
This approach has been developed within a pluralist perspective which takes into 
account the theoretical elaboration of thinkers of the Chinese school of International 
relations - in particular Qin Yaqing’s - which can offer interesting analytical synergies 
 
 
1 Pan Chengxin, “Problematizing ‘Constructive Engagement’ in EU-China Policy”, in Roland 
Vogt (ed.), Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals? (Hong Kong: HK University Press, 2012). 
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for better understanding some key ideational components of the relationship between 
Europe and China. In this way the thesis has broadened the interpretive potential of the 
constructivist epistemological assumptions which have addressed the fundamental 
underlying problem of “cognitive dissonance” between Europe and China.  
By focusing on the “conceptual gaps in China-EU relations” the epistemological 
approach of the thesis has made possible to inscribe them in the broader framework of 
both the increasing conceptual and normative divergence between the EU and China and 
of its practical consequences for the Partnership. In line with these 
epistemological/hermeneutical premises the analytical approach of the thesis addresses 
some of the main contentious issues of the Strategic Partnership by linking the ideational 
disconnect between Europe and China to its practical consequences and implications for 
the two partners’ policy-making in their reciprocal interaction.  
On this basis it has been possible to explore the elements which are at the root of 
the Partnership’s deficit in terms of a “structural” strategic dimension: by elaborating on 
a categorization proposed by Giovanni Grevi,2 the thesis argues that this strategic 
dimension necessarily hinges on the ability of the EU-China Partnership to address – 
without neglecting the “relational” aspects of its interaction – the multilateral/global 
issues which are central to the present phase of evolution of the international system. For 
this reason the thesis focuses, as significant case-studies, on the partners’ approach to the 
crucial issues of human rights and multilateralism as a test-bed of the degree of 
convergence-divergence between the EU and China on structural strategic sectors. 
In order to better understand the paradigm shift taking place in the strategic 
relations between Europe and China the thesis has also connected its analysis to the 
revived debate on the systemic implications of the rise of an assertive global China by 
specifically focusing on the potential asymmetries/symmetries between the American and 
European approach to this process. Taking into account the implications of this evolving 
context, the thesis offers a new analytical perspective aimed at better understanding the 
consequences and the objectives of the process that has begun to problematize the 
fundamental tenets of the Partnership.  
In doing so it underlines, at the same time, the degree of complexity and 
uncertainty stemming not only from the prospects of an in depth reconsideration of the 
traditional paradigm of “constructive engagement” but also from the challenge, in terms 
 
2 Giovanni Grevi, “Why EU strategic partnerships matter”, Working Paper 1, European 
Strategic Partenership- Observatory- FRIDE, (June 2012). 
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of policy coherence, sustainability and longer-term implications, of a possible EU “turn 
to realism”. The assessment of the process underway - based on the analysis of the main 
documents which have gradually articulated the new European China policy of 
“principled pragmatism” and complemented by interviews with European officials – also 
takes necessarily into account the Chinese debate on the volatility of the EU-China 
relations. In this respect it underlines the clear resistance of the Chinese party-state 
towards the European aspiration of gradually socializing China into the norms and 
political values promoted by the EU through the normative project represented by the 
policy of “constructive engagement.”  
In this sense the thesis argues – building upon its epistemological premises – that 
the symbiotic relationship between the EU’s identity as a transformative normative power 
and its attempts of influencing the process of change underway in the PRC is challenged 
by an increasingly assertive “Normative Power China,” whose strategic ambitions make 
it reluctant to be socialized unless this process can happen on its own terms. For these 
reasons the thesis’ critique of the EU staple policy of “constructive engagement” 
problematizes the search of a new paradigm by the EU in light of China’s “stubborn 
presence as a normative Other:”3 if the PRC is in this sense for the EU also a “systemic 
rival,” the strategic dimension of the Partnership is going to be put under further pressure 
by the EU’s need, on the one hand, of preserving its interests-values continuum in the 
context of a widening ideational gap with Beijing. On the other, by growing tensions 
which make more complex the interaction with regard to a set of key unresolved issues, 
ranging from the economic and technological sectors to the global multilateral issues 
which should constitute the “quid pluris” defining the truly strategic dimension of the 
Partnership.  
In this context the analysis developed by our research tends to underscore that the 
paradigm shift underway is particularly challenging for the EU because it simply seems 
not sustainable on the basis of the coexistence of a revised “constructive engagement” 
policy and a new approach of “managed competition” which risk being two “strange bed-
fellows.”4 Against this background, the perspectives developed by the thesis are aimed at 
contributing to the analytical awareness - in terms of theory and praxis – of the challenges 
 
3 Pan Chengxin, “Problematizing ‘Constructive Engagement’ in EU-China Policy”, in Roland 





related to the search of a new consensus on the Partnership’s structural strategic 
dimension able to make it a truly primary relationship.  
In this sense the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership can be regarded 
in the present phase as being a “double mirror”: on the one hand it reflects – beyond its 
“institutional inertia” and formulaic interaction - the degree of commitment of the two 
partners to address the structural material and ideational elements which still limit the 
development of their strategic relations. On the other hand, it reflects the diverging 
worldviews of two protagonists of the “strategic triangle” and consequently their potential 
determination to overcome the underlying problems of “cognitive dissonance” and 
“conceptual and normative divergence” which continue to exist between Europe and 
China. 
Through the lens of a pluralist and post-positivist epistemological/hermeneutical 
approach the thesis offers an interpretive “fil rouge” which seeks to break the logic that 
has often insulated the EU-China relations in the “comfort zone” offered by the 
architecture and institutional logic of their bilateral interaction. At the same time it sets 
the deconstruction of the tenets on which the Partnership has been based – such as 
“constructive engagement” and “multipolar world” – in a perspective which 
problematizes possible new paradigms of interaction by underlying that their coherence 
and sustainability will depend on the ability of managing intertwined but often diverging 
dynamics affecting the Partnership in the broader process of change which characterizes 
the 21st century international system.  
 
1.2. Outline of the thesis structure 
 
The thesis structure is divided, in terms of substance, into two parts, each 
composed by four chapters. The first part delineates the main theoretical and 
epistemological assumptions of the research along with the key arguments used in the 
following analysis. After the rationale of the research, literature review and methodology 
contained in chapter 1, chapter 2 focuses on the context in which the Strategic Partnership 
is “located”, namely the evolving dynamics which influence the EU-China-Us relations 
and form the most important “strategic triangle” in a 21st century international system 
characterized by trends of growing competition.  
Chapter 3 is the most important in argumentative terms because it delineates the 
epistemological/hermeneutical approach of the research by addressing the key theoretical 
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issues underlying the problems analyzed in the thesis by focusing on the historical, 
cultural backgrounds, identities, actorness, concepts of sovereignty of the two partners. 
In this way the chapter sets in a key theoretical context - based on a pluralist approach - 
the “conceptual gaps” and the increasing ideational and normative divergence between 
Brussels and Beijing.  
Chapter 4 is closely interconnected with chapter 3: it enters “in media res” by 
defining firstly the strategic premises of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership and, secondly, by analyzing its establishment, motivations and evolution. On 
the basis of this excursus, a preliminary set of relevant conclusions is drawn at the end of 
chapter 4 on the degree of convergence/divergence of the two strategic partners by 
assessing, against this background, the EU’s policy of “constructive engagement” and the 
“turn to realism” in the present phase of development of the Partnership. 
The second part of the thesis contains two chapters, the fifth and the sixth, which 
are conceived as case-studies of the key theoretical and epistemological arguments and 
assumptions made in the first part of the research. In this sense chapters 5 and 6 represent 
“acts of application” of the interpretive assumptions delineated in the previous chapters. 
In this perspective the subjects of these chapters – the European and Chinese approach to 
human rights and to multilateralism – are two very significant case-studies to verify the 
structural strategic dimension of the Partnership in light of the diverging positions of 
Brussels and Beijing on these crucial issues.  
Chapter 7, dedicated to the bilateral dimension of the Sino-European relations, 
addresses this set of issues in terms of the interplay between bilateral economic interests 
and the promotion of European political values by the EU and its member states against 
the background of Chinese initiatives such as the Belt and Road and the 17+ 1 format. 
The conclusions of the thesis, contained in chapter 8, argue that the strategic 
relations between the EU and the China have reached an inflection point which requires 
a new paradigm of interaction based on a set of key elements: the awareness of the 
increasing ideational and normative divergence between the two  partners and the 
concrete implications of their persistent conceptual gaps; the need, in this perspective, of 
a reality and ideational check of the European policy of “constructive engagement” which 
will require a thorough reconsideration not only of the “relational” dimension of the 
Partnership - mainly focused on trade and investment issues - but also of the “structural” 
dimension related to the ability of Brussels and Beijing of addressing jointly multilateral 
questions of global relevance. Finally, the concluding remarks underscore the importance 
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that this process of paradigm shift can be context-sensitive in light of the phase of global 
competition which makes extremely challenging the search of a “middle ground” within 
the “strategic triangle”. 
 
1.3 The analytical debate and the literature devoted to the subject of the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
 
The literature which has addressed the issues related to the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is inscribed in a broader framework of analysis 
centred, since the late 1970s, on the relations between the European 
Communities/European Community and the People’s Republic of China. As argued in 
the first section of this chapter, the thesis focuses on the period between the establishment 
of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2003 and its latest developments in order 
to investigate its strategic dimension in the timeframe in which this strategic character 
has been formalized from an institutional point of view. Nevertheless, the thesis focuses 
also on the antecedents and motivations which were conducive to the decision of 
establishing such a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in order to set in a proper context 
such key components as the EU policy of “constructive engagement”: for this reason 
authors who have studied this earlier phase of the EU-China strategic relations have been 
taken into account.  
At the same time the analysis and the use of the secondary sources has been 
developed in close connection with the theoretical and epistemological assumptions 
which permeate the research design of the thesis. In this respect an  added value that the 
thesis has tried to offer is the connection, on the one hand, between the literature and 
analytical debate on the EU-China Partnership and the philosophical and political meta-
theories which have influenced it through the prism of IR Theory (IRT); on the other hand 
the epistemological/hermeneutical approach of the thesis has been developed in a pluralist 
perspective which has focused - in addition to Western IRT - also on the contributions of 
such significant scholars of the Chinese School of IR as, in particular, Qin Yaqing, Yan 
Xuetong and Zhao Tinyang. The theoretical synergies with these Chinese theorists have 
been elaborated by connecting their political thought to the post-positivist interpretive 
perspective that – on the basis of the hermeneutical circle elaborated by Heidegger and 
Gadamer in philosophical terms – has been developed by authors such as Richard 
Bernstein and, in IR theory, Onuf, Katzenstein, David Campbell, among others.  
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On the basis of these necessary premises, which hopefully better clarify how the 
thesis has taken advantage of the more specific literature on its research subject, we can 
divide it in three main periods, reflecting not only the analytical focus but also the shifting 
European and Chinese relations within the Partnership. 
The first period is comprised of the years between the establishment of the 
Partnership and 2008: it has been described as the "honeymoon phase” because of the 
positive undertone on the potential of the Strategic Partnership which had characterized  
since the late 1990s the development of Sino-European relations. The thesis’ focus on the 
literature and analytical debate of this period has tried to identify the elements of potential 
divergence rooted in the establishment of the Partnership itself. In particular, the Chinese 
expectations that Europe could be a partner in the process of multipolarization of the 
international system, on the one hand, and the European expectations that the cooperation 
with China could be extended to a set of key multilateral sectors, on the other. In this 
sense, as it has been argued, this period could be regarded as an “imagined honeymoon” 
because the development of the EU-China interaction led these positive expectations 
fading away. 
The second timeframe is that between 2008 – when the financial crisis began - 
and 2016, a year which marks a turning point in the EU’s strategic approach, as, inter alia, 
its new Global Strategy underlined. The thesis’ focus on the literature of this period is 
related, in argumentative terms, to the increasingly critical views of the problems and 
prospects affecting the evolution of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and, in a 
broader perspective, of the role of the EU on the international scene. The thesis, at the 
end of chapter 2 and in chapter 4 underlines how this literature reflects the fact that both 
European and Chinese perceptions and views on the further development of the 
Partnership underwent a significant change in this phase. In this perspective the thesis, 
linking the material dimension of the Partnership to its ideational components, takes 
advantage, in particular, of the analysis of authors - such as Pan Zhongqi’s - who have 
focused on the structural implications of the persistent “conceptual gaps” for the 
development of the EU-China strategic relations.  
It is also important to note that - across these two periods – a significant theoretical 
and practical period of reflection addressed, on the European side, the subject of the EU’s 
strategic partnerships while, on the Chinese side, a stronger emphasis was placed on the 
role of the PRC as a strategic actor in an evolving international system.  
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By referring to the literature of the third period, from 2016 onwards, the thesis 
develops its arguments by taking into account the growing number of analytical voices, 
in particular in Europe, which have problematized – on the basis of a decade-long debate 
- the evolution of the strategic relations between Brussels and Beijing in a systematic way. 
The thesis, in line with the literature influenced in this period also by the elements of 
novelty stemming from important primary sources, analyzes the Sino-European 
increasing divergence on several key issues, notwithstanding the high degree of 
institutionalization reached by the EU-China interaction within the Partnership. The 
consideration of the literature and of the analytical debate of the last four years seems to 
confirm the thesis’ fundamental argument that a paradigm shift in the EU-China 
relationship has been gradually bringing about a reconsideration of the EU strategic 
approach to China, in particular the policy of "constructive engagement” defined in the 
mid-1990s and ever since regarded as one of the fundamental tenets of the Strategic 
Partnership. As we will see, the analysis of the literature of this period underscores that 
this debate is still open and is being driven not only by the consideration of the internal 
elements of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership but also by elements stemming from 
the increasing global competition which characterizes the present trends of evolution of 
the international system. 
 
1.3.1“From honeymoon to marriage”: 2003–2008 
 
The evaluation of the debate in the literature during this period tends to show how 
it was influenced by the acknowledgment that the bilateral relationship had constantly 
progressed for a decade driven mainly by a growing economic interaction, as Chen 
Zhimin and Reuben Wong have written.5 The main focus of analysts and scholars was on 
the economic and commercial dimension of the strategic relationship between Brussels 
and Beijing, in line with the developments of the late 1990s which were conducive to the 
establishment first in 1998 of the EU-China Comprehensive Partnership and then in 2003 
of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. As Shambaugh, Yahuda and Zhang have 
written, this approach was consistent with the key EU policy paper entitled “A long-term 
 
 5 Chen Zhimin, “Europe as a Global Player: A view from China”, Perspectives, vol. 20, nº 2 
(2012); Reuben Wong, “An Anatomy of European and American Perspectives on China in the International 
System”, in Roland Vogt (ed.), Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 2012). 
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policy for China” which had emphasized the importance of economic relations and the 
role of China as a "cornerstone" in this regard.6 This perspective stemming from the 
“primacy of trade” is problematized by the thesis in light of the conceptual gaps which 
already affected some structural elements of the Partnership.  
Another theme characterizing this phase that the thesis analyzes is the idea of a 
EU-China “emerging axis” - as argued by Shambaugh - which could contribute, as a 
welcome prospect, to an “economic triad” or “economic condominium” with the United 
States, as Crossick wrote. Shambaugh, elaborating on the notion of an “emerging axis” - 
which proved to be premature - defined the EU-China-US relations a “strategic triangle”.7 
By arguing that the main tenets of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership could be 
regarded - in line with the official European and Chinese statements – as a serious 
engagement and as the search for a more multipolar international system, optimism on 
the potential of the strategic partnership and its role as a positive force of change in the 
21st century international relations was shared by both Chinese and European scholars. 
Examples are Jing Men, David Scott, Katinka Barysch, Charles Grant, Mark Leonard and 
Nicola Casarini, who regarded Brussels and Beijing as headed towards a mature and 
meaningful relationship.8 In this respect the thesis argues that the literature reflects an 
underlying assessment of the “rise of China” as an opportunity for  the process of gradual 
socialization of the RPC into the international liberal order.  
It is also important to note, as Dai Bingran has done, that in this period the Chinese 
analytical focus and debate on the EU and its relations with China was supported by the 
significant funds offered by the European Commission to Chinese scholars who wanted 
to investigate this field of study. In the 1998-2007 period the EU-China Higher Education 
Cooperation Programme and the EU-China European Studies Centers Programme played 
an important role in promoting the development of the research related to issues relevant 
 
 6 David Shambaugh, China and Europe, 1949-1995 (London: Contemporary China Institute, 
SOAS, 1996). Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, 1945-1995 (London and 
NYC: Routledge, 1996); “China and Europe: The Significance of the Secondary Relationship” in Thomas 
W. Robinson and David Shambaugh (eds.), Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (Oxford: OUP, 
1994); Zhang Yongjin, China in International Society since 194. Alienation and Beyond (New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1998). 
 7 David Shambaugh, “China and Europe: The Emerging Axis”, Current History, September 2004; 
David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhong Hong (eds.), China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, 
Policies and Prospects (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); David Shambaugh, “Coping with a 
Conflicted China”, The Washington Quarterly, 34 (1), 2005, 7-27. Stanley Crossick, “Rise of China and 
Implications for the European Union”, Singapore, EAI, 2006. 
 8 Katinka Barysch, Charles Grant and Mark Leonard, Embracing the Dragon: The EU’s 
partnership with China, (London: Centre for European Reform, 2005). 
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to the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership itself.9 The effects of this broader debate were 
visible in the publishing of books such as China-Europe Relations:Perceptions, policies 
and prospects edited by David Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong or 
The International Politics of EU-China Relations, edited by David Kerr and Liu Fei, 
which offered views on a wide ranging set of issues that tended to underscore the maturity 
of the EU-China strategic interaction. 
It is significant that authors such as Sonia Lucarelli, Richard Youngs, Li Shejun, 
Liselotte Odgaard, and Sven Biscop addressed key issues such as the strategic identities 
of the two partners10 while the China-Europe engagement at regional and global levels 
and the perspectives of further development of the strategic relations were analyzed by 
Chinese authors such as Wai Ting.11  
The literature of this period reflects the expectations in both the EU and China for 
a transformation of the global order in which the US no longer played the only leading 
role as Scott, Casarini, Shen Dingli wrote.12 The focus on the EU as a key “multipolar 
partner” was in line with the first ever EU Policy paper released by the Chinese Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in 2003 and which was mirrored by a detailed analysis in leading 
Chinese academic and policy journals on international affairs: this focus on the 
“balancing” role of Europe did not exclude, however, the idea, as Ruan Zongze observed, 
that it was possible to shape a “constructive future” in EU-China-US relations.13 
Moreover, the establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
redirected the interest of the Chinese analysts away from the individual European states 
towards the EU as the main counterpart of the Sino-European relations in this potential 
multipolar, non-hegemonic context of realignment of international relations based on 
 
 9 Dai Bingran, “European studies in China”, in Shambaugh, Sandschneider and Zhou Hong (eds.), 
China-Europe Relations, 105-126. 
10 Sonia Lucarelli, “European Political Identity and Others’ Images of the EU”, CFSP Forum5, n° 
6, (2007), 11-15; Richard Youngs, “Normative Dynamics and Strategic Interests in the EU’S External 
Identity”, Journal of Common Market Studies, n° 2 (2004), 415-435. 
11 Wai Ting, “China’s Strategic Thinking: The Role of the European Union and China”, in Richard 
Balme and Brian Bridges (eds.), Europe-Asia Relations: Building Multilateralisms (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2008). 
 12 Nicola Casarini “What Role for the European Union in Asia? An Analysis on the EU’s Asia 
Strategy and Growing significance of EU-China Relations”, Current Politics and Economics of Asia, vol.7, 
nº1, 2008; David Scott, “The EU-China Strategic Dialogue: Pathways in the International System”, in 
David Kerr and Liu Fei (eds.). The International Politics of EU-China Relations (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 13; 
Shen Dingli, “Why China sees the EU as a counterweight to America”, Europe’s World, n°10, Autumn 
2008, 48-53. 
 13 Ruan Zongze, “China–EU–US relations: Shaping a Constructive Future”, in Shambaugh et al., 
(eds.) China–Europe relations, 287–300; Jing Men, “Chinese Perceptions of the European Union: A 
Review of leading Chinese journals”, European Law Journal, vol 12, nº6, November 2006, 788-806.  
12 
 
cultural diversity and economic interdependence, as authors such Shambaugh, William 
Callahan, Zhong Yongjin, Deng Yong, Zhang Tuosheng all argued.14 
The overall positive expectations on the recently established Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership - expressed in the analysis and research works of these years - began 
to change after China’s setbacks in not removing the EU's arms embargo or obtaining a 
market economic status (MES) from the Union.  Notwithstanding the launch in 2007 of 
an ambitious negotiation for a Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA), the end of this period is marked also in the literature by a “growing uneasiness” 
in the EU-China interaction, that Shambaugh defined as a “complicated relationship” just 
a few years after calling it an “emerging axis”.15 
This thesis, taking into account the increasing focus of European authors at the 
end of this period on unresolved issues within the Partnership leading Holslag to talk of 
a “great disillusion”,16 addresses the key question of the definition of its strategic 
dimension by focusing on the broader debate about the EU’s strategic partnerships of 
which the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was the most institutionalized 
example. In doing so the thesis defines the strategic dimension of the Partnership in 
“relational” and “structural” terms thus elaborating on a conceptualization proposed by 
Giovanni Grevi in the framework of a analytical debate characterized by the theoretical 
and practical insights of authors such as Thomas Renard, Rosa Balfour, Michael Smith 
and Xie Huaixian, Nicola Casarini and Francois Godement 17. From this perspective the 
 
 14 Shambaugh, ibid. Zhong Yongjin, “Understanding Chinese views of the emerging Global 
Order”, in Wang Gungwu and Zheng Yongnian (eds.), China and the New International Order (London: 
Routledge, 2008). William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New 
Hegemony?”, International Studies Review, Vol. 10, n° 4 (December 2008), 749-761; Deng Yong, China 
struggle for status: the realignment of international relations, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), 156-60; Zhang Tuosheng, “On China’s concept of the international security order”, in Robert S. 
Ross, Øystein Tunsjø and Zhang Tuosheng (eds.) US-China_EU relations. Managing the new world order 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2011), 37.  
 15 David Shambaugh, “China-Europe Relations get complicated”, Brookings North East Asia 
Commentary nº 9, May 2007. 
16 Jonathan Holslag, “The European Union and China: The Grat Disillusion”, European Foreign 
Affairs Review, 11 (2006), 555-580.  
 17 Nicola Casarini, “The evolution of the EU-China Relationship. From Constructive Engagement 
to Strategic Partnership”, Occasional paper, nº64 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, October 2006); 
Michael Smith and Hie Huaixian, “The EU and China: The logics of Strategic Partnership”, Paper presented 
at the ECPR Standing Group, Porto 24-26 June 2010; Giovanni Grevi, The Interpolar World: A new 
Scenario, (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2009); Sven Biscop and Thomas Renard, “The EU’s 
Strategic Partnerships with the BRIC; where’s the strategy?”, BEPA monthly brief, n°29 (September 2009), 
5-8; Giovanni Grevi, “Making the EU Strategic Partnership effective”, FRIDE paper 105, 2010; Thomas 
Renard, “EU Strategic Partnerships: Evolution of a Concept, from Amsterdam to Lisbon”, EU-China 
Observer, issue5, (2010), 16-22; “A need for strategy in a multipolar world: Recommendations to the EU 
after Lisbon”, Security Policy Brief, n° 5, January 2010; François Godement, “Europe- Asia: the historical 
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thesis analyzes the debate on the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership by 
inscribing it in a broader theoretical debate on the EU strategic partnerships and their 
impact on an evolving international order.18 Thus – by analyzing the related literature - 
the thesis links the research and analytical perspectives on the EU-China Partnership to 
broad policy issues such as the partners’ approach to multipolarization/multilateralism, a 
theme widely addressed by both European and Chinese scholars.19 At the same time this 
analytical standpoint has allowed us to further problematize the development of the 
Partnership on “structural” issues such as human rights and the potential cooperation in 
the political and security sectors, as the writings of Zhang Chi and Ye Zicheng, 
Godement, Gompert, Stumbaum have tended to underline.20 
In this evolving context the increasing asymmetries, reflected also by the 
European and Chinese literature on the EU-China Strategic Partnership, were magnified 
by the effects of the 2008 financial impact and its lasting implications in particular in 
Europe.  
 
1.3.2 The 2008 crisis: a pivotal inflection point also for the analytical perspectives on 
the EU-China Partnership  
 
The 2008-09 global financial crisis had a very significant impact on the analytical 
debate on the development of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and 
 
limits of a Soft Relationship”, in Richard Balme and Brian Bridges, (eds.), Europe-Asia relations: building 
multilateralism, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Rosa Balfour, “EU Strategic Partnerships: Are 
they worth the name?”, Commentary, the EPC, 15 September 2010; 
18 Nicola Casarini, Remaking Global Order: the evolution of Europe-China relations and its 
implications for East Asia and the United States (Oxford: OUP, 2003); Charles Grant and Katinka Barysch, 
Can Europe and China Shape a New World Order? (London: Centre for European Reform, 2008). 
Christopher Griffin and Raffaello Pantucci, “A Treacherous Triangle? China and the Transatlantic 
Alliance”, SAIS Review, vol. 27, n°1, Winter-Spring 2007; William Callahan, “Future imperfect: the EU’S 
encounter with China (and the United States)”, in Zhao Quansheng and Liu Guoli (eds.), Managing the 
China Challenge (London: Routledge, 2009). 
19 Xu Xin, “A Dialectic of Multipolarity and Multilateralism: China’s Regional Security Practice in 
the Age of Globalization”, in David Kelly, Rajan Ramkishen and Goh Gillian (eds.), Managing 
Globalization: Lessons from China and India (Singapore: World Scientific, 2006); Wu Guogang and Helen 
Landsdowne, China turns to Multilateralism (London: Routledge, 2007); Alvaro de Vasconcelos, 
“Multilateralising Multipolarity”, in Giovanni Grevi e Alvaro de Vasconcelos (eds.), Partnerships for 
Effective Multilateralism: EU Relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia (Paris: Institute for Security 
Studies, 2008); Karen Smith, “EU Foreign Policy and Asia” in Richard Balme and Brian Bridges (eds.), 
Europe-Asia relations: building multilateralism, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Gustaf Geeraerts, 
“China the EU and the New Multipolarity”, European Review 19, n° 1, 2011, 57-67. 
 20 David Gompert, François Godement, China on the move (Washington DC: RAND 2005); May 
Britt U. Stumbaum, “Opportunities and Limits of the EU-China Security Cooperation”, International 
Spectator 42, n° 3, September 2007, 351-70; Zhang Chi and Ye Zicheng, “Difference on Human Rights 




yielded substantial scholarship in this respect. By acknowledging that the crisis 
represented a “pivotal turning point”, the thesis focuses on the two distinct strands of 
analysis that it originated in the EU and China which are still relevant today.  
On the Chinese side the analytical debate was driven by the changing perceptions 
and assessments of the EU after the crisis and its role of strategic partner vis-à-vis China, 
as the Institute of European Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
underlined.21 In the evolution of the Chinese debate and scholarship - which was 
conducive to diversified positions - a not secondary factor was the fact that, after the 
Eurozone crisis, funding for research on the EU-China relationship had dwindled, in 
contrast to the generous funds previously made available by the European Commission, 
as Vincent Chang, Frank Picke and Li Wang pointed out.22 For the same reason, in 
parallel to the new approach of a more assertive China both in ideational and analytical 
terms, in the 2009-2015 period we witness the growing role of those Chinese policy think 
tanks and research centers active in the field of international relations in addressing the 
EU-China Partnership. In particular, the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ analysts 
such as Zhou Hong focused on the future of the EU through the lens of its institutional 
dynamics, its role as a “major pole”, its capacity of reform and structural change. Within 
the debate on the EU-China Strategic Partnership the influence of these groups of “proxy 
advisers” was instrumental in redefining some analytical perspectives.23 
Authors such as Feng Zhongping refocused in this new context on the Union-
member states interaction by underlining the persistent role of the latter, an issue which, 
as the thesis underlines in chapter 7, has been of constant relevance in reshaping the 
Chinese approach to the EU-China Partnership. 
Even though a limited number of scholars and analysts - namely the EU specialists 
and the economists - tended to downplay the structural problems of the EU and 
maintained a cautious optimism on the prospects for EU-China relations, the post-crisis 
debate was increasingly characterized by critical views on the future of Europe. Chinese 
 
21 Institute of European Studies, A Survey and Preliminary Analysis of the Chinese Perception of the 
EU and China-EU Relations, Working Paper Series on European Studies, vol. 2, n° 1,  Institute of European 
Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 2008. 
 22Vincent K.L. Chang and Franck N. Picke, “Europe’s engagement with China: shifting Chinese 
views on the EU and the EU-China relationship”, Asia Europe Journal, 16, 2018, 317-331; Li Wang, “From 
Client Status to Strategic Partnership: China’s Changing Perceptions of Europe” in Roland Vogt (ed.), 
Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012), 82-
93. 
 23 Zhu Liqun, “Chinese Perceptions of the EU and the China-Europe relationship in Shambaugh, 
Sandschneider, Zhou Hong, op.cit; Zhou Hong, “Chinese Public views towards the EU mid-2008”, Chinese 
Journal of European Studies, nº 5, 2009. 
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financial analysts and the more ideological political scientists were among who argued 
that there had been “a lot of wishful thinking about Europe” which in reality was weak 
and divided. These authors underlined the structural problems which affected the EU and 
which could have implications for its Partnership with China: economic and political 
divisions, the EU’s lack of institutional effectiveness and flexibility in reforms and a 
growing legitimacy gap.24 The view of the EU as a “compromised actor”, while the PCR 
was a “winner of globalization”, introduced a lasting theme, as the thesis argues, in the 
debate on the EU-China strategic relations by putting under scrutiny not only the idea that 
the Union was an emerging super-power but also its traditional ambitions of being a 
normative power. The Chinese critique of the EU’s “post-sovereign” normative mission 
- as underlined by Chen Zhimin, Gerrits and Wang - is a key analytical perspective which 
had and has significant implications, as the thesis argues with regard to the revived debate 
on “constructive engagement”.25 In this framework the dialectic between interests and 
values emerged as a significant theme, as Paul Irwin Crookes suggested.26 
The idea of Europe’s eroded normative power and of its fading soft power was 
also a significant reference for the increasingly critical Chinese approach to the crucial 
issue, within the Partnership, of human rights which were regarded by authors such as 
Shen Wenwen as an example of Eurocentrism, of double standards and of lack of 
pragmatism.27 In this period the Chinese analytical contributions reflect an increasing 
divergence with the EU on human rights particularly in light of the two partners’ different 
identities, as authors such as Chen Dingding argued. 28 
In this context of growing critical Chinese voices vis-à-vis the EU, more positive 
considerations, in addition to the recognition of the outstanding level of trade cooperation, 
were centered on Europe as a “social power” able to provide various models – as Song 
Xinning has argued – and on the multidimensional nature of its soft power that Qin 
 
 24 Zhu Liqun, “China’s Foreign Policy Debates”, Chaillot Paper, n°121, Paris: EU Institute for 
Security Studies, (September 2010). 
25 Chen Zhimin, “Europe as a Global Player: A view from China”, Perspectives, vol. 20, nº 2 (2012); 
Andre’ Gerrits (ed.), Normative Power in a Changing World: A Discussion (The Hague: Clingendael, 
2009), 1-8; Wang Yiwei, “The identity dilemmas of EU normative power: observations from Chinese 
traditional culture”, in Gerrits (ed.), Normative Power in a Changing World: A Discussion. 
26 Paul Irwin Crookes, “Resetting EU-China Relations from a values-based to an Interests-based 
Engagement”, International Politics, 50/5 (2013), 639-663. 
27 Shen Wenwen, “EU-China Relations on Human Rights in Competing Paradigms: Continuity and 
Change”, in Thomas Christiansen,  Emil Kirchner, Philomena Murray (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of 
EU-China Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2013). 
28 Chen Dingding, “China’s Participation in the International Human Rights Regime: A State 
Identity Perspective”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, n°3, 2009, 399-419. 
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Yaqing has regarded as conductive to a culture of peace, cooperation and community. All 
these elements, according to these authors, militated in favor of a “win-win policy 
approach” which constituted a positive factor also in the framework of the EU-China 
strategic relations.29 The theoretical approach of thinkers of the Chinese School of IR 
such as Qin Yaqing and their focus on the civilizational elements driving China’s identity 
and international behaviour has been taken into account in this research’s epistemological 
approach, as we will see in chapter 3. 
Against this multifaceted background, the undertones of the analytical debate and 
of the scholarship on the EU-China Partnership can be described – as Pan Chengxin has 
written – as a “transition from honeymoon to marriage”: what is more important to note, 
however, is that in this phase a fundamental reflection emerged on the meaning and 
impact for the EU-China strategic interaction of the EU’s policy of “constructive 
engagement”. In this respect Pan Chengxin’s critical analysis remains particularly 
meaningful within the debate on the EU-China Strategic Partnership, as the thesis 
argues.30 Pan Chengxin’s fundamental argument on the structural divergence within the 
Partnership is related to the EU’s policy of “constructive engagement” as a normative 
project which aims, explicitly or implicitly, at the transformation of China more or less 
in the image of the European self. Through different discursive contexts, including the 
Partnership, Normative Power Europe has tried to transform indirectly the “Chinese 
other” on the basis of Europe’s own self-image. From this perspective Pan Chengxin’s 
critique underlined that the “false modesty” of “constructive engagement” has been based 
on the false premise of the overly ambitious goal of transforming China. According to 
Pan, the EU’s double standards and the policy inconsistency of Normative Power Europe 
has led the Partnership to what Christopher Hill has defined, in a different context, as an 
“expectations-capability gap” in this “battle over norms”.31 We can see that in 2012 there 
 
29 Qin Yaging, “Struggle for Identity: A Political Psychology of China’s Rise”, in Brantly Womack 
(ed.), China’s Rise in historical Perspective, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2010), 249-270; Song 
Xinning, “European ´Models` and their implications to China: Internal and External Perspectives” Review 
of International Studies 36, 2010, 755-75; Song Xinning, “The European Union as an International Political 
and Security Actor” in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon, European Commission 2011, 237-
241. 
30 Pan Chengxin, “Problematizing constructive Engagement in EU China Policy” in Roland Vogt, 
(ed.), Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals? (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2012). 
31 Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations gap, or Conceptualizing Europe’s International 
Role”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Volume 31, n° 3, (September 1993).  




was already present in the Chinese literature a key reflection on a fundamental element 
of the EU-China relationship which challenged one of the very tenets of the Partnership. 
This is an analytical perspective that the thesis considers with great interest because this 
substantial critique of “constructive engagement” as a manifestation of the EU normative 
project also underlines how the analytical approach of some Chinese scholars - taking 
advantage of post-positivist interpretive perspectives - had began to deconstruct this EU 
staple policy well before the recent paradigm shift in the European policy-making vis-à-
vis China.  
These analytical perspectives - also in terms of their policy-making implications - 
have been taken into account here because they underline - in addition to the focus of the 
literature on trade and economic competition, power transition theories, institutional 
considerations - the importance of ideology and civilizational differences between 
Brussels and Beijing. In particular, the thesis argues, the issue of the identity of the two 
strategic partners is a very relevant element to be considered in the analysis of the 
Partnership, which has been in fact increasingly researched. In this respect Reuben Wong 
has developed a useful reflection on the role of identities by referring to the concept 
elaborated by Qin Yaqing of a “relational identity” which makes sense only when an actor 
interacts with another and forms an image of the “self” and of the “other”32. 
The consideration of these elements is clearly relevant for an evolving Partnership 
which has increasingly addressed, as Roland Vogt has noted, “post-material issues” - such 
as environmental protection, climate change, human rights, democratization and good 
governance - which should constitute a significant part of the “structural” strategic 
interaction of the two partners, in line with its definition also elaborated in this thesis. 
The thesis’s argument on the relevance of the ideational components of the EU-
China Partnership and its practical implications has benefitted from the analysis of those 
authors who have focused on the effects of the “cognitive dissonance” between Europe 
and China: in this respect Pan Zhongqi has offered a particularly productive contribution 
with his study of the “conceptual gaps” affecting the development of the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership,33 a study that the thesis has used as an interpretive 
instrument to assess the European debate on a “resetting of the EU-China Partnership”, 
 
 32 Reuben Wong, “The issue of identity in the Eu-China relationship” in Politique Européene, n° 
39, (2013), 158-186.  
33 Pan Zhongqi, “Managing the Conceptual gap on sovereignty in China-EU Relations”, Asia Europe 
Journal 8, n°2, 2010, 227-43; Pan Zhongqi (ed.), Conceptual gaps in China-EU Relations. Global 
Governance, Human Rights and Strategic Partnerships (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012). 
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which has focused on both the material and ideational factors of increasing divergence 
between Brussels and Beijing. In this respect Jonathan Holslag contributed in an 
important way to the clarification of the factors defining the “strategic dissonance” which 
had made the EU-China strategic relations an “elusive axis”.34 
For these reasons the perspective of a “normal relationship” - that Chen and 
Armstrong had investigated - was increasingly problematized by the Sino-European 
dynamics influenced by the lasting effects of the 2008-2009 crisis in Europe, as Fox and 
Godement pointed out in their “power audit of EU-China Relations” and, later on, 
Casarini, Godement, Grevi, Renard, Lentz and Lee in their analyses of the EU strategic 
partnerships and the global economic downturn.35 The 2012-2013 literature, beyond the 
strong focus on economic issues, also addressed the still underdeveloped relations 
between EU and China in the security sector, as Renner, Van der Putten and Chu Shulong 
wrote36 
At the same time, my research tends to deconstruct those Western analytical 
perspectives in the phase following the crisis. This continued to focus on the relations of 
the “strategic triangle” on the basis, as Bates Gill and Andrew Small did, of positive views 
on an “untapped trilateralism” in the common economic and security interests of the 
European Union, the United States and China. Expectations for a further positive 
development of EU-China economic relations were indeed reiterated by both Western 
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and Chinese analysts such as Alicia García-Guerrero, K.C. Kwok, Lin Xianglong, Tim 
Summers and Zhang Yanshang, even though trilateralism was an issue which, from a 
Chinese and US point of view, was also addressed in the context of doubts about a future 
European role as an independent pole in the international system (as, in different ways 
Ye Jiang, Gill and Murphy have argued).37 
Despite a certain analytical inertia related to the potential and salience of the EU-
China economic cooperation, a growing consensus on the internal and external limits of 
the Partnership is evident both in the contributions of the academic literature and of the 
think tanks of this period, with a revised approach to the strategic objectives of both 
Brussels and Beijing, as authors such as Renard, Grant and Zhang Feng underlined also 
in the light of the two partners’ evolving strategic interests and ideas.38  
The reflection on the PRC’s strategic aims developed by a prominent IR theorist 
such as Yang Xuetong and the revived neo-realist considerations on the “Thucydides 
trap” between China and the West proposed by authors such as John Mearsheimer and 
Stephen Walt are two meaningful examples of theoretical positions which have 
underlined the increasingly complex relationship with Beijing, in contrast to the more 
reassuring view of Henry Kissinger.39 In this sense, it is meaningful that two of the most 
prolific and eminent scholars of the Europe-China relations - Jing Mei and David 
Shambaugh - who in the past had held positive views on the potential of the Partnership, 
in this period increasingly focused on the many problems of a strategic relationship which 
seemed “mismatched” and under pressure because of the strategic implications of a global 
China40.  
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In the second half of the 2010s the academic literature and the analytical debate 
on the EU-China strategic relationship has reflected a phase increasingly characterized 
by a multifaceted reflection on a paradigm shift affecting the development of the 
Partnership. 
This reconsideration, which has been focused on the conceptual and operational 
aspects of the relationship, has been influenced, on the one hand, by the new leadership 
of Xi Jinping and its theoretical and ideological approach, itself centered on approaches 
such as the “new type of great power relationships” and the "rejuvenation" of the Chinese 
party-state which were the sources of the PRC international “offensive” and assertiveness, 
described by Le Corre, Sepulchre, Wissenbach and Chang Liao.41 On the other hand, the 
growing divergence between the two partners on key issues has been conducive, in 
particular on the European front, to a gradual paradigm shift which has been called  a 
“turn to realism” in the strategic interconnection with China.  
In 2016 Richard Maher in his analysis devoted to the “elusive partnership”  
provided a convincing survey of the elements of structure which have made the strategic 
interests, respective world-views and value-systems a crucial factor of divergence within 
the Partnership.42 While Maher underlines the clashing views between Brussels and 
Beijing on the main security issues, Salvatore Finamore, by acknowledging the normative 
differences in the Chinese and European discourses on Global Security, has argued in 
favor of realistic engagement based on the awareness of the acute sensitivities of a global 
China in the field of security, in particular vis-à-vis the United States. The growing 
importance of the EU role as a global actor in a “(un)holy trinity encompassing economy, 
diplomacy and security” has been underscored by Pomorska and Vanhoonacker, while 
Chistiansen, Wang Jiwei and Song Weiqing have set it in an interaction with China which 
impinges on the “politics of global governance”.43 
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The focus of this thesis on the elusive “structural strategic dimension” of the 
Partnership does not neglect the literature which convincingly has addressed the 
shortcomings of its “relational” strategic dimension. The understandable, persistent 
attention to the US as a primary factor of influence on EU-China relations - “the elephant 
in the room” - is pointed out in the comprehensive analysis of the Sino-European 
economic relations developed by Farnell and Irwin Crookes. This “complex 
triangulation” in the evolution of the Partnership is an important theme recognized also 
by Godemont and Vasselier in their 2017 “new power audit of EU-China relations” which 
– compared to the 2009 version – argues for a more realistic European approach in order 
to try to make more concrete the strategic aspirations of the two partners in the context of 
a “fragile world order”, as Chen Zhimin has written.44 
The thesis’ analytical interest in connecting Sino-European dynamics to an 
evolving international context has benefitted by Scott A.W. Brown’s interesting scholarly 
contribution which sets the Partnership in the broader perspective of the EU and US 
responses to the rise of China. The role of perceptions in this context has been reinforced 
by the fact that this is a theme addressed in depth by the authors who have studied the 
increasing role of ideational elements in the evolution of the Partnership. In this 
framework Chang and Picke have analyzed how the “dramatic recent shifts” in Chinese 
policy perspectives on EU-China relations confirm the need to rethink the basic 
assumptions underlying the Strategic Partnership, including “constructive engagement”. 
These diverging dynamics affecting the ideational strategic dimension of the 
Partnership are at play - the thesis argues -  in particular with regard to the contrasting 
political values expressed by the PRC and the EU, as Nicholas Rühlig , van der Putten, 
Seamen, Otero-Iglesias and Ekman have argued in a comprehensive study of this 
problematique. In this respect the thesis has taken into consideration the equally important 
contributions of Anna Michalski and Pan Zhongqi on the “role dynamics” in the Strategic 
Partnership, of Zeng Jinghen on the role of Europe in Chinese  narratives of the “One Belt 
One Road” and of the “new type of great power relations”, of Swaine, Keukeleire, 
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Debreux and Wang Zheng on the EU and Chinese views in terms of  foreign policy and 
security environment.45 
 
1.3.3 In search of a new paradigm: 2016-2020 
In this phase, the analytical debate has been influenced, on the Chinese side, by 
an in-depth reassessment of the strategic priorities on the basis of Xi Jinping’s “new era” 
objectives46; on the European side, by a paradigm shift which has found an important 
confirmation in the key 2019 EU policy document which, in delineating the Union’s 
strategy outlook on China, has defined the PRC for the first time as a “systemic rival”. 
This new approach has been investigated so far mainly by think tankers who have 
regarded it as significantly novel putting under scrutiny the concept of Strategic 
Partnership from a perspective which could end the European “Chinese dream”, as Mark 
Leonard, François Godement, Andrew Small, Alex Berkofsky and Fraser Cameron have 
written.47 At the same time the questioning of a new Chinese “grand strategy” and its 
origins - as Angela Stanzel, Agata Kratz, Justyna Szczudlik, Dragan Pavlicevic and 
Howard French have done48 - has addressed the historical and cultural background of this 
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approach and the recent key initiatives of China’s power projection, such as the 16+1 and 
the Belt and Road Initiative. Positive narratives on the new Chinese strategic objectives 
have been disseminated by think tankers and academics close to the party-state, such as, 
inter alios, Jiang Shixue Chu Yin and Wang Wenwen.49 On the active role of the Chinese 
think tanks the contributions of Silvia Menegazzi have been helpful.50 
The dynamics underway within the Strategic Partnership have been amplified by 
the effects of the pandemic crisis and the analytical debate in 2019 has reflected an 
increasing polarization of the interpretative views: in contrast to “proxy analysts” there 
have been some critical Chinese voices which have problematized the present trends, as 
underlined in the writings of Pei Minxin, Bao Huaying and Wu Xianging.51 Since 2019 
the debate on the Partnership has developed to include a set of key issues addressed in 
light of the stronger strategic competition which seems to characterize the Western 
approach to China, as suggested by Kurt Campbell and Jake Sullivan, Ian Bremmer, 
Frank Kempe, Silvia Menegazzi, Michelguglielmo Torri, Nicola Mocci and Filippo 
Boni.52 
In this evolving context the implications for the EU-China Strategic Partnership 
have been analyzed along the lines of three main perspectives: the EU’s reconsideration 
of the policy of “constructive engagement” and the challenge of implementing a “turn to 
realism” in the interaction with Beijing on a basis of a new consensus as Fischer, Garton 
Ash, Oertel have argued;53 the implications of China’s “new course”for the EU and its 
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member states on which Casarini and Stanzel have written; and the role of the EU-China 
Partnership in a phase of evolution and competition within the international system 
(Ikenberry, Walt, Nye, Breslin and Zeng, Christiansen,  Bremmer, Burns Campbell and 
Sullivan).54 We can say that the recent events have opened a renewed multifaceted 
analytical and academic debate on the structural implications of a “risen China” for the 
evolution of the Global Order. In this context the focus on the strategic relationship 
between Brussels and Beijing - also in the light of the paradigm shifts underway - are 
seen as an important component of a broader process of realignment of  contemporary 
international relations.  
This evolving debate seems to confirm some fundamental arguments of my 
research: the need to reconsider some key tenets of the Partnership which have not been 
conducive to the development of a truly structural strategic dimension between Brussels 
and Beijing. At the heart of the present increasing divergence, the thesis argues, there is 
an unresolved underlying “ideational dissonance” between the two strategic partners 
which manifests itself through clashing “normative positions” on several issues which are 
essential for their cooperation within the Partnership. The diverging interests-values 
continuums of the EU and PRC have been rightly identified as the main factor which 
prevents the development of the structural strategic dimension of the Partnership because 
it impinges on those issues of global cooperation which should be key components of the 
relationship between Brussels and Beijing. The maturity and depth of the analytical 
debate on the Partnership can offer all the interpretive instruments to link theory to praxis 
and thus influence the necessary policy-planning and policy-making which is being 
required by the paradigm-shift affecting the European and Chinese approach to the 
Partnership. This process will be - as the thesis argues in line with the evolution of the 
literature and the analytical debate - a trilateral dynamic involving the United States which 
is the major strategic counterpart for both the EU and China particularly in a phase of 
changing equilibria within the international system. 
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1.4 Research Methodology 
 
The research methodology of the thesis is entirely qualitative and is aimed at 
supporting the investigation and better understanding of the ideational and material 
dimension of the subject of research in its development through processes of change, 
relational dynamics and institutional interaction. 
To this end, the methodology chosen has been used to research the EU-China 
strategic interaction  and better analyse its background, its evolving context, its 
multidimensionality and complexity.  
On this basis the analytical approach has tried to develop its  objectives in a way 
which is necessarily context-sensitive and coherent with the epistemological assumptions 
of the thesis. The post-positivist theoretical perspective of the research – reinforced by a 
hermeneutical dimension – has taken advantage of the methodological tools offered by 
discourse analysis to examine how the language contained in the primary sources (official 
statements, documents, leader’s declarations) has “generated meaning” at the level of 
policy-making and in the analytical debate. 
From a methodological point of view, the analysis of the primary and secondary 
sources has been “tested” through a limited set of interviews with decision-makers, 
policy-planners and policy-makers who have been involved in the development of the 
Partnership and of the context influencing it.  
In a field already widely researched the stratification of meaning is often a 
challenge for the analyst who needs to explore it especially in a phase of paradigm shifts: 
in this respect the methodological approach of the thesis has been functional for 
addressing in a critical way issues which have been influenced by such a highly 
institutionalized framework as that of the EU-China Strategic Partnership. 
In this sense, the methodology of the thesis has contributed to drawing 
interpretative elements from the “archaeology of knowledge” related to the strategic 
relations between Europe and China. This methodological approach has hopefully 
produced useful synergies with the epistemological/hermeneutical premises of the 
research aimed at connecting the theoretical dimension of the issues investigated with 
their practical implications, the ideational with the material constitutive elements defining 





The EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the context of the EU-US-
China “strategic triangle”: a context of growing strategic competition.  
 
International Relations Theory is always influenced, as Robert W. Cox argued55, 
by the specific perspective in time and space, in particular by the political and social 
contexts from which it derives. For this reason it is important to consider the contexts in 
which the analytical perspectives and implications of the current research have been 
defined. The aim of this chapter is therefore to identify the “strategic space” in which the 
EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is “located”. It is a space specifically 
represented, we will argue, by the broader context of an evolving international system 
characterized by growing trends of strategic competition. The consideration of context is 
important because it is a factor making for structural influence on the development of the 
EU-China relationship through, in particular, the key strategic interaction that both 
Brussels and Beijing have with Washington. Even though the strategic relations between 
Europe and China cannot be defined as, prior to 1992, “secondary relationship”, it is still 
true that the future of the EU-China partnership is going to be affected – in parallel to its 
internal dynamics - by the evolution of the relationship of the two partners with the United 
States.  
In this perspective the further development of the Strategic Partnership cannot 
take place, in an international system whose evolution is driven by trends of complex 
global competition, on a sort of “neutral field” mainly centred on the bilateral institutional 
architecture so far developed. The dynamics between Brussels, Beijing and Washington 
represent what Shambaugh defined a “strategic triangle” to which the Partnership is 
closely interconnected.  
While acknowledging the structural importance and complexity of this trilateral 
interaction, it is useful, at the same time, to deconstruct this notion. Even though the 
“strategic triangle” represents, as a matter of fact, the sum of the three most important 
strategic bilateral relations in terms of comprehensive power and influence, it cannot be 
regarded as the manifestation of a “trilateralism” at work in the international system. We 
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could say in this sense that the image of the “strategic triangle” describes the international 
system more from an ontological than from a teleological viewpoint: it is based on the 
acknowledgement that these actors represent the most important components of the 
international system as it is but it does not indicate a common “telos”, a strategic direction 
shared by all the three major powers. Within a process of gradual redistribution of the 
international hierarchy of power, this “trilateral” set of relationships is key for re-defining 
the international order also vis-à-vis other dynamics and actors which can contribute to 
this process. This preliminary analysis will set in a needed updated context the analytical 
perspectives that we are going to elaborate in the next chapters. 
 
2.1 The EU-US-China triangle: evolving dynamics 
 
The importance of the set of relations which are centred on the three main actors 
of the international system at the end of the second decade of the 21st century derives 
from the comprehensive power and influence which, in different ways, emanates from 
these two national global powers and from the “post-national” EU. The “strategic 
triangle” image acknowledges not only the prominence of these powers – based on the 
sum of their populations, economies, overall military and civilian capabilities and 
resources - but also the fact that each of them plays a major role with regard to the world’s 
main global issues. However, the concept needs, as we have argued, to be deconstructed 
because it does not reflect either a potential convergence in terms of strategic vision and 
approaches between the EU, the US and China or their willingness to act on the basis of 
some common economic and security interests  in the framework of a trilateral format. 
For this reason, in the present phase of evolution of the international system, the 
“untapped trilateralism”56 which was, at the beginning of this decade, considered as a 
possible way forward for collective action of the three global powers now seems a very 
unrealistic perspective.  
If it is true that, on the one hand, “the most important - and obvious - dynamic at 
work” in the transformation of the international system over the last two decades has been 
“the rapid shift of the balance of power between the West and China”,57 it is also true, on 
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the other, that recent international trends have seen a proactive and increasingly more 
assertive role on the part of the United States, with both the Obama and Trump 
administrations aiming, through different approaches, at confirming America’s influence 
and leadership worldwide. 
At the same time, we have witnessed a resilience on the part of the EU in the face 
of the long economic recession and the Brexit crisis, coupled with its ability of re-
launching the process of integration through significant initiatives in the sector of 
European defence. Moreover, the EU’s response to the key challenge of the Covid-19 
crisis has shown the ability of the European institutions and of its main member states to 
broker a difficult consensus in order to define an ambitious plan to support the continent’s 
economies in the wake of the disruptive impact of the pandemic. 
In this context in Washington and Brussels one of the main - if not the main - 
strategic concerns continues to be focused on whether China wants to ultimately establish 
a post-Western international order offering an alternative to existing models and norms,58 
as Xi Jinping’s assertive “new era” ideology and theoretical elaboration seem to indicate. 
A vision of international relations “with Chinese characteristics” has indeed been part of 
the strategic reflection of the Chinese leadership in the last two decades. A confident and 
assertive view of the role of China aimed at being “a major driver of the current 
transformation of the international system”59 has been conceptualized through subsequent 
formulas which have tried to present the rise of China as conducive to “peaceful 
development” and “harmonious society”, until Xi Jingping’s more assertive vision - 
enunciated at the 19th congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - of a new era 
which will bring about not only “national rejuvenation” but the creation of a “new type 
of great power relations.”60 In this sense Xi Jinping’s approach has, to some extent, 
overcome the traditional concern of the Chinese authorities to minimize the perceived 
threats arising from  China’s ascent, that Deng Xiaoping had expressed in the famous 
admonition “avoid brightness, cherish obscurity” (taoguang yanghui). Xi’s new guiding 
ideology signals “an end to the reform era as we knew it, proclaiming the advancement 
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of a ‘strong’ China that would strive to shape the global order in accordance with the 
national interest and its vision”.61  
This process of change has been driven at the domestic level – as Silvia Menegazzi 
has written – by Xi Jinping’s striking consolidation of power which has been based on a 
further fortified “political narrative envisioning Xi Jinping as the one and only leader able 
to guide China toward a New Era”.62 The significance of the programmes of ideological 
indoctrination launched under  Xi Jinping’s leadership  have been underscored by Pei 
Minxin who has pointed out that the “CCP under Xi Jinping’s leadership has launched 
the most sustained and comprehensive program of ideological indoctrination in the post-
Mao era”.63 
The relevance of the “ideological” aspects in the present phase of the US-China 
relations is a significant factor underlined by several analysts who have argued that the  
“ideological rift” between Washington and Beijing indicated that a confrontation which 
began as a trade war has been “morphing into a battle of values”.64 The focus on the 
ideational elements of this interaction is an important analytical perspective, as we will 
extensively argue in the next chapter.   
The situation within the strategic triangle has revived the debate, at the political, 
theoretical and operational level, on the rise of China in a scenario characterized by 
unprecedented elements of strategic competition. From a historical point of view, this 
debate has been characterized in the United States and Europe by a certain asymmetry in 
the response to the challenge posed by a rising global China.65 In this context the 
Tiananmen watershed influenced the theoretical and public debate in the United States 
and in Europe66, even though the Chinese leadership, after the crisis, “adroitly kept on 
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adopting policies which could be read as a renewed commitment to a broader reformist 
agenda”: this contributed to the strengthening of the paradigm of China as an economic 
opportunity which has significantly influenced decades of American and European 
foreign policy towards a rising China.  
This strand of strategic thinking intrinsically opposed to the neo-realist security 
dilemma scenario was supported by various groups and lobbies, “from politicians to the 
business councils and the academy” which proposed variations of the same basic 
argument: more economic cooperation and integration with China would push Beijing to 
“increasingly conform to the norms of Western liberal behavior, both abroad and at 
home.”67 In this period the China policies of the US and the EU - respectively of 
“comprehensive engagement” and “constructive engagement” - were aligned on the basis 
of the common assumption that “the transformative magic of economic engagement” 
would “increase the spirit of liberty over time...just as inevitably as the Berlin Wall fell” 
(President Clinton) and economic liberalization would create “habits of liberty, and habits 
of liberty create expectations of democracy” (President G.W. Bush).68 On the other side, 
“the Chinese leadership constantly expressed an overarching sensitivity to the needs of 
an international projection” which had to take into account, even in the case of disputes, 
China’s essential trade relations with its most important economic partners - the U.S., 
Japan and Europe”.69  
Against this historical background, an increasing level of friction, in particular with 
the United States, has induced the RPC to balance its assertive stance by resorting to its 
more traditional policy of “threat reduction” vis-à-vis the growing negative perceptions 
and reactions of its Western but also Asian counterparts. If it is true, as it has been rightly 
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pointed out,70 that “since the start of the Trump administration’s policy of China 
containment, Beijing determinedly moved to counter Washington’s increasingly 
confrontational posture, both at the rhetoric and factual level, in Asia and world-wide”, it 
is also true that representatives of the PRC’s establishment, such as the Ambassador to 
Washington Cui Tiankai, have nuanced this assertive stance with the call for a reset of 
the US-China bilateral relations.71  
The 2019 White Paper on “China’s National Defense in the New Era” is another 
significant example of Beijing’s attempt to highlight its outlook on the most pressing 
international and domestic matters in a rather reassuring way. With regard to its own 
global ambitions, the document states, once more, that “China will never follow the 
beaten track of big powers in seeking hegemony” and that it “will never threaten any other 
country or seek any sphere of influence”.72 In the framework of an intense activity aimed 
at fostering dialogue and occasions of contact with a large number of interlocutors 
President Xi Jinping has been engaged before the 2020 pandemic in a “tireless summit 
diplomacy”.73 As Barbara Onnis has written,74 this strong diplomatic activism by the 
Chinese paramount leader has aimed at mending “fraught relations with some 
neighbours”, reassuring “some partners about Chinese intentions and confirming 
Beijing’s vocation to the cause of peace and global governance.”  
On the other hand, “China has had to face serious challenges to its leadership and 
its international reputation that risked seriously undermining Xi Jinping’s long-term 
plans. Above all, the protracted trade war and growing antagonism with the US [is] 
certainly the greatest challenge and fraught with consequences”.75 The complexity of the 
post-Coronavirus scenarios for China – in particular with regard to its relations with the 
United States and the EU – and the ambivalence of its response, a mix of assertiveness 
and attempted soft power projection, are underlined by initiatives such as the so called 
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“wolf warriors diplomacy”,76 an interesting example of the “ideological rift” which 
characterizes these dynamics:   
[T]he world and Chinese diplomats have changed. The days when China can 
be put in a submissive position are long gone. China's rising status in the 
world, requires it to safeguard its national interests in an unequivocal way.77  
 
As it has been noted, this aggressive information strategy “carries risks for Beijing, 
and in some quarters it seems to be backfiring”. Lashing out at international counterparts 
and spreading disinformation, and amplifying conspiracy theories not only risks 
undermining any positive image China has managed to develop but also sends 
contradictory signals about a global power which simultaneously portrays “itself as a 
responsible global provider of public goods while engaging in irresponsible behavior 
online”.78 In this sense “over the long run, being obnoxious has costs”79 and these 
repercussions can have an impact not only on the growing negative perceptions of a global 
China’s international behavior  but also on the image of Xi Jinping’s leadership, as Pei 
Minxin has noted.80 
In an evolving context, the Chinese leadership has become increasingly aware that 
the present distribution of power within the international system,  notwithstanding 
China’s rapid rise, cannot be challenged realistically through a “counter-hegemonic 
coalition” simply defined along anti-Western lines because the interaction among 
emerging/revisionist powers is complex and certainly not uni-directional.81  
The strategic relationship with Russia has been constantly strengthened on the 
basis of utilitarian synergies but its intrinsic imbalance makes Moscow sensitive to the 
potential of Chinese economic expansion and influence in its own far-East and in Central 
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Asia: “the advanteges for Russia of such an unequal partnership are not so obvious”. If 
Putin gets a comrade-in-arms for his denunciation of Western liberalism, he does it “at 
the expense of watching Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative undercutting Russian power 
in central Asia”.82 If China’s expanding influence in Eurasia is likely to feed these latent 
tensions with Russia, Beijing, in turn, “harbours a historically rooted distrust of its 
northerly neighbour Russia which will not simply disappear by mutual cheering of their 
‘best ever’ bilateral relationship”.83 Beijing and Moscow tend to converge “against 
something” but it is much more difficult for them to define a truly shared revisionist 
agenda which can encompass critical key issues such as, for instance the sector of nuclear 
proliferation.84  Last but not least, we cannot underestimate the ideational elements and 
the complex historical background which have shaped Sino-Russian relations from the 
imperial age until the interaction between the Soviet Union and the PRC. From this 
perspective the present “marriage of convenience” between Moscow and Beijing needs 
to be assessed in a broader context that takes into account that the national identity of 
Russia continues to be shaped, to a significant extent, by the traditionally complex process 
of attraction/opposition vis-à-vis the West, as has been the case since Peter the Great. In 
this context, for Moscow to reopen the “European door” is essential to strengthen its 
strategic role in a phase that sees, as Dimitri Trenin has written85, both Europe and Russia 
confronted to a gradual process of Sino-American bipolarization of the international 
system.  
Both China and Russia, as the major representatives of an anti-Western front, have 
been trying to change “from a foreign-policy perspective […] their environment in 
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accordance with aims and objectives they have set for themselves. From a structural 
perspective [they have been attempting] to adapt to their environment, making the best of 
the cards the system has dealt them”.86 In this sense China seems to be constrained - 
notwithstanding its impressive rise as a global power - by the “structural cards” the system 
continues to deal it, as the increasingly complex relations with the two other protagonists 
of the “strategic triangle” tend to underscore.  
Against this background, we can continue to regard China’s approach to the 
international order as an “amalgam of conformity and revisionism with persistent 
uncertainties”,87 as it has been in the last 20 years. The element of novelty has certainly 
been Xi Jinping’s ambitious vision for a Chinese “new era” because it has injected - in 
the interaction with the US in particular but also with the EU - not only a potential of 
competition on key geopolitical and economic issues but also tends to widen the gaps, in 
terms of interests-values continuum, between the three sides of the “strategic triangle”. 
At the same time, the Chinese strategic approach has fostered, in the last two years, a 
converging element in Washington’s and Brussels’ policy-making, that is a strong “turn 
to realism” which has been reinforced by the dynamics originated by the pandemic crisis. 
Against this background Xi Jingping’s China is increasingly aware that these complex 
dynamics with the other two counterparts of the “strategic triangle” are not just a 
transitional factor related to contingent circumstances.  
 From this perspective, the growing determination and confidence of the Chinese 
leadership in the PRC’s ability of assuming a “leading global role and serve as an example 
not just for developing countries but for the entire world” will have to meet the challenge 
of the structural constraints exemplified by the dynamics within the strategic triangle. For 
this reason, despite the “buoyed expectations of the Xi era”, China could be  still “lacking 
the means to fully realize its ambitious goals, something which is particularly true in 
defence and diplomacy”.88 As Sautin underlines, “for the past two decades, the 
overarching theme of reporting on China has been that of China’s rise. It appears that 
China has already risen”: the biggest question now is whether China can really provide 
international leadership beyond just the ambitions of its ideological turn. As it has been 
noted, Beijing’s growing tensions with several international counterparts “suggest that 
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the ‘new type of great power relations’ proposed by China” might look a lot like the old 
one.89 And in this sense  transatlantic relations - a key component of the international 
system in the last 70 years - continue to be an important structural element that China has 
to reckon with. 
 
2.2 The EU-China Partnership in light of the “strategic depth” of the relations 
between the United States and Europe   
 
As Scott Brown has observed,90 “the evolution of US and EU-China relations 
cannot be completely separated out from the evolution of the transatlantic relationship 
itself”. The “strategic intimacy” between America and Europe intrinsically connected 
with the international order which emerged from WWII – has been forged by decades of 
close structural cooperation in the political, economic and security sectors. The 
transatlantic relationship is characterized by that “structural” strategic dimension which 
is elusive in the EU-China Partnership. This is reflected in the two main dimensions of 
the transatlantic relations: the EU-US relationship – which has been mainly focused on 
trade – and the key defense, political and security cooperation represented by the North-
Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Atlantic Alliance, of which all the EU core countries 
are members (that is, apart from Austria, Finland, Sweden, Malta, Ireland and Cyprus).  
With the emergence of a European Common Foreign and Security policy (CFSP) 
and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the role of the EU as a strategic 
partner was reinforced, in principle, beyond trade matters. This made possible the 
signature - at the EU-US Madrid summit in 1995 – of a New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA). 
The degree of convergence of the interests-values continuums of the EU and the 
US has always been significant but it has been affected, more recently, by a period of 
tensions particularly in the trade sector which brought about, inter alia, the failure of the 
negotiations for a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). As Marianne 
Schneider-Petsinger has written,91 “since the US and the EU are China’s two most 
important trading partners, a united US-EU front could potentially lead to real progress 
and compel Beijing to change its trade practices”. In a phase of complex interaction 
between Washington and Brussels, the EU has been performing “multiple balancing acts” 
 
89 Ibid. 
90 Scott A.W. Brown, Power, Perception and Foreign Policymaking: US and EU Responses to the 
Rise of China (London and New York: Routledge, 2018), 18. 
91 Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, “US-EU Trade Relations in the Trump Era: which way 
Forward?”, Chatham House Research Paper, March 2019, 23. 
36 
 
with regard to trade concerns with China. Disagreement on the US tariffs policy in 
Brussels has been, at the same time, complemented by the perception within the EU that 
with China the Trump administration’s “high pressure approach may prove effective”. In 
this context an EU-US renewed common approach for systemic global trade problems – 
such as the reform of the WTO and China’s trade practices – could be an important 
component of evolving transatlantic relations.  
  The focus on the importance of the economic and financial dimension in the 
transatlantic relationship has been recently revived by analysts who have argued that it is 
useful to reconsider “an oversecuritized worldview” which still sees the US ties with the 
European Union “primarily as military matters or tools for superpower rivalry” without 
taking into consideration that “the factors binding Europe and the United States together 
are far different from those present in 1949, when NATO was founded.”92 Even though a 
cooperative reconsideration of the foundational economic and financial nexus which has 
shaped the transatlantic relationship can be beneficial, in particular in times of trade 
tensions between Washington and Brussels, we cannot underestimate the relevance of an 
evolving security cooperation/coordination between the United States and Europe. The 
Euro-American dynamics underline the complex, multidimensional nature of the 
transatlantic partnership in which, however, the “strategic depth” related to the 
defense/security aspects is still key.  
As an EU senior official has observed,93 the relevance of this relationship has been 
meaningfully confirmed by the 2016 European Global Strategy (EUGS) which refers to 
the United States and NATO as core strategic partners for the EU (in the para related to 
cyber). The breadth and depth of EU-US relations in all sectors are based on uniquely 
shared values, objectives and practices.  It is meaningful that the European ambition to 
greater “strategic autonomy” in the sector of security and defense has been defined by the 
Global Strategy as aimed at enabling the EU “to act autonomously while also contributing 
to and undertaking actions in cooperation with NATO. A more credible European defense 
is essential also for the sake of a “solid transatlantic partnership through NATO and with 
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the United States and Canada”, which  helps the EU to “strengthen resilience, address 
conflicts, and contribute to effective global governance”.94  
The fundamental value of the cooperation with the Atlantic Alliance is described 
by the EUGS in crystal-clear terms: “NATO, for its members, has been the bedrock of 
Euro-Atlantic security for almost 70 years…The EU will deepen its partnership with 
NATO through coordinated defense capability development, parallel and synchronized 
exercises, and mutually reinforcing actions”.95 
On the contrary, China’s concept of the international security order in the post-Cold 
War era - as Zhang Tuosheng has argued96 - has traditionally regarded military alliances 
as substantially a product of the past and, in particular, the Atlantic Alliance as a bulwark 
of the US-led hegemony. Chinese suspicion of NATO has been based on Beijing’s 
realistic strategic consideration that the transatlantic relations between the Unites States 
and Europe have been and are a key factor for constraining a multipolar order in which 
Europe could play the role of a more independent pole.  
As we will see, the goal of strengthening multipolar trends in the international 
system did not play a secondary role, from a Chinese standpoint, in the establishment of 
the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Even though, as a former NATO 
Deputy Secretary General has commented, the approach of President Trump to NATO – 
“following years of weak leadership at the helm of the Alliance and of erosion of its 
political dimension” – has put the transatlantic bonds, to some extent, under pressure, the 
structural dimension of the cooperation within the Alliance continues to provide 
unparalleled strategic depth to the relationship between Europe and the United States.97  
The strength of this strategic relationship has been underlined by the significant 
progress of the EU-NATO cooperation: in her report on the implementation of the Global 
Strategy, High Representative Mogherini underlined the EU´s “historic breakthroughs in 
the field of security and defense, implementing and going beyond many suggestions made 
by the EUGS”.98 These objectives have been met in a context – as the report points out – 
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“of greater international complexity” where a significant feature “is the ongoing shift 
from a uni-polar structure to a more fragmented distribution of power” which, so far, has 
not led “to more cooperation, but rather to growing uncertainty and rivalry”.99 The 
political signal related to this unprecedented cooperation that the EU considers essential 
is that it has been proven that a stronger European defense would not be to the detriment 
of the Alliance.  
These developments have a clear significance, per relationem, for the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: if one thinks that in the mid-2000s – after the 
establishment of the Comprehensive Partnership – there had been analysts who argued in 
favor of a greater European strategic autonomy in part through a more structured 
cooperation with the PRC in the field of security, we can see that this side of the “strategic 
triangle” has remained considerably underdeveloped, as are any form of strategic contacts 
between two prominent players in the sector of defence/security such as NATO and 
China, notwithstanding some timid attempts in this direction in the late 2000s. As a 
former NATO Deputy Secretary General has observed,100 “the weakening of the role of 
the Alliance as a political actor in the last years has limited its interest and ability to look 
in a proactive way at some of the international transformative trends such as the rise of 
China as a global player, including in the security sector. Notwithstanding the increasing 
interest for NATO expressed in the more recent years by ‘partners across the globe’, such 
as Shinzo Abe’s Japan, the nearly uni-dimensional focus on deterrence and defense 
towards Russia has defined in a narrow sense the Alliance’s core business. It is therefore 
not surprising that a rising security player such as the PRC has remained substantially out 
of the strategic map of the Alliance”. Yet a change in the Alliance’s “mindset” seems to 
have begun even though, as the former French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine has 
observed, ”pendant longtemps il n’ya pas eu de place mentale pour la Chine au sein de 
l’Otan”. Now, he has added, the problem is to see how the Alliance will address the 
relevant issue of the implications for NATO of an increasing strategic interaction with 
the PRC, in particular in the security sectors which are outside its traditional core 
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business. Looking at the wording on China in the 2019 NATO Summit communiqué it 
seems that the Alliance - following, as usual, the strong signals coming from Washington 
- has taken note of the strategic re-orientation of its leading member state vis-à-vis the 
PRC. The London Declaration, issued by the allied Heads of State and Government on 
occasion of their meeting of December 3-4 2019, has recognized for the first time that 
“China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and 
challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance”.101 The anodyne language of 
the London declaration has been made clearer in the declarations of NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg who has defined China as an increasing “threat” to Europe, 
alongside Russia:  
“The rise of China is fundamentally shifting the global balance of power ... 
multiplying the threats to open societies and individual freedoms and 
increasing the competition over our values and our way of life…NATO does 
not see China as the new enemy or an adversary but ... all of this has a security 
consequence for NATO allies.”102 
 
The strategic re-orientation of the Atlantic Alliance vis-à-vis China is a factor103 
which will be relevant for a EU-NATO cooperation which has been rapidly growing in 
the last four years, “perhaps beyond the expectations of the two sides”.104 This trend will 
inevitably reverberate also on the development of the EU-China Strategic Partnership.  
Even though the transatlantic and the EU-US relationship have been characterized 
at the end of this decade by unprecedented elements of friction, the “strategic depth” of 
the partnership between the United States and Europe has not been structurally 
undermined.105 In particular the cooperation in the defense and security sector between 
Washington and Brussels has witnessed in this period a convergence on the multifaceted 
challenges posed by the continuous rise and global ambitions of Beijing. This 
fundamental Euro-Atlantic convergence in the security sector vis-à-vis China is therefore 
a “reality check” for Beijing in terms of the significant constraints and potential 
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confrontation that stem from the comprehensive strategic interaction between the two 
other sides of the “triangle” on key security issues which, in turn, impinge on – as the 5G 
controversy underlines – on other crucial areas of cooperation between the PRC and the 
EU. 
 
2.3 Trends and tensions within the “strategic triangle”: towards a new paradigm of 
strategic competition? 
 
Some novel elements in the international behavior of the two other main actors of 
the “strategic triangle”, the United States and China, have been regarded as being 
conducive to a “paradigm shift” in terms of the American and European consideration of 
the impact that a global China is having on these key strategic relations. In this perspective 
the future development of the EU-China Strategic Partnership can be influenced by 
dynamics which – accelerated and magnified by the pandemic crisis – have been leading 
to a scenario of increasing strategic competition. 
As we have seen, in the framework of the “strategic triangle” the trends between 
Washington and Beijing seem to indicate a further shift in a more realist and competitive 
direction of the US approach to its strategic relations with China. This  policy change can 
be regarded as a new version of one of the old paradigms on the rise of China, namely 
that of China as a systemic challenge, in a sort of up-dated version containing a mix of 
economic and security elements. As we have argued, the US and EU paradigms on China 
have been characterized by a certain degree of asymmetry. Washington’s approach has 
been driven over the years by policies based on elements of engagement coupled with 
more realist views closer to a “co-engagement” or even containment strategy while 
Brussels has followed until a recent past a predominant paradigm of “constructive 
engagement”. If in Washington the debate on the rise of China has constantly influenced 
the policy-making towards Beijing, in Europe the present strategic reflection - taking into 
account the parallel process of US strategic re-orientation - has had the merit to connect 
more closely the EU’s China policy to an in depth reconsideration of the implications of 
a “risen China”, in conceptual and operational terms.  
 In this framework an interesting analysis has been developed by Scott Brown who 
has divided the American and European interpretations of the rise of China into six main 
categories: military threat, non-military threat, economic threat, normative threat, 
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economic opportunity, political opportunity.106 In this respect the Trump administration’s 
“China policy” has prioritized elements of strong global economic competition which 
have been expanded, in the wake of the pandemic crisis, to political, defense, security and 
ideological aspects. This approach reflects, however, strands of strategic thinking that 
were already fully present in the past American debate on the rise of China. In this respect 
it is interesting to note that one of the allegedly most influential “inner circle’s advisers” 
of the President has indeed been Peter Navarro who, since the late 2000s, has argued that 
China would become a global competitor of the United States.107 On the EU’s front, as 
we will see, the strategic reflection seems to be focused in particular on China as a non-
military and economic threat but as a potential normative threat as well. 
In the context of an increasingly strained relationship between Washington and 
Beijing the US interpretive paradigm has revived some elements of the “hegemonic 
transition theories”, even though the debate is made more nuanced by the 
acknowledgement of the multidimensional implications of the interaction with a “risen 
China”. President Trump’s China policy has been the most recent step in a process which 
has gradually changed a long-lasting paradigm of cooperation-competition. If the Obama 
presidency had regarded the PRC as a partner-opponent which was urged, during the 
President’s first term, to be, hopefully, a “responsible stakeholder”,108 the Trump 
administration has further moved in a direction which has substantially overcome the 
concept of engagement.  
This approach can be regarded as a paradigm shift which mixes elements from 
power transition theories with the strategic reflection upon challenges arising for the US 
from the “complex interdependence”. However, the Trump administration’s China policy 
should not be considered a radical change in the US strategic thought and practice: as it 
has been rightly pointed out, “the contraposition between the US and China has long been 
in the making”.109 During the concluding years of Barack Obama’s presidency the 
consensus in Washington on China had indeed started decisively to shift:  
“the idea that China had to be engaged as a constructive strategic partner and 
a responsible stakeholder in the US-dominated world order was then 
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discarded. The view accepted in its stead was that the Asian giant was an 
increasingly dangerous, unrelenting strategic adversary”.110 
 
As Torri, Mocci and Boni argue, “during Obama’s second term, the new adversarial 
consensus on China found expression in a well-reasoned and coherent grand policy”. This 
comprehensive approach was based on two pillars: the “Pivot to Asia” and the Trans 
Pacific Partnership (TPP) which aimed, in a far-sighted way, at establishing “a set of US-
decided new rules, which would mould not only any future economic interexchange in 
the Asia-Pacific but the working itself of the local economies. Its political aim was the 
imposition of these new, US made rules on China, by confronting Beijing with the 
dilemma of either accepting the Washington-dictated rules, entering the gigantic free 
market created by the TPP, or being excluded from it, with heavy – and possibly 
disastrous – negative consequences for its economy”.111  
It is interesting to consider in this respect the argument that the Trump’s China 
Policy – if compared to Obama’s – has been more a matter of communication than of 
radical change: the transition process has not been from an engagement policy to active 
containment, but, rather, “the transformation of an already existing confrontational 
policy. This transformation, nonetheless, was highlighted as a startlingly new policy, 
which extended the ‘America First’ political approach…to the field of foreign 
relations”.112  
The ideological and ideational aspects which has surrounded President Trump’s 
“new course” vis-à-vis China have probably been the most radical component of it: they 
have indeed contributed to shape a debate on the perspective of a looming new Cold War 
because of the increasingly confrontational interaction between the two big powers. As 
Torri, Mocci and Boni have rightly pointed out, in the “America First” anti-China 
Trumpian strategy the “most visible hallmark…was the abandonment of any caution in 
highlighting the administration’s confrontational stand vis-à-vis China”.113 
By contrast, the cautious but clever diplomatic initiatives which had characterized 
Obama’s de facto anti-China policy had disguised “to a certain extent…its real objective, 
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namely taming what had come to be seen as the US’ main world competitor”.114 In 
addition to “openly branding China as the most dangerous strategic rival of the US” soon 
after his election, President Trump transformed the previous US China policy by abruptly 
jettisoning - in line with his anti-globalist and anti-multilateral  inclinations - “the 
economic containment network that Barack Obama had been building around China 
through the TPP”.115  
As we have seen, the tensions between Washington and Beijing originated by the 
pandemic crisis – fueled by a “battle of narratives”, reciprocal accusations of 
disinformation campaigns and a growing “ideological rift” – have reopened a debate in 
the United States on China’s “grand strategy” which had started a decade ago. In this 
respect Xi Jinping’s assertive stance has been connected to a process which has been 
regarded as driven by a Chinese long-term strategy aimed at bulding-up global power. In 
this regard Ashley Tellis had indeed written that “the principal objective of China's grand 
strategy, the accumulation of ‘comprehensive national power’ was clearly inherent in 
Deng's vision”.116 In this sense Xi Jinping’s strategic vision can be regarded as different 
from Deng’s in terms of means and policies but not in terms of its ultimate goals. The 
“quid pluris” which has characterized it compared to the approach of his predecessors is 
the openly ideological/ideational component inherent in his 21st century worldview.  
The ideological and ideational components which characterize, on both fronts, the 
present phase of the US-China relations have reinforced the American perceptions “that 
the Chinese model of development - politically authoritarian but open to international 
economic integration and free-market practices - can be regarded as an alternative (and 
possible threat) to liberal democracy”.117 The position echoes what polemically James 
Mann had described as a “China fantasy” by underlining that “if China’s political system 
stays a permanently repressive one-party state, that will mean that US policy toward 
China since 1989 has been sold to the American people on the basis of a fraud – that is, 
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What has been really unprecedented in Trump China policy’s ideological 
connotation is that it has impinged ultimately on the Chinese party-state’s most important 
core interest, its legitimacy, on which the survival of the communist regime is based. This 
was made evident by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo who, in a high profile speech - as 
Francesco Sisci has written - “drove a knife right at the heart of the relationship between 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese people, crucial for the power of the 
CCP in Beijing”.118 Sisci interestingly argues that Secretary Pompeo - with a logic similar 
to that used by Mao Zedong in his “On Contradiction” – “tried to prove that the CCP 
didn’t represent the Chinese people, and that actually the party is the enemy of the 
Chinese people”,119 an argument with potentially momentous implications for the 
legitimacy of the Chinese party-state.120 
As Frederik Kempe has observed, the strategic relevance and symbolism of this 
speech was deftly underscored by the choice of the Nixon Library as its stage. Noting that 
“next year would mark the 50 anniversary of Henry Kissinger’s secret mission to China, 
which began Beijing’s opening to the United States and the Western world” the Secretary 
of State linked “Nixon’s aims to President Trump’s follow-up”.121 Referring to Nixon’s 
historic assertion that the world could not be safe until China had changed, Pompeo said 
that “thus, our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce 
change…The kind of engagement we have been pursuing has not brought the kind of 
change inside of China that President Nixon had hoped to induce”.122 Pompeo’s remarks 
can be read as  part of a package because they “were the last of a quartet of speeches from 
National security Advisor Robert O’Brien on ideology, FBI Director Chris Wray on 
espionage and Attorney General William Barr on economics”.123 In this sense Secretary 
of State Pompeo’s “landmark speech” at the Nixon Library not only “marked the most 
robust call to action yet against the Chinese Communist Party”124 but also took place in 
an phase increasingly characterized by new contentious issues in the Sino-American 
relations, including intensified interaction between Washington and the Taiwan 
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authorities,125  a move that directly impinged on the second most important core-interest 
of the Chinese party-state, the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the PRC. If we 
consider that Taiwan has been traditionally one of the possible “flashpoints” in the US-
China strategic relations, it is interesting to note that in a 2020 speech the Taiwanese 
President has used the concept of “unrestricted warfare” elaborated in 1999 by China’s 
famous “hawk strategists” Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. As Qiao Liang has pointed 
out “the Taiwan issue is actually a key problem between China and the US, even though 
we have insisted it is China’s domestic issue…In other words, the Taiwan issue cannot 
be completely resolved unless the rivalry between Beijing and Washington is 
resolved”.126 The renewed relevance of the Taiwan question for the US-China strategic 
relations has been underscored by Robert Kagan127 who has argued that – after the crisis 
in Hong Kong – the US support to the island will be the true test bed for assessing the 
resolve of either the Trump or a future Biden administration in preventing Taiwan 
“absorption” by the PRC, an event which “would send shockwaves throughout the region 
and beyond” and would enable China “to control East Esia and the Western Pacific as 
never before, scrambling the entire global strategic equation”.  
The escalating tensions between Washington and Beijing - the trade war, the 
“ideological rift” deepened by the pandemic crisis, the confrontation on the HongKong 
question - have induced several analysts and commentators to brand this situation not 
only as the initial phase of a new Cold War but even a possible escalatory scenario in 
security and military terms.128 If we are “in the foothills of a new Cold War,” as an 
eminent “China-watcher” like Henry Kissinger has said,129 we have anyway to consider, 
as it has been rightly pointed out, that this potential “struggle will certainly be more 
complex and multi-dimensional” because “while the US and the Soviet Union were 
hermetically separate, the US and China are intimately entangled in economic, 
technological and cultural terms.”130 As Hal Brands and Jake Sullivan have pointed out, 
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for the United States during the Cold War “the Soviet Union was never a serious rival for 
global economic leadership; it never had the ability, or the sophistication, to shape global 
norms and institutions in the way that Beijing may be able to do”.131 
The characteristics of this possible new confrontation have in fact been analyzed 
from diversified point of views ranging from the focus on its nationalistic and ideological 
drivers (Peter Gries) to defensive neo-realist positions such as Stephen Walt’s, who has 
argued that the discussion of the Sino-American rivalry should not succumb “to a latest 
familiar tendency to attribute conflict to our opponents’ internal characteristics” but 
should instead look at the structural elements which define this competition because “the 
roots of the present Sino-American rivalry have less to do with particular leaders or 
regime types and more to do with the distribution of power and the particular strategies 
that the two sides are pursuing”.132   
Among these diversified analytical standpoints there have also been those who, 
like Hal Brands, has welcomed a possible “Cold War” with China as a factor which could 
bring out “the best of the American democracy” by stimulating renewed innovative 
energies in the system and fostering a more cohesive society133 
In the framework of this debate there has been, however, a widespread 
recognition, as the former Australian Prime Minister and sinologist Kevin Rudd has 
written, that the recent “saber rattling from both Beijing and Washington has become 
strident, uncompromising, and seemingly unending. The relationship lurches from crisis 
to crisis…The speed and intensity of it all has desensitized even seasoned observers to 
the scale and significance of change in the high politics of the U.S.-Chinese 
relationship”.134 The Western response to the strategic implications of the rise of China – 
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“unmoored from the strategic assumptions of the previous 50 years” is thus defining a 
new paradigm of interaction with the PRC “but without the anchor of any mutually agreed 
framework”.135 
From an American point of view, as Frederick Kempe has written, it is important 
to recognize first and foremost “the historic novelty of what’s unfolding and its epochal” 
significance “because the United States, since its rise to global power, has never 
confronted such a potent peer competitor across so many realms: political, economic, 
technological, military and even societal”.136 In a unique period coinciding with the 
“Fourth Industrial Revolution and an era of unprecedented technological change”, this 
contest between the United States and China could re-define the international system not 
in terms of “world domination” but for its potential “significant impact on ‘world 
determination,’ influencing whether democracy or autocracy, market capitalism or state 
capitalism, are the flavors of the future”.137  
As Pei Minxin had rightly predicted,138 between the US and China “the relative 
balance of power has been changing at a pace” that has finally produced “real geopolitical 
consequences”: this is due to the fact that “no country in modern history has risen as 
quickly as China and this leaves Beijing, for the first time, confronting global challenges 
without the learning curve of a more gradual evolution”.139 
 The complexity and the magnitude of this process clearly affects the EU which 
is confronted not only with the structural implications of the change in relative power 
between the other two major international actors but also the dynamics of a new 
bipolarism, characterized by possible protracted trends of global competition, which 
makes  unrealistic the perspectives of either a cooperative “G-2 Mirage” or a pragmatic 
“condominium of power”.140  
In this context the trilateral interaction within the “strategic triangle” has been 
made more challenging for the EU not only by the confrontational trends of “the most 
important bilateral relationship of the 21st century” but also by the increasing disconnect 
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of the EU’s interests-values continuum from those of China and by the search of a new 
consensus in this regard with the United States.141 The EU’s reconsideration of its 
interaction with Beijing in the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
will have therefore to take necessarily into account the fact that, as Kurt Campbell and 
Jake Sullivan have recently written, “the United States is in the midst of the most 
consequential rethinking of its foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Although 
Washington remains bitterly divided on most issues, there is a growing consensus that the 
era of engagement with China has come to an unceremonious close. The debate now is 
over what comes next”.142 At the same time the US post-2020 political scenario will make 
the EU better understand which kind of “American exceptionalism” - Brussels is going 
to deal with, if any, in particular with regard to the strategic relations of the liberal world 
with China. For this fundamental element of context will undoubtedly shape the future 
“environment” of the EU-China Strategic Partnership. The direction of the US foreign 
policy in the coming years will be a key factor to be considered by the EU China policy-
makers: in the event of a second Trump mandate, as the National Security Strategy put it 
in 2018, “strategic competition” would continue to animate the United States’ approach 
to Beijing. In the event of a Biden presidency a China policy based on a new form of 
engagement is equally unlikely but it is interesting to take note of how Sullivan, Vice 
President Biden’s former National Security Adviser, and Campbell, former Assistant 
Secretary of State for East Asia in the Obama administration, address the key issue of 
which kind of strategic competition is going to take shape.143 If “US policy makers and 
analysts have mostly, and rightly, discarded some of the more optimistic assumptions that 
underpinned the four-decade-long strategy of diplomatic and economic engagement with 
China,” nevertheless these authors point out that it is important to be aware today that “in 
the rush to embrace competition, policy makers may be substituting a new variety of 
wishful thinking for the old… by assuming that competition can succeed in transforming 
China where engagement failed, this time forcing capitulation over collapse”.144 What is 
anyway very likely to be a key component of any future US administration’s China policy 
is the recognition that “the basic mistake of engagement was to assume that it would bring 
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about fundamental changes to China’s political system, economy, and foreign policy.”145  
The analysis of this new context of strategic competition offers converging 
elements with the reflection that the EU has been developing on its own China policy: the 
“realist turn” in Brussels vis-à-vis the Strategic Partnership with Beijing has indeed been 
mainly focused on a rethinking, still underway, of the paradigm of “constructive 
engagement”.  
The paradigm delineated by Campbell and Sullivan – who argue that lessons 
should be drawn from the Cold War in order to avoid a Cold war logic – would be based 
on “a steady state of clear-eyed coexistence on terms favorable to U.S. interests and 
values”.146 The awareness in this evolving context of the need of realistic views about the 
capacity of the decisions made in Washington or Brussels “to determine the direction of 
long-term developments in Beijing” seems to be an essential prerequisite to define a 
“durable” strategy “whatever the future brings for the Chinese system.”  
This approach reflects elements relevant also for the European debate underway 
by focusing on a kind of coexistence which would involve elements of competition and 
cooperation with China that might bring about friction while in Washington and Brussels 
the respective China policies move beyond engagement.  
If in the past, in particular in Brussels, the avoidance of friction was “an objective 
unto itself” in the relationship with Beijing, this new paradigm of interaction should aim 
at securing the kinds of interests and values that the United States and the EU want to 
advance by defining, at the same time, “a set of conditions necessary for preventing a 
dangerous escalatory spiral, even as competition continues”.147  
The potential affinity of a revised strategic EU’s approach to China with these 
strands of American strategic thinking underlines the reluctance of the traditional 
European paradigm to look at this process through the prism of power-transition theories 
by assuming that the present evolution of the US-China relations could be leading to a 
scenario of “Thucydides Trap”148, whereby a global China has risen to the point that it 
can even challenge the United States inducing its possible overreaction. Deconstructing 
the idea of a US-China Thucydides trap, Friedman, Brands and Sullivan  have argued that 
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which Beijing will find difficult to solve. Firstly, Xi Jinping’s China lacks a meaningful 
alliance structure as a global power, in particular in the security sector. Secondly, China 
seems to be far less capable of providing “global public goods than the United States, 
both because it is less powerful and because its authoritarian political system makes it 
harder to exercise the comparatively enlightened, positive-sum leadership that has 
distinguished U.S. primacy”.149 Thirdly, in a logic of “complex interdependence”, the 
other two actors of the “strategic triangle” continue to be indispensable counterparts for 
the Chinese economy. At the same time the dynamics underway seem to delineate a 
context whereby China, still inferior to the US in several regards, has risen to a point 
which makes problematic for Washington to accept any longer China’s global ambitions 
nor finance the Chinese economy.150  
The economic dimension is in this sense at the forefront of the debate, 
exacerbated by the pandemic tensions, which has been significantly centred also on the 
issue of “decoupling”. Of course, as it is recognized by several analysts, to extricate the 
US and European economies from the structural network of economic ties and integration 
that has been developed in the last thirty years is an herculean task. Nevertheless, a 
possible long-lasting outcome of the pandemic seems to be an in depth reconsideration of 
the vulnerabilities linked to the economic “complex interdependence” with China.  
The American nascent debate on “decoupling” has been characterized by very 
diversified views ranging from those of conservative analysts who argue that its 
“costs…are dwarfed by the costs of continued Chinese economic predation and the 
empowerment of the Communist Party” to arguments centered on the economic 
implications of this process which regard it as a “folly”.151 However, as Paul Haenle has 
written, it is undeniable that the 2020 global crisis has amplified calls to decouple from 
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China increasing “the concerns of multinational corporations with supply chains based in 
China, many of which have seen business curbed by Beijing’s lack of transparency and 
extreme, swiftly imposed measures”.152  
These confrontational trends - which add to the fundamental technological 
competition between the US, the EU and China -  have been probably been a crucial factor 
for making Beijing send, in the course of 2020, signals of “threat reduction” in order to 
decrease the potential risks of structural change in the economic cooperation and 
integration between the RPC and its Western counterparts.  
All this underlines, as Rudd has pointed out, that for the United States, “the 
China challenge is real and demands a coherent, long-term strategy across all policy 
domains and in coordination with allies.” Both Washington and Brussels in this sense 
require a new framework for their future relationship with Beijing, which should be based 
on conceptual and operational elements able to turn the increasing political, economic, 
technological, and ideological divides into a “managed” strategic competition aimed at 
avoiding escalation and defining hopefully “areas of global cooperation where it is 
mutually advantageous”.153  
The direction of the US foreign policy will be clearly crucial for understanding 
which kind of “coordination with allies” the new American administration intends to 
pursue.154 In this perspective narrowing the gap between the United States and Europe 
seems to be a key element in this respect because - as we have seen - there is both in 
Washington and Brussels a growing “ideological barrier to Chinese leadership. The 
tensions surrounding China’s rise do not simply result from clashing economic and 
geopolitical interests. They also reflect a deeper, more inherent distrust that often afflicts 
relationships between democratic governments and powerful authoritarian regimes.”155 
This gulf between Beijing’s political values and those of the world’s democracies has 
increased also the EU’s unease about China’s assertive stance and role in global affairs. 
For this reason a coordination between the US and the EU on the “softer tools of 
competition seems to be “just as important as harder tools in dealing with the Chinese 
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challenge”.156 At the same time a re-launched cooperative interaction between 
Washington and Brussels could prove to be a key factor in order to strengthen the 
transatlantic relations and prevent their “internal decay, hastened by Chinese influence-
buying and information operations”.157 The preservation of the liberal international order 
is linked, as Joseph Nye has written,158 to an American exceptionalism able to produce 
global public goods, strengthen an effective multilateralism, support liberal alliances and 
partnerships based on the advancement of political values and human rights. In this 
perspective a renewed convergence of the interests-values continuums of Washington and 
Brussels seems to be a significant component of the strategic reflection underway within 
the EU on the long-term challenges posed by “a systemic rival promoting alternative 
models of governance” such as China and on the need of defining a new paradigm of 
interaction with it.159  
This context seems to have pushed the European strategic thinking about China, 
already shifting, past a tipping point with regard to the traditional paradigm of  
“constructive engagement”. These dynamics have made more visible the “dissonance” 
already affecting - as we will argue in the next chapters - both the material and ideational 
building blocks of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and have 
intensified the European perception that the pursuit of a “business as usual” approach to 
Beijing is no longer sustainable.  
Against this background, the Chinese Government seems to be confronted with 
“daunting challenges” to which President Xi Jinping himself has referred calling on the 
country “to make mental and material preparations for changes in the external 
environment that will last a relatively long period of time”.160  
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In this process of change the role that the EU can play will depend - as we have 
argued in this chapter - on the internal dynamics of the Strategic Partnership but also on 
some key external variables stemming from the broader context which influences the 
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The ideational dimension of the EU-China Partnership: an epistemological 
perspective  
 
In this chapter we will focus on a clarification of the underlying epistemological 
assumptions for this research, arguing that a better understanding of the difficulties and 
prospects of the EU-China strategic partnership is significantly related to the ideational 
elements which influence this relationship. We will incorporate in this epistemological 
approach a hermeneutical perspective which can give a more comprehensive background 
to the analytical instruments that we will use to investigate some key issues which 
problematize the strategic potential of the EU-China relationship. In doing so we will take 
into account not only the Western theoretical elaboration on these issues but also the 
recent contribution of the Chinese school of International Relations Theory in a pluralist 
perspective. 
In delineating the epistemological assumptions on which the analysis of our subject 
has been based we think that it is important to underscore - as Kurki and Wight have done 
- that the reference to what in IR Theory is defined “meta-theory” is essential not only for 
“being aware of the issues at stake in meta-theoretical debate, and of their significance in 
terms of concrete research” but also because “meta-theoretical positions direct, in a 
fundamental way, the manner in which people theorize and, indeed, ‘see’ the world.”162 
The importance of meta-theories is a theoretical aspect which is widely shared by Chinese 
IR scholars who have made in their analyses frequent reference to the contribution of 
Western philosophers and social sciences thinkers and to the rich background of the 
Chinese philosophical tradition. 
The second aspect that we will focus on in the chapter is how the identity, historical 
and cultural background, the actorness of China and the European Union affect their 
relationship: in doing so we will address a first significant “conceptual gap” between 




162 Milja Kurki and Colin Wight,“International Relations and Social Science,” in Tim Dunne, 
Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theories, Discipline and Diversity. (Oxford: 
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3.1 The EU-China Strategic Partnership: a case of “cognitive dissonance” between 
international actors? 
The Strategic Partnership between China and the European Union has been often 
defined as “elusive” because of a set of substantial factors which constrain its potential 
evolution. As Jonathan Holslag has argued, “at the discourse level it is found that both 
sides fail to identify common interests, joint priorities continue to be concentrated in the 
business sector, and China and Europe have not been able to determine what the relevance 
of their relationship is compared to other powers.163 
This argument underlines the gaps between how the EU-China strategic dimension 
has been defined in a set of documents and joint statements and its reality “on the ground”. 
The analysis of these aspects needs to be complemented, however, with the inclusion of 
underlying ideational elements which shape the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In 
this respect it is true, as Pan Zhongqi has written,164 that “the relationship between China 
and the EU has gone beyond the stage when it was largely shaped by the ‘tyranny of 
distance’ and ‘primacy of trade’”. For this reason it is useful to analyze the material 
aspects which influence the Partnership against the fundamental background of those 
ideational elements which continue to act as a factor of “cognitive dissonance”. This term 
- used in our context by David Shambaugh adapting a concept created in Psychology by 
Leon Festinger in 1957165 - refers to the lack of consistency in the Partnership between 
some key elements of interaction and the respective conceptualization of these elements 
by the two international actors. This situation is conducive to a fundamental contradiction 
between the facts which constitute this relationship and the beliefs, cultural identities, 
ideals and values through which the two actors categorize the constitutive elements of 
their interaction. As Festinger argued166 in the case of individuals – who tend to respond 
to cognitive dissonance by avoiding the circumstances and contradictory information 
likely to increase its magnitude – the EU and China seem so far to have been partly in 
denial of the importance of the ideational elements which significantly affect their 
relationship and its potential evolution. Along these lines David Shaumbaugh has in 
particular argued that cognitive dissonance is “in essence, the natural proclivity to 
 
163 Richard Maher, “The Elusive EU-China Partnership”, International Affairs 92: 4, 2016; Jonathan 
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selectively look for confirmation of one’s pre-existing beliefs and to reject evidence that 
contradicts these beliefs”.167 
On the basis of this assumption this chapter will try to elucidate more specifically 
what this cognitive dissonance consists of by arguing that the strategic limits of the EU-
China relationship need to be set in an epistemological context which can help to factor 
into our analysis the complex interaction between material and ideational elements which 
affects the potential strategic dimension of the EU-China partnership.  
This epistemological clarification will also offer the theoretical framework for an 
in-depth consideration of the consequences of this “cognitive dissonance” which 
manifests itself, inter alia, through what Pan Zhongqi called “conceptual gaps”, which 
influence the behaviour of the two actors when they address some critical aspects of their 
relationship. On this basis it will be possible to assess the constitutive characteristics of 
the relationship between the European Union and China by investigating which elements 
make it a partnership and which, if any, elements make – or could make it – a partnership 
of a strategic nature. 
 
3.2 The conceptual gaps in the EU-China relations as an analytical tool in the 
framework of a constructivist/post-positivist epistemological approach 
 
Before analyzing the implications that the existing conceptual discrepancies 
generate in EU-China relations, the first step is to address the indispensable 
epistemological clarification of the peculiar framework which influences the 
development of the strategic relations between China and the EU in a perspective which 
links the dimension of theory to that of “praxis”. To this end I will not only to refer here 
to the epistemological approach that I tried to develop in my previous analyses168 of 
China’s international behavior but I will also consider the theoretical contributions made 
in this respect by Chinese scholars such as Qin Yaqing, Yan Xuetong and Zhao 
Tingyang.169 An epistemological approach which emphasizes the importance not only of 
the material but also of the ideational factors  influencing international politics and takes 
 
167 David Shambaugh, “China eyes Europe in the world. Real convergence or cognitive 
dissonance?”  in David Shaumbaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Zhou Hong (eds.), China-Europe 
Relations: perceptions, policies and prospects (London: Routdlege, 2008), 128. 
168 Massimo Ambrosetti, Power and Influence: Ideational and Material factors in the nternational 
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DC, 2011. 
169 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge: Cultures and IR Theories”,  The Chinese Journal of 
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into account the “meta-theoretical” dimension cannot but find some interesting 
perspectives in the reflections elaborated in the last decade by Chinese International 
Relations theorists. Actors such as China and the European Union inevitably make their 
explicit or implicit choices in the context of underlying “theories of knowledge” and 
“strategies for action” which stem from distinct epistemological paradigms,170 influenced 
in turn by specific cultural and ideational backgrounds: the assumptions on which their 
international behavior is based are thus the product of a complex process of interaction 
which can have both intended and unintended consequences.  
In this respect Shaumbaugh rightly underscores that, for instance, Chinese views of 
Europe’s role in the world “do not exist independently”.171 This is true also for European 
views vis-à-vis China, which are defined through a multifaceted prism that reflects both 
the views of the EU as a unitary actor and those of its member states. Overall, these views 
are largely derivative from the two actors’ broader “understandings of, and preferences 
for, the global system and international order”172 which, as Qin Yaqing has interestingly 
argued, depend also on the “background knowledge/representational knowledge”173 of 
the strategic partners. As a result, according to Shaumbaugh, the analyses and attitudes 
of the two actors in their interaction “are somewhat derivative from these broader beliefs 
and they thus frequently have a cognitively dissonant character”.174 The reference to the 
essential role played by “broader beliefs” is echoed by Qin Yaqing when he argues that 
“social theory as representational knowledge cannot but reflect and represent the 
background knowledge wherein its producer is is deeply embedded”.175 As we will see, 
this approach seems to be shaped by ideas in line with Gadamer’s hermeneutical 
perspective and the key reflections on the nature of understanding made by Heidegger.  
As we know, epistemological assumptions do indeed contribute to defining the 
ontological dimension of the main elements of a problem: from this perspective it is 
interesting to note that the “conceptual gaps” which characterize the EU-China 
interactions seem to underscore a low degree of “epistemological awareness” in the 
reciprocal behavior of the two partners. This deficit seems to be at the root of the 
 
170 Ambrosetti, Power and Influence , 17.  
171 Shambaugh, ibid., 128 
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173 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”, 418. 
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fundamental problem of conceptual dissonance which contributes to weaken the strategic 
character of the Partnership.  
Since they will be used as an interpretive instrument throughout this research, it is 
necessary to clarify at this point what we exactly mean when we refer to the notion of 
“conceptual gaps”, as defined by Pan Zhongqi. According to this Chinese author, he 
coined the term in order to explain  
“different conceptualizations of the same concept by different actors.  It 
signifies how two people may understand, define, or interpret a notion in such 
a different way that it carries divergent connotations when used in 
communications. As a kind of cognitive difference, a conceptual gap emerges 
whenever different people resort to the same concept in order to describe 
different things”.176 
 
When Pan Zhongqi argues that “a conceptual gap exists because many concepts are 
multifaceted, dynamic and ambiguous…[and] almost no concept…enjoys a universally 
accepted definition”177, he clearly rejects a positivist/rationalist epistemological 
approach: this is made more evident when he notes that “[m]ultiple definitions make the 
meaning of a concept ambiguous. And this ambiguity makes a conceptual gap between 
different actors more likely, on the one hand, and more difficult to discern, on the 
other”.178 It is therefore clear that the notion of conceptual gaps can be inscribed in an 
epistemological approach which refers to the perspectives that both constructivism and 
post-positivism have brought to bear on the study of International Relations and foreign 
policy. Post-positivists, as Christopher Hill writes, in general reject 
the fact-value distinction most prominent among realists and 
behaviorists…This is because politics is constituted by language, ideas and 
values. We cannot stand outside ourselves and make neutral judgments.179  
 
If we consider that post-positivist positions are based on approaches that, while 
drawing on a wider range of intellectual traditions, all reject positivism as a valid way of 
 
176 Pan Zhongqi, Conceptual gaps in China-EU relations, 3. 
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going about the study of social processes,180 we can find analytical synergies between 
some IR Western and Chinese theorists such as Qin Yaqing who has focused in his works 
on the key link between Culture and Social Theory. Rejecting the long predominant 
positivist paradigm he has rightly pointed out that  
“mainstream IR theory has largely ignored culture, especially in view of its 
Waltzianization since the 1980s. It aims to generate knowledge across time 
and space and produce a universally applicable theory that denies the role of 
any cultural background. As a result, local knowledge production and theory 
development, usually drawing largely on cultural resources, have been 
unfairly marginalized”.181  
 
The reference to these strands of recent Chinese theoretical thought has the potential 
to connect a post-positivist approach to a pluralist approach in terms of IR theory. It is 
meaningful that Hans Morgenthau wrote from his realist standpoint that foreign policy 
(and indeed the whole of international relations) is deeply rooted in the cultural 
background of a historical period and reflects the theory and practice of that context. For 
this reason it is difficult to understand not only the “conceptual gaps” but also the strategic 
nature of the EU-China Partnership if we do not try – following Morgenthau’s suggestions 
– to understand what is the “general philosophy” which influences the context of this key 
strategic relationship.182  
If Morgenthau referred to a “general philosophy” which was clearly Western-
centred, a pluralist approach can help better clarifying the elements at the root of the so 
called “cognitive dissonance”. Being aware that our views of international political events 
and issues are inevitably highly dependent on the philosophical underpinnings that we 
adopt, whether in an implicit or explicit way183 - as Hollis and Smith posited, echoing 
Morgenthau - we need therefore to find which can be these philosophical underpinnings 
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3.3 A hermeneutical perspective  
 
The theoretical considerations that we have so far developed have sought to set the 
subject of our research in the context of the epistemological approach from which the 
notions of “conceptual gaps” and “cognitive dissonance” stem.  It is necessary, though, 
to complement it with what we consider a necessary “quid pluris”, that is a hermeneutical 
perspective which will link in a systematic way the dimensions of theory and praxis which 
shape the strategic relations between China and the European Union. Broader interpretive 
tools are indeed offered, at the meta-theoretical level, by concepts and reflections 
elaborated in the framework of philosophical hermeneutics in particular by Hans Georg 
Gadamer.184 In epistemological terms this perspective can enrich our gnoseological 
approach in a way which goes beyond the IR debate focused on merely finding a post-
positivist/post-rationalist theoretical “middle ground” and, at the same time, can broaden 
it through a pluralistic interpretive paradigm. If we recognize that the EU-China strategic 
relations take place indeed in a world “more complexly multiple and closely 
connected”185 in which China tends to assert with increasing force its uniqueness in 
political, economic, ideological but also “civilizational” terms, we then need to be aware 
- as Katzenstein has argued186 - that it is clearly no longer possible to implicitly refer to a 
paradigm which equates Western norms, values and practices with those of the whole 
human community. As Qin Yaqing has written, it has been indeed a common practice “to 
equate knowledge produced in the West with universal knowledge. By taking for granted 
that they produce universal knowledge, theorists tend to forget the fact that culture 
provides the background that influences their subconscious mind and on a highly abstract 
and metaphysical level”.187  
Qin Yaqing’s arguments reflect positions of a debate which is extremely relevant 
for Chinese theorists who have underlined that “the IR theoretical hard core has been 
formed through the background knowledge gained from the practice of European IR since 
the establishment of the Westphalian system”: for this reason in the study of world politics 
 
184 The references to Gadamer’s hermeneutical circle are made on the basis of the explanations and 
comments contained in Nicola Abbagnano, Storia della Filosofia. Il pensiero contemporaneo: 
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Relations”, Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 11, n° 4 (2018), 373–390. 
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the “different international systems that existed in other regions outside the West, 
especially outside Europe where the IR discipline was initiated” have been  rendered 
largely irrelevant. In this way “only the practice of Westphalian IR” mattered, and “only 
the background knowledge wherefrom” counted.188  
In a context which increasingly put into question, inter alia, the assumption of 
universality of Western IR theory, the search of an “epistemological middle ground” has 
been mainly based on the critical constructivist approach and some fundamental post-
positivist epistemological assumptions such as the social constituting of meaning, the 
linguistic construction of reality and the historicity of knowledge.189 If, from a post-
positivist perspective, “there is something larger at stake than different epistemologies” 
the challenge is to try to respond to the “Cartesian anxiety” for the absence of secure 
foundations in ethics and politics in a way which can reconcile ontology and 
epistemology. This can be done through a hermeneutical approach which delineates solid 
theoretical foundations and connects them with the correlated implications in terms of 
praxis. In this context, the reference to philosophical hermeneutics - through the 
fundamental discovery of what Hans Georg Gadamer has defined “the ontological 
dimension of the hermeneutical circle” - helps us taking advantage of a comprehensive 
theoretical approach which deconstructs the tenets of positivism and historicism based on 
the ideal of a scientific objectivity which needs just to be applied through a correct 
methodology.  
In this respect, the key theoretical background is offered by Gadamer’s reflection,  
developed in the second part of Truth and Method190, on the fundamental problem of 
“understanding”. By addressing this issue Gadamer takes into account the cardinal idea 
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elaborated by Martin Heidegger and expressed by the notion of “circle of understanding” 
(Zirkel des Verstehens).191 By referring to para 32 of Heidegger’s Being and Time192 
Gadamer argues that any interpretation is the articulation and the internal development of 
an original pre-understanding (Vor-verstaendis): the basic assumption underlying the 
concept of a “hermeneutical circle” is in fact that whenever we try to understand 
something, we understand something which we already understand in part because of our 
background of given ideas, opinions, previous experiences and prejudices.193 The 
originality of Heidegger’s concept of Zirkel des Verstehens is the ontological nature and 
the cognitive function of the hermeneutical circle which goes well beyond a mere 
methodological approach.  
The notion of conceptual gaps can be thus related to what Gadamer explains with 
regard to the ontological dimension of our understanding: being aware of how the “circle 
of pre-understanding” works, makes it possible for us to experience a process of true 
interpretation in the search for autonomous truth in the field of social sciences as in other 
areas. This epistemological perspective can be fruitfully applied not only to the cultural 
and historical relationship between the West and China but more specifically – also 
through the lens of the existing conceptual gaps - to the present debate on the China-EU 
Strategic Partnership. 
The theoretical foundations brought about by Heidegger and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical thought - which made possible a new understanding of the historicity of 
our understanding and of the relationship between language and reality - can also set in  
perspective the concept of relativism/reflectivism194 which “rejected the classical 
positivist/explanatory approach to IR theory and research, emphasizing instead reflexivity 
and the non-neutral nature of political and social explanation.”195 From a hermeneutical 
perspective it is easier to understand why post-structuralism has  problematized this 
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assumption:196 in order to create, as Onuf said, “a world of our making”, a basic 
preliminary awareness of the limits and of the scope of our understanding is a conditio 
sine qua non. 
This broader theoretical clarification does not exclude a perspective whereby 
different epistemological approaches should not be seen, as Christopher Hill observes, as 
competing with one another but should, on the contrary, be considered as a useful part of 
an “analyst's armory”.197 Indeed, an important aspect of post-positivism in foreign policy 
studies, that Hill has highlighted, is that it should be regarded not simply as a competing 
approach vis-à-vis realism, “but as one which confirms to some extent the importance of 
the state. Writers like David Campbell, Roxanne Doty and Henrik Larsen have examined 
the language of foreign policy and what they see as its dominant, usually disciplinary, 
discourses.
 
These are, however, still national.
 
Language is seen as crucial to national 
identity, on which the representation of outsiders ('the Other') will be a significant 
influence. Indeed, foreign policy is important precisely because it reinforces (undesirably, 
in the view of Campbell) national and statist culture. Language, whether official or 
private, rhetorical or observational, has a lot to tell us about both mind-sets and actions, 
and it is a relatively untapped resource”.198 
If we look at Chinese IR Theory we can find some interesting points of contact with 
those theoretical positions aimed at deconstructing the positivist/rationalist paradigms. If 
we take, for instance, the role of the state, of national identity and of statist cultures, we 
can see that it is a significant element for the theoretical approach of Chinese IR thinkers 
too: from Yan Xuetong’s moral realism - which investigates the key relationship between 
material power and the ideational elements shaping authority and leadership – to Zhao 
Tingyang´s cosmopolitan worldview based on the concept of a “tianxia system” which 
problematizes the Westphalian order in which every state is an “alien” necessarily acting 
within the boundaries of the self-other dynamics.199  
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Qin Yaqing’s relational theory of world politics – through its strong focus on the 
role of culture in IR – looks at the state also as a cultural community which belongs to an 
international system made by “actors in relations” rather than discrete individual 
entities.200 All these theoretical perspectives touch upon key elements which are 
extremely relevant for the EU-China strategic relations. Moreover, the “recognition of a 
multiverse of knowledge” through a pluralistic approach201 makes us better aware - as 
Acharya and Buzan have pointed out -  that “because Western IR Theory has been carried 
by the dominance of Western power over the last few centuries, it has acquired a 
Gramscian hegemonic status that operates largely unconsciously in the minds of others, 
and regardless of whether the theory is correct or not”.202  
These Chinese reflections can offer analytical synergies not only with Western IR 
post-positivist theories but, more in particular, with what has been defined the 
hermeneutical dimension of “praxis” by Gadamer.203 If we consider the “ontological turn” 
given by Gadamer to philosophical hermeneutics,204 we can see how recent contributions 
of Chinese theorists - in particular Qin Yaqing’s - reverberate some themes developed by 
those who have looked at Gadamer’s philosophical work to underscore, inter alia, the 
disparity between the Anglo-American and Continental Europe’s understanding of the 
nature of the social sciences”. In this context Bernstein underscores that in the main 
tradition of Anglo-American thought “the overwhelming bias has been to think of the 
social sciences as natural sciences concerning individuals in their social relations” while 
“a proper understanding of the range of the social disciplines requires us to recognize the 
essential hermeneutical dimension of these disciplines”. 
By addressing this kind of issues Qin Yaqing has developed a critique of some key 
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components of  IR Theory shaped by the main tradition of Anglo-American thought: he 
has argued that not only “mainstream Western IR theories…share a similar metaphysical 
component, that is, individualistic rationality” but also that this form of rationality “is 
based on an atomistic ontology and focuses on the individual actor, no matter whether an 
individual in society or a nation-state in international society”.205 In Qin’s theoretical 
perspective rationality, on the contrary, needs to be “relationally expressed” in a 
framework in which processes are defined in terms of relations in motion as ontologically 
significant. 
In this perspective the search for a pluralistic epistemological perspective - which 
helps us avoiding the risks of a “binary logic” in analyzing and conceptualizing key 
elements of such a complex relationship as the EU-China Strategic Partnership - is 
enriched by the interpretive potential offered by the “hermeneutical circle.” The 
theoretical problem of understanding, of its conditions and limits, is addressed by Qin 
Yaqing in a converging way in his “knowledge-oriented” theory with Heidegger’s “circle 
of pre-undestanding” by delineating the key concept of “cultural background”. What we 
could call Qin Yanqing’s “ontological dimension of culture can be connected to 
Gadamer’s “ontological dimension of language” because language is a crucial component 
of culture at the individual, community and national level. As we have seen, Qin has 
argued that “Culture matters crucially in the development of social theory” because it is 
an important source for informing and inspiring theoretical innovation in the social 
sciences.206 However, in his view “Western social theory draws on cultural resources in 
a highly implicit way and on a highly abstract level, as if far removed from its cultural 
background”.207  
In his theory Qin divides what he calls “the theoretical hard core” into two 
interrelated components: a substantive one, “which deals with the outside world by 
observing and receiving signals from selected ‘out-theres’” and a metaphysical one 
“which explains, understands, and interprets the perceived phenomenon and received 
signal. […] The metaphysical component is the soul of a social theory for it defines and 
identifies the theory.208 This approach can be particularly relevant – as Qin argues – “in 
 
205 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”,420. 
206 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”, 417. 
207 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”, 424. For this reason he thinks that the influence of 
culture can be considered with regard to Western IR Theory as a process of “implicit permeation” while it 
takes shape in Chinese theoretical thought as a process of “explicit penetration”. 
208 Ibid. Qin argues that in the social sciences, theory is not only for explaining but also for 
understanding, interpreting, and constructing social reality. Different theories’ various understandings and 
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an international system that has gone far beyond the Westphalian fiefdom in a multiple 
and complex world of pluralistic cultures and societies”.209 On the basis of these 
theoretical assumptions we could call what Qin defines the “metaphysical component” 
the “hermeneutical component” of his epistemological approach: the “metaphysical 
component” is indeed “nurtured, shaped, and informed primarily by background 
knowledge”, a concept which can be inscribed in Gadamer’s hermeneutical perspective. 
Qin Yaqing argues that210 “background knowledge is the knowledge that has been formed 
naturally - even spontaneously - in and through practice and over history, which constitute 
its time-space matrix”.  
A key point in this theoretical approach is its emphasis on the fact that background 
knowledge is “generated in, by, and through practice”. The importance of this “practice 
turn” 211 connects this theoretical approach to another significant theme of philosophical  
hermeneutics, the role of “philosophia practica” in linking theory with  praxis. As Richard 
Bernstein notes, “one of the most challenging, intriguing, and important motifs in 
Gadamer's work is his effort to link his ontological hermeneutics with the tradition of 
practical philosophy, especially as it is rooted in Aristotle's understanding of praxis and 
phronesis”.212 It is not a coincidence that the “specific context in Truth and Method where 
Gadamer explores the relevance of Aristotle to hermeneutics is the investigation of the 
moment of “application” or “appropriation in the act of understanding”: his approach 
considers that “every act of understanding involves interpretation, and all interpretation 
 
even opposite interpretations of the same social phenomenon are commonly seen”.Since the so called 
metaphysical component “provides a scheme for understanding, a frame for interpretation, and a 
cornerstone for construction and reconstruction”, a theory depends on this component “for its originality 
and distinctiveness”. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Qin Yaqing’s concept of background knowledge derives specifically from John Searle’s notion 
of “background” and it is similar to what Foucault has called a “prior history” and Bourdieu “habitus”. John 
Searle, The Construction of Social Reality (New York: The Free press, 1995), 129.  
211 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”, 418. Qin refers to Vincent Pouliot, “The Logic of 
Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities”, International Organization, vol. 62, n° 2 
(2008), 257–88; Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, “International Practices: Introduction and 
Framework”, in Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot, (eds.), International Practices (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011), 16. Adler and Pouliot have pointed out, that “background knowledge 
consists primarily of inter-subjective expectations and dispositions, which can be grasped only as embedded 
in practice”. Theodore Schatzki, “Introduction: Practice Theory”, in Theodore Schatzki, Karin Knorr 
Cetina, and Eike von Savigny, (eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2001),1-19. 
212Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 36. As Bernstein explains in this regard, 
“according to an earlier tradition of hermeneutics, three elements were distinguished: subtilitas intelligendi 
(understanding), subtilitas explicandi (interpretation), and subtilitas applicandi (application). But Gadamer 
argues - and this is one of the central theses of Truth and Method - that these are not three distinct moments 
or elements of hermeneutics.”  
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involves application”.213  As Bernstein has pointed out “it is Aristotle's analysis of 
phronesis that, according to Gadamer, enables us to understand the distinctive way in 
which application is an essential moment of the hermeneutical experience”.214 
In the context of this epistemological approach the specific notion of “conceptual 
gaps” can be therefore regarded as a significant act of interpretation and “application” for 
understanding the weight and influence of the ideational gap between China and the EU.  
The focus on this key dimension of praxis is underlined also by Qin Yaqing who 
argues that international actors often represent “communities of practice”: in delineating 
this concept the Chinese scholar points out interestingly not only that the “most natural, 
spontaneous, and prototypical community of practice […] is a cultural community”, but 
that “[i]n this sense, a civilization-based cultural community is the most representative of 
cultural communities”.215 As we will see in the next sections this reference to culture as 
a factor which, “at the macro level shapes the way of thinking and doing of the members 
of a community” is an important analytical perspective to better understand the identity 
and actorness of both China and the EU (and its member states).  
At the same time, we have seen that in this process of hermeneutical interpretation 
and application Chinese IR theorists are not only influenced, like their Western 
counterparts, by their “culture and embedded in the background knowledge therein” but 
also that they, although critical of Western IR theories, have integrated them into their 
own discourses and narratives.216 A further element of complexity is related to the fact 
that China’s international behavior - and therefore its interaction with the EU - is shaped 
by both this broader “civilizational background” and the communist party state’s own 
ideology and political theory and culture. This multifaceted context makes us better 
understand the notion of conceptual gaps and the risks that a limited epistemological 
awareness can generate through “the dichotomous understanding and interpretation of 
cultural difference”:217 this has led to phenomena of Eurocentrism and Sinocentrism in 
the past interaction between Europe and China while - as Peter Katzenstein has warned218 
- it is also at the root of cultural exceptionalism if we refer to the relationship of the United 
 
213 Ibid.  
214 Ibid. 
215 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”, 429. 
216 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”, 430. 
217 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”, 431. 
218 Peter Katzenstein, “Duoyuan duowei wenming goucheng de shijie” (“A World of Plural and 
Pluralistic Civilizations”), trans. Liu Weihua, Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economic and Politics), n° 
11 (2010), 45–53. 
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States with both China and Europe.  
The hermeneutical clarification that we have tried to develop is aimed at reducing 
the risk of perpetuating, in analyzing the Partnership, a “dichotomous binary trap”219 of 
which the conceptual gaps are a manifestation. An epistemological/hermeneutical 
approach which takes into account also pluralistic perspectives will allow us to take 
advantage in the coming chapters of the “conceptual gaps” toolbox, both in terms of 
interpretation and of application. 
 
3.4 China and the European Union: two rising global powers, different in terms of 
historical background and identity  
 
The “epistemological synergies” that we have delineated make us indeed better able 
to understand the peculiar characteristics of the two actors of the Partnership. This is an 
important element that Pan Zhongqi addresses when he refers to the “actorness” of China 
and the EU. In this sense he argues that “besides culture and values, actorness also makes 
the picture more complicated. China and EU are two very different types of players in 
international politics today. China is writing its story of a peaceful rise and building itself 
as a consolidated sovereign state. The EU on the other hand, is seeking further regional 
integration and building itself as a unitary post-sovereign polity”.220  
 In assessing the defining components of the EU-China partnership it is indeed 
important to recognize the constitutive characteristics of its two actors. As Pan Zhongqi  
argues, the PRC regards herself and the international system as an environment populated 
by “modern” nation-states which express norms and values still shaped by the principles 
of “Westphalian sovereignty” while the EU has become a unique model of post-modern 
normative actorness. This different actorness clearly stems also from distinct identities 
shaped by the specific historical and “civilizational” backgrounds of the two actors. The 
two actors are, of course, very different also because the People’s Republic of China is a 
state - still shaped by the role and structure of the Chinese Communist Party and its 
ideology - while the European Union is a union of states which has developed its own 
identity but which reflects also the national identities of its member-states. This is a very 
important element for assessing the strategic potential of the China-EU Partnership and 
 
219 Qin Yaqing, “A Multiverse of Knowledge”, 432. 
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we need now to focus on it from the standpoint of the epistemological assumptions that 
we have tried to delineate in the previous paragraphs.  
China and the EU - as rising global players - have distinct identities shaped by the 
political, cultural, social, as well as material, circumstances in which they are embedded. 
It is important to note in this regard that social construction, suggesting difference across 
context rather than a single objective reality, underlines the importance of change at the 
international level, with subjects that are not static but ever-evolving as they interact with 
each other and their environment.221 As we will see, this is a crucial aspect for our analysis 
because both the EU and China are going through a phase of significant transition. This 
context inevitably influences – with a different degree of continuity and variation – the 
identity of China and the European Union, driven by a mix of material and ideational 
forces. It is also important to underline, as Peter Katzenstein rightly pointed out, that 
“much of the writing on state structures is in fact informed by a historical perspective. 
State structures are not only the products of competition in the international system but 
also of history. And the legacy of history leaves a deep imprint on their character”.222  
These aspects are particularly relevant for a country such as China whose 
thousands-year history has been characterized by a peculiar civilizational continuity but 
also by dramatic changes and upheavals. In this sense the Chinese discourse on the 
country’s historical identity and national interests has been often elaborated through “a 
rather constant ideological” view of Chinese history” which “has created a ́ mythological´ 
image of the Chinese past regarded as a ´cultural genealogy´ functional to legitimize the 
existing structure of power”.223 For this reason, in line with our epistemological premises, 
we can say that “the risk of either neglecting or misinterpreting significant elements of 
context such as history can indeed have for China various implications also in terms of 
foreign policy-making: the definition of China’s core-interests on the basis of national 
narratives, perceptions and misperceptions [has made] Chinese international behavior 
more influenced by a new nationalistic discourse”.224 
The set of debates on China’s national identity in parallel with its rise as a global 
power have been centered on the PRC’s distinct notion of modernity in the framework of 
the process of reform and modernization of the country. This process has been influenced 
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also by historical narratives which have become “a major driver of Chinese soft power 
projection in recent years as a means of legitimizing current practices by establishing 
links with ‘sometimes imagined’ historical precedents”.225 The role of the historical past 
in shaping the identity of an international actor - an aspect that both the English and 
Chinese Schools of IR226 have addressed - is a significant standpoint to analyze the 
actorness of China as a rising global power.  
 
3.5 China’s national identity: still a “prisoner of history”? 
The complex background of China’s history - sometimes perceived as the “weight 
of the past” - is a rich fabric in which stratified elements are intertwined in a pattern which 
has contributed to define Chinese national identity. In line with our epistemological 
pluralistic perspective we need to approach this key historical dimension being aware that 
it has been often used to justify Western foreign policy options vis-à-vis China. It is 
therefore necessary to factor into our analysis the Chinese perspective with regard to the 
historical encounter with Western counterparts which were, first and foremost, European 
powers, in particular in the period when China’s modern identity as a nation state was 
shaped.227   
The multifaceted dimension in the narratives of Chinese history and the fact that 
China has been the historical hegemon of East Asia for practically two millennia are 
reflected in a Chinese identity which has cultural, historical and political roots not only 
as a state but also – as Lucian Pye wrote - as a civilization which “pretended to be a 
state”.  The past role of the “Middle Kingdom” as the historical East Asian great power 
and its influence as the leading civilization of the region have also been used by Beijing 
in the last two decades for projecting the image of China as an alternative model to certain 
basic characteristics of Western modernity: this “charm offensive” has evolved since Xi 
 
225 Shaun Breslin, “Understanding China’s Regional Rise: Interpretations, Identities and 
implications,” International Affairs 85, n° 4 (2009), 824. 
226 Ambrosetti, Power and Influence, 134. “The focus on historical understanding is a distinctive 
feature of the English School of IR which has reflected on the central problem of how to construct a form 
of international society which is orderly and just. A key concept for the English school is the mutual 
recognition of sovereign states and the notion of “great powers” as an institutional component of world 
politics”. In this framework the British/Canadian scholar Barry Buzan has reflected about the rise of China 
and its integration in the international society”.  Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is “Peaceful 
Rise” Possible?”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 3, 2010, 5-36.   
227 James Mayall, “The Shadow of Empire: The EU and the Former Colonial World”, in 
Christopher Hill and Michael Smith (eds.), International Relations and the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press: 2006), 292-316. Ambrosetti, Power and Influence,135. 
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Jinping’s leadership into an approach which blends soft-power projection with more 
assertive undertones in developing initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative.228  
The historical interaction between Europe and China can be regarded as the most 
significant example, over the centuries, of both a dialogue and a clash of civilizations. If 
we consider Qin Yaqing’s concept of states as “cultural communities”, the “birth of the 
modern world” in 19th Century East Asia can be analyzed in retrospect as a process 
characterized, after an initial peaceful interaction, by an increasingly antagonistic 
encounter which “involved indeed not only the political and economic relations between 
an ancient and highly civilized country such as China and its Western counterparts but 
also a confrontation between cultural systems defined by profound differences”.229 
In this sense there is a link of continuity between the Chinese past and the present 
situation because, as Michael Yahuda has noted,  
“the development of the Chinese modern state is intrinsically linked with 
meeting the challenge of the West, or rather that of modernity. There has 
been a tendency to confuse the two, a confusion that of course is not unique 
to China, but which has been a particular obstacle to Chinese attempts to 
establish their political identity”.230 
 
In order to better understand some key dynamics of contemporary China, it is 
important to underline that – after Imperial China’s disruptive and humiliating political 
decline and collapse of its entire society – it has been “a different form of modernity, 
communism, which developed a fundamental discourse on national identity and statehood 
and reached the modernization standards and the nation-state structure that a reformed 
Japan acquired much earlier in its modern history”.231  
 
228 On the Chinese soft power see Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China is 
Transforming the World (New Haven CT, Yale University Press, 2007).  
229 The key role in this encounter played, on the European front, mainly by the United Kingdom 
and France is an element that we cannot neglect when we set in a broader historical context China’s 
interaction with the EU and, in particular, its member states. At the same time – in parallel with this 
confrontational encounter with European powers – during the 19th century the Chinese predominance in 
East Asia was gradually diminished by the rise of modern Japan and the crucial presence of the United 
States in the Asia-Pacific region, two key elements of context which still characterize the security scenarios 
in East Asia. Ambrosetti, Power and Influence,136. 
230 Michael Yahuda, “The Changing Faces of Chinese Nationalism. The Dimensions of 
Statehood”, in Michael Leifer (ed.), Asian Nationalism (London: Routledge, 2000), 25.  
In the period of confrontation with the “European West”, the Chinese dynastic state - 
notwithstanding the collapse of its politico-institutional and socio-economic structures - “was first 
unwilling and then unable to thoroughly accept modernization”, unlike Meiji Japan which forged a new 
national identity through a process of radical reforms driven by a Westernization of its institutions and 
society. Ambrosetti, Power and Influence,136. 
231 Ambrosetti, Power and Influence,137. 
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This confrontation with modernity made the Middle Kingdom evolve from a self-
centered, universal dimension based on the “centripetal” elements of the Chinese 
civilization to a Westphalian nation-state. However, it has never  fully obliterated, even 
in the history of Communist China, some foundational elements of its traditional culture 
and historical heritage. It is interesting to note in this respect that some of the most 
important representatives of the Chinese School of IR have developed concepts indebted 
with the traditional philosophical thought: Yan Xuetong with its reference to morality – 
a quintessentially Confucian ideal – as a balancing element vis-a-vis  material power and 
the basis for Wangdao (“humane authority”). Zhao Tingyang with his idea of a “tianxia 
system” opposed to the Westphalian order and aimed at a truly global system founded on 
coexistence. Qin Yaqing - as we have seen - with its strong focus, in a framework of 
“zhongyong dialectics”, on the notion of the state and society as cultural and civizilational 
communities. If we consider these Chinese theoretical perspectives it is interesting to note 
that the great American sinologist John K. Fairbank has rightly pointed out that 
modernization is not an autonomous process: “if we define it as a country’s and people’s 
development in the framework of a comprehensive response to modern technologies, we 
must recognize that it is linked to profound and complex interactions with cultural values 
and national trends”.232 For Fairbank this means, on the one hand, that modernization 
tends to produce some degree of ”convergence” in all countries, since modern science 
and technology, particularly in the present times of globalization, are international 
realities influencing all societies in a similar way; and, on the other hand, that individual 
countries respond to the modernization process according to their institutional and 
cultural backgrounds.233  
China’s international behavior as a global power seems underscore that the 
Chinese complex historical process of modernization as a national state and the sheer 
weight of its past civilization do not represent any longer a "paralyzing syndrome" for the 
PRC’s ambitions in the 21st century. In this sense Xi Jinping’s China seems to be 
determined to overcome the self-centred and inward-looking trends of development that 
Chinese civilization had for centuries adopted in contrast to “the ‘outward looking’ 
 
232 John K. Fairbank, Storia della Cina Contemporanea (Milano: Rizzoli, 1996), 19. Jurgen 
Osterhammel, Storia della Cina Moderna (Torino: Einaudi, 1992), 16. 
233 Jurgen Osterhammel has written that the reaction of China to the challenge of Western modernity 
has been mainly analyzed according to criteria focused on the capacity of the Chinese system to overcome 
the constraints of its traditional culture and historical heritage in order to follow the path of development 
of the Western countries and societies in modern times. Osterhammel, Jurgen, Storia della Cina Moderna 
(Italian edition of the History of Modern China, (Torino Einaudi, 1992), 16. 
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approaches of the West’s ancient classical civilizations and, later on, of the great 
European nation-states.234 Imperial China regarded modernization not as a free choice but 
as a fundamental means of controlling the new dynamics of change resulting from the 
imposed interaction with the West. 21st century China wants instead to be a driver of 
change also in the most advanced strategic sectors.235 If the challenge of modernization 
in Imperial China was not perceived mainly as a cultural process but as a process of 
acquisition of western technologies, the PRC under Xi Jinping seems to consider its future 
predominance in the technological sector not only as a fundamental instrument of 
strategic competition but also as a way to preserve the communist party-state’s core 
ideological and political values.236  
As Tu Wenming has written, the narratives of the violent encounter with the 
“West” in the 19th  century underline how this set of events were first and foremost a 
confrontation with a civilization technologically more advanced and with strong 
universalist pretensions of its own which “fundamentally dislodged Chinese intellectuals 
from their Confucian haven ...[creating a] sense of impotence, frustration, and 
humiliation”.237 The “search for modern China” after the end of the Empire and the birth 
 
234 Ambrosetti, Power and Influence,138. 
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modernization process reluctantly, while Japan, after the first shocking confrontation, resolutely undertook 
a season of momentous reforms. In this sense, to the Japanese reformers of the Meiji period, modernization 
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of Sun Yat Sen’s Republic is an eloquent example of all the difficulties in finding a new 
viable political and cultural model in a country where the crisis was due also to the fact 
that – as Gramsci wrote referring to the “twenty years crisis” period -  the old was dying 
and the new was not born yet.238 
Evolving and contested narratives have reflected and shaped China’s relations 
with the West on the basis either of a “victimization” or of a “victor” syndrome, which 
have coexisted in Chinese nationalism.239 The programme of “national rejuvenation” 
launched by Xi Jinping at the 19th congress of the CPC tends to be characterized by a 
“victor syndrome”. These narratives are in stark contrast with the powerful victimization 
syndrome which - since the traumatic confrontation between China and West – has 
intermittently influenced the Chinese views of the world: from this standpoint it is easier 
to contextualize the meaning of the so called “Century of Humiliation” for the Chinese 
national psyche.240  
The Chinese party-state has been always acutely aware of this historical 
background that makes us better understand the obsession of modern China with a strong 
notion of sovereignty.241  
As Peter Gries has argued in this respect, “(t)he crucial national narrative of the 
“Century of Humiliation” (bainian guochi) from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-
twentieth century has been and is a central element to Chinese identity-shaping and 
nationalism”.242 The continuous production and reproductions of this kind of historical 
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institutions. China’s written language was another crucial factor in retaining a highly formalized education 
and means of conveying traditional knowledge, which resulted in preventing mass literacy and stifling more 
popular culture”. Ambrosetti, ibid. 
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242 In this sense, according to Gries, “the telling and retelling of narratives about the Century of 
Humiliation have framed and still partly frame the views and interaction of the Chinese with their Western 
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narratives not only contributed to shape China’s modern national identity, but also had a 
direct impact, as Gries points out243, on political dynamics. 
“The ‘Century’ is a continuously reworked narrative about the national 
past central to the contested and evolving meaning of being “Chinese” 
today. Furthermore, the “Century” is a traumatic and foundational moment 
because it fundamentally challenged Chinese views of the world”. 
 
In a perspective which addresses the strategic relationships of China as a global 
power it is relevant to understand whether, in terms of identity, “China is [still] caught in 
a (…) prison of history”244 fed by narratives such as the “bainian guochi”. In this sense 
the Chinese party-state seems to have been aware that national narratives “are stories 
…[which] infuse our identities with unity, meaning, and purpose. We cannot, therefore, 
radically change them at will”.245 If, as Stuart Hall has written246, “(i)dentities are the 
names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves in, the 
narratives of the past”, China, in Xi Jinping’s era, seems to be confident that its 
“rejuvenated” identity is that of a global power which, regaining its historical role, will 
be able not only to shape its own story but also that of the world. At the same time we 
must be aware, in analyzing China’s strategic relations with other global players such as 
the EU and the USA, that ”national identity is both dependent upon interactions with other 
nations, and constituted in part by the stories we tell about our national pasts”.247  
If the “weight of the past” continues therefore to be an important element of context 
to understand  China, it is important to note that in a phase of increasing strategic 
competition the present leadership has redefined and promoted its ideological worldview 
also by re-shaping “histories and traditions to serve contemporary ends”.248 This is not 
surprising because - as Geremie Barmé has written - “(e)very policy shift in recent 
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Chinese history has involved the rehabilitation, re-evaluation and revision of history and 
historical figures”.249  
The dimension of national identity - being relevant for some crucial aspects of 
China’s actorness - has significant implications for its strategic relations with Europe. It 
is indeed important to recognize not only that “historical narratives” have become “a 
major driver also of Chinese soft power projection as a means of legitimizing current 
practices by establishing links with ‘sometimes imagined’ historical precedents”250 but 
also that are part of the significant ideological background redefined by the party-state 
for its project of “national rejunevation”. These components of the Chinese party-state’s 
political and ideological elaboration contributes to support a “relatively new era of 
ideational persuasion” which relies also on the idea of a 
“historical regional order that prospered when China was strong and in a 
leadership position. Chinese values are being promoted in a form of 
occidentalism or 'reverse orientalism', in that they are depicted as the mirror 
image of all that the West (for which primarily read the US) stands for”.251  
 
In the last two decades the PRC has referred to “Historical China's appeal to 
harmony, peace and virtue…as providing a cultural alternative to Western materialism 
and individualism”.252 In Xi Jinping’s era these values have been complemented by 
the confirmation of the Marxist-Leninist principles and structure which define the 
leading role of the party-state. In the framework of an increasing strategic competition 
the PRC uses its historical and cultural background to be perceived not only as a model 
of values which can be adopted in the non-Western world but also as a dynamic and 
efficient ”hybrid system” - permeated by socialist and capitalistic principles - which 
has been able to undergo a process of impressive modernization while retaining and 
redefining some aspects of its specific identity. In a context characterized by trends of 
strategic competition, driven also by the growing confrontation in the field of 
technological innovation,  “for the first time in centuries, a further stage of 
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modernization might be a process influenced by the rising capacity of countries such 
as China to act as champions of a ’modernity’ based on non-Western values”.253  
This is a challenge for the main counterparts of a global China determined to act 
on the basis of a reinforced national identity which promotes an idea of the past which 
suits “official policy, on one hand, and intellectual endeavours to rethink China's place 
in the world on the other”.254  
 
3.6 National identity and the concept of sovereignty in China 
After considering the historical dimension of the Chinese national identity we are 
now in a better position to understand its influence on China’s international behavior and, 
as we will see later on in this chapter, its implications for the strategic relationship with 
the European Union. The Chinese discourse on sovereignty is part of the broader 
connection and interaction between China’s national identity and its international 
behavior. As Zheng Yongnian writes,255 the link between identity and international 
behavior should be identified not only in material factors but also in a broader dimension 
which includes cultural and identity aspects.  
In the period of reforms launched by Deng Xiaoping the focus on modernization 
was crucial: one of the effects of this process during the reforms era was, on the one hand, 
some de-construction of the functions of the state through decentralization, but on the 
other hand, a response aimed at implementing a form of “statism” conducive not only to 
the re-constructing of a new strong nation-state but also of a new national identity.256 In 
this context the so called “New Left” “tried to elaborate in the 1990s a response not only 
to neo-liberal theories but also to China’s transforming national identity and to the 
challenge posed by the country’s increasing Westernization”.257 The focus on such a 
debate can help us better understand how in the post-Mao era the twofold dimension of 
China's international rise and domestic reform, the definition of a distinct Chinese model 
of statehood and governance, anti-Westernization trends and the search of national 
 
253 Ibid. As Shaun Breslin rightly pointed out, a meaningful example of this trend are the efforts “of 
redefining and reinventing Confucianism (in China and beyond) as a means of redomesticating national 
capitalisms in response to the dominance of western global norms”.  
254 Ibid. 
255 Zheng Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China, modernization, identity and 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 10.  
256 Zheng Yongnian, Discovering Chinese Nationalism in China,13. 
257 Ambrosetti, Power and Influence, 132-133; on these themes see also He Gaochao and Luo Jinyi, 
”The nature of knowledge is its openness”, Hong Kong Journal of Social Sciences, (July 1995), viii. 
78 
 
identity have been constantly addressed in the ideological and political agenda of the 
Chinese party-state. In line with the epistemological considerations elaborated by 
scholars such as Qin Yaqing, the relevance of these debates - as Guo Jian has written - 
was related to their goal of deconstructing “Western knowledge of China and at the same 
time [of exploring] various possibilities to reconstruct China's own cultural identity and 
national subjectivity”.258 This kind of political and ideological approach undoubtedly 
resonates in the present context of Xi Jinping’s “new era”, where some of these themes 
seem to be revived. This is true also if we consider the parallel debates on the change in 
China’s international environment: this increased the perception of the policies and 
strategies of foreign actors, influencing identity changes to adjust to China’s new role in 
the international system. The “national rejuvenation” launched by President Xi Jinping 
is, in many regards, the latest manifestation of “statism”, with its emphasis on the leading 
role of a strong party-state determined to preserve its fundamental Leninist character. The 
recurrent renewed focus on “statism” reflects the presence of a “strong state complex” in 
the modern Chinese national background which is the outcome of China’s interaction 
with Western powers; as it has been noted in this respect,259 “the modern concept of the 
nation-state was imported from the West and nation-state building was influenced 
significantly by Western nationalism”.  
As Horseman and Marshall have written,260 the so called Westphalian nation-state 
has a twofold dimension: “the descriptive, historical one, which is linked to the end of the 
medieval ideal of ‘universal power’ (both political and religious) and the prescriptive, 
‘conventional’ one, which has been used, also in retrospect, to define the legitimacy of 
the national state’s sovereignty”. Both these dimensions are relevant for China: the 
imperial-universal one which characterized, in terms of ideology and practice of power. 
two millennia of its history; and that of the modern Westphalian nation-state which has 
characterized since the 20th  century both republican China and the People’s Republic of 
China.  
If we refer to the creation of the Chinese Empire – accomplished  in the 2nd century 
BC by the Qin Shi Huang Emperor – and its subsequent development during the Han 
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Dinasty as a centralized structure and an ethnically rather homogeneous society - we see 
that Imperial China has not just been a civilization which wanted to be a state. At the 
same time we need to be aware of the euro-centric and “ideological” character of the 
Westphalian model, which - being a structure functional to Europe’s political absolutism 
- implicitly excluded “a more nuanced and diversified concept of sovereignty…for 
political reasons”.261  
The ideas of “universal power” – typical of the European Middle Ages but also of 
the Middle Kingdom – rested on the assumption of a universal legitimacy and hierarchy 
of power, both in the political and religious sphere: this universal dimension in the 
Western Middle Ages was strictly associated with the Holy Roman Empire and the 
Church of Rome as the two universal medieval institutions in Europe.262 In China the 
imperial structure and ideology - centred on the figure of the emperor whose legitimacy 
derived by the theory of the “mandate of Heaven” - always had universalist pretensions 
and was never rivaled by other entities or models. For this reason, when the efforts of 
reform accelerated after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894 the imperial 
model was perceived in many regards as an obstacle to the creation of a modern Chinese 
state.263  As we have seen , during the era of Western imperialism in China the “dynastic 
state” was totally deconstructed, representing just a “fictio” of sovereignty: China was 
thus forced to modernize in order to survive and modern Western institutions and 
concepts flowed into the country and began to influence its own development.264  
In this period of crisis Western powers brought the idea of nation-state to China 
but they were not prepared yet to recognize China as a sovereign state because, as 
Theodore Friend wrote: “in the tradition of social Darwinism they treated Asian polities 
as legal and moral inferiors unless counterforce proved otherwise”.265 The domestic and 
international weakness of the Middle Kingdom reached a point which made China – as 
Hedley Bull interestingly argued – a member of the international system (being formally 
a sovereign state still recognized by other sovereign states) but not a member of the 
“international society”, because of its de facto unequal status vis-à-vis the major world 
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powers. This historical trauma and the continuing struggle to come to terms with political 
modernity is in particular identified by the loss of sovereignty which happened during the 
“Century of Humiliation”.266  
For this reason, since the birth of the modern Chinese state, great emphasis has 
been put on the principle of sovereignty267 which  has remained firmly rooted within a 
paradigm dominated by “traditional ideas of territorial and state security” and by a notion 
of sovereignty centered on the Westphalian nation state while, in this respect, the 
evolution of the European Union has made it “the first truly postmodern international 
political form”268 
 
3.7 Sovereignty in China’s contemporary political discourses 
 
The concept of sovereignty in the framework of The PRC’s political discourses 
“has been a keyword for many decades and will continue to be so in years to come”.269 
The main interpretation of this concept in China’s contemporary political theory and 
practice is a set of “entitled rights” such as territorial integrity, non-interference, 
independence and equality. On the basis of these substantial rights Mao Zedong and Zhou 
Enlai created the five principles of peaceful coexistence: mutual respect for territorial 
integrity and sovereignty, non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs, equality 
and mutual benefit, peaceful coexistence. The five principles - which became “a 
cornerstone of the non-aligned movement at the 1955 Bandung conference and are still a 
major pillar of Chinese foreign policy today” - are meaningful because they tend to 
underline how in the People’s Republic of China “state sovereignty is viewed as a prized 
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historical conquest and as a bulwark against foreign interference and oppression”.270 The 
PRC considers sovereignty as an absolute and fundamental principle strongly supporting 
in this field a position which is “more conservative and fundamentalist” than the EU’s in 
its interpretation of what it views as “the original meaning of the concept and thus in line 
with traditional understandings of the rules of interaction between states”.271 As Finamore 
rightly points out, in this sense the PRC can be regarded as the norm rather than the 
exception in international relations in its “staunch defense” of the traditional principle of 
sovereignty, which is in line with the position of other great powers such as the United 
States and Russia. As Wacker noted, the PRC’s authorities are “very strict in defending 
their sovereignty against interference from other countries or from international 
institutions”.272 The Chinese foreign policy and international behavior are based on the 
principle of sovereignty intertwined with that of national dignity (gouge): this term was 
coined by Deng Xiaoping who stressed that “without national dignity - disregarding 
national independence - a country, in particular the third world developing countries like 
China, cannot stand up”.273 
As Pan Zhongqi, notes,274 the PRC’s notion of sovereignty, as inseparable and 
non-transferable, underlines the absolute, sacred and inseparable character of the state275: 
on this basis the PRC has constantly underlined that the principle of sovereignty remains, 
contrary to various Western theories which challenged the continued relevance of it, the 
guiding principle of international relations.276 The idea that sovereignty can be 
transferable has been always opposed by Chinese officials. For this reason in the Chinese 
academic debate with regard to the process of European integration, it has been argued 
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by most scholars that “what the member states have given up to the EU is not their 
sovereignty but some of their governing power (or right), a process that is not 
irreversible”.277As Finamore writes,278 China’s adherence to this traditional, Westphalian 
view of sovereignty “translates into an opposition to foreign intervention and to the use 
of force in international relations, in full respect of the principle of mutual non-
interference in other countries’ domestic affairs”.  
The PRC’s position in terms of sovereignty is centred in this respect on the idea 
of “mutuality”, which was a driving concept of the Five Principles of Peaceful 
Coexistence. The 2011 White paper on China’s peaceful development279included in 
China’s core interests” state sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and 
national reunification”: this document refers not only to the PRC’s sovereignty over Tibet, 
Xingjang and Taiwan but extends it to the recent Chinese sovereignty claims over other 
disputed areas such as the islands of the South China Sea and their surrounding waters.280 
China’s regional approach to security issues, driven by a much more assertive stance 
stemming from its assumption of great power status, seems to weaken one of the crucial 
components - the principle of mutual non-interference - which characterizes its traditional 
idea of sovereignty.  
In contrast to a widespread thesis on the sources of the Chinese concept of 
sovereignty, Dan Blumenthal has developed an interesting critical argument to explain it 
which does not regard this concept as stemming from China’s search of being a “modern” 
nation state in a Westphalian sense: “though China must often behave in accord with the 
norms and historic patterns of a “normal’ nation-state, its dominant personality is that of 
empire”.281 According to Blumenthal, Xi Jinping’s “China dream” doctrine and his 
program of “national rejuvenation” aim at reviving “the greatness and ancient glory of 
China’s past, lost to Western and Japanese imperialism”.282 The Chinese historical 
concept of sovereignty was based on the Chinese empire’s refusal “to accept any country 
as a sovereign equal”.283 On the basis of Confucian notions of virtue, the Emperor was 
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indeed the universal ruler of “all under heaven” and this way of thinking, Blumenthal 
argues, “left no room for a plurality of sovereigns in international relations, let alone the 
new European concept of sovereign equality among notions”.284  
It is interesting to note - in contrast to Blumenthal’s reflections - the consideration 
of the universalistic tradition of the Chinese Empire elaborated by Zhao Tingyang in his 
“Tianxia System” and “A Possible World of All-under-heaven System”285. By referring 
to concepts of Chinese political philosophy he draws conclusions quite different from 
Blumenthal’s. Zhao argues that the contemporary international system is not based on a 
universal institution or, at least, on actors which have universalistic aspirations: the lack 
of a comprehensive “worldview” deprives the international system of the possibility of 
having institutions that are of and for all nations and peoples and that are able to resolve 
conflicts and transnational issues. According to Zhao, the constitutive structure of the 
Westphalian international system is not functional, by nature and by design, to deal with  
increasingly complex transnational problems and global issues. In contrast to it, the 
Confucian “all-under-heaven system”, intrinsically inclusive, could offer an “ontology of 
coexistence”, not centred on the conflicting dynamics of nation-states, which is aimed at 
fostering genuine perpetual peace, successful governance, and a stable world order.286  
Both Blumenthal’s and Zhao’s arguments tend to underline, however, that the 
conceptual gap between China and Europe (and the rest of the world) with regard to the 
concept of sovereignty has deeper roots than it is usually perceived.  In this sense different 
understandings of sovereignty and its applicability would affect not only EU-China 
controversies on issues such as Taiwan, Tibet, the arms embargo, Africa and the Iranian 
nuclear issue. This distinctive concept of sovereignty, stemming from a Chinese 
“civilizational identity”, would influence China’s actorness and its very idea of 
international relations. As John Fairbank wrote,287 “the Chinese tended to think of their 
foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principle of social and 
political order that was manifested internally… China’s foreign relations were 
accordingly hierarchic and non-egalitarian”. We will discuss later on whether 
Blumenthal’s fundamental argument that China “seeks a new order based on this imperial 
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Sinosphere” is  an accurate description  of the PRC’s evolving worldview, but what is 
evident from this analysis is that the concept of sovereignty does not seem to constitute a 
bridge in the relationship between the European Union and China. From this standpoint 
it is therefore necessary now to focus on the European Union in terms of its own notion 
of sovereignty, being aware that it is interconnected with its identity as an international 
actor. 
 
3.8 The concept of sovereignty in the EU debate  
 
In contrast to China the European Union is often regarded as a “post-Westphalian 
or post-sovereign polity”.288 Against this traditional background, we need to recognize, 
however, that the debate on sovereignty in Europe has been recently living through a new 
and complex phase characterized by “sovereignist” positions which seem to be weakened, 
however, by the effects of the recent global crisis.  
In Europe the role of sovereignty as a key principle has been declining, being put 
under scrutiny both from a conceptual and a practical point of view. Even though 
conventional sovereignty rules have never been abandoned in and by the EU, the 
European approach to sovereignty has been regarded as “reformist” and even revisionist, 
considering it as “subordinate to the fulfillment of State responsibilities and employing it 
pragmatically as an optional tool both within and outside Europe”.289 The “sovereignist 
turn” in European politics has, however, problematized the opinions of analysts such as 
MacCormick and Henkin who considered sovereignty an outdated principle to be 
dismissed or even relegated to the “shelf of history as a relic from an earlier era”290 The 
evolution of the concept of sovereignty within the EU had in past decades focused more 
on its character of accountability: sovereignty has been regarded as “an inescapable 
responsibility to govern in a certain manner”. From this perspective “the legitimacy of 
sovereignty has changed from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility”, 
including the principle of “responsibility to protect” with its strong focus on the human 
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rights dimension.291 Overall, as Risse has underlined, “the EU has rejected the notion of 
unitary sovereignty”, considering it as relative, and transferable. Moreover the idea that 
sovereignty can be shared and divided at a transnational level “serves as the theoretical 
basis underpinning European law and legal order”.292 These views elaborated within the 
European Union on sovereignty represent an approach to international relations which 
reflects also the identity of the EU as an international actor.  
 
3.9 The identity of the EU as an international actor 
 
As we know, the European Union is neither a nation state nor a classical 
international organization:293 its peculiar and innovative nature as an international actor - 
stemming from the unique features of the process of European integration - poses the 
question of the identity of the Union itself as distinct from the national identities of its 
member states. At the same time the influence of some member states’ national identities 
on the EU’s relationship with China is not a secondary issue, in light also of the “weight 
of the past” in the relations between Europe and China.  
As an international actor, the EU has developed a distinct sense of itself on the basis 
- as Manners wrote - of its unique combination of “historical context, hybrid polity and 
legal constitution”.294As Nicola Verola and other authors argue, the international identity 
of the European Union has been emerging in the last decades from the EU’s “collective 
identity”,295 that is the idea that the democratic life and dynamics of the European 
institutions have shaped, over the years, a European “demos”, a community of citizens 
which identifies in the EU common values, rules and practices. The peculiar mix 
represented by the process of European integration has produced distinct ideas and 
institutions in this context: “individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human 
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rights and cultural freedom […] are European ideas not Asian or African, nor Middle 
Eastern ideas, except by adoption”.296 
This is a crucial aspect, considering the epistemological assumption that we have 
chosen, because these ideational components of its identity shape the actorness of the EU 
and reverberate on its relationship with China. As Hill and Smith write, the ideas that bind 
the EU’s member states together reflect “also a strong emphasis on the EU’s evolving 
approach to IR on the ideational quality of the EU’s international role. This involves the 
development of EU’s principles and a view of its contribution to ‘international 
society’”.297  
As Ian Manners has argued - and Hill and Smith underlined - “what the EU is 
matters at least as much as what it does, in terms of the impact on others”.298  
The fact that the EU’s identity and legitimacy has significant implications for its 
actorness is clearly an aspect that we also need to consider in connection with the 
ideational dimension of the strategic relations between Brussels and Beijing. If the EU, 
in contrast to China, has resisted so far the temptation of a “civilizational view of 
European identity”, it is undeniable that the evolution of this identity in the framework of 
the process of European integration has shaped this “quiet superpower” as a peculiar and 
innovative international actor.299 In order to better understand what kind of international 
power the European “post-sovereign” polity has become and what this implies in terms 
of interaction with a great power such as China it is necessary to consider, first, the main 
labels which have been attributed to the European Community since its early years: those 
of a civilian and normative power. 
 
3.9.1 The European Union as a civilian and normative power 
 
In 2000 Romano Prodi, then President of the European Commission, stated that: 
“we must aim to become a global civil power at the service of sustainable global 
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development. After all, only by ensuring sustainable global development can Europe 
guarantee its own strategy security“.300 This statement by Prodi reflects the broad debate 
which, since its inception, has been aimed at defining the nature of the European 
Community/European Union considering the fact, as Ginsberg wrote, that is “is neither a 
State nor a non-state actor, and neither a conventional organization nor an international 
region”.301 At the same time, if one considers the categories to define an international 
power proposed by Buzan, it is difficult to regard the European Union “as a great power 
in a classical sense”.302 Nevertheless, its impressive development and institutional 
evolution has made the EU a key actor on the international stage because of “its 
significant presence in nearly all international matters” and its ability “to have an impact 
on today’s complex world”.303  
       The European Community was defined back in the 1970s by François Duchêne 
as a “civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on armed 
force”.304 Duchêne emphasized for Civilian Power Europe (CPE) the need of 
characteristics such as “interstate multilateral cooperation, democratic control and soft 
power over coercion and hard power favored by other international actors”.305 A civilian 
power was supposed to concentrate on the proliferation of “social values of equality, 
justice and tolerance”. The idea of a civilian power, on the basis of the different theoretical 
contributions of Karen Smith, Hanns Maull and Stelios Stavridis has indeed been that of 
an actor which “conducts its foreign policy through non-military instruments, is subject 
to democratic control and is willing to address international matters in cooperation with 
others”.306 However both the notions of civilian and normative power have been 
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“contested concepts, bearing inconsistent definitions across academia”.307 The fact that 
the EU has perceived itself first and foremost as a civil power is not surprising: as Krohn 
notes, “indeed, the best example of the pursuit of civilian means is the creation of the EU 
itself”.308 
       The underlying philosophy of the process of European integration have 
“translated also into a civilian foreign policy”309 and into the EU’s role as a global 
advocator of human rights and the rule of law: the EU has always aimed at “moralizing 
its external relations” also as the largest provider of development assistance.310 
However, after the approval of the Lisbon Treaty, it is rather difficult to define the 
EU as a pure civilian power because of the increasing importance of its defence and 
security dimension.  This significant evolution is clearly visible if we compare the 
European Security Strategy of 2003 – which was a notable advance on previous language 
on security issues but still stated that “spreading good governance, supporting social and 
political reform, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best 
means of strengthening the international order”- with the Global Security Strategy of 
2016 which has a much greater focus on security issues and cooperation in the defence 
sector.311 The development of a more distinct defence dimension aimed at stressing its 
greater strategic autonomy and the fact that the European military capabilities and 
budgets, if pooled, would be second only to the United States, clearly do not make the 
EU a military power in the classical sense.312 However, if it is true that, in spite of its 
growing “hard power”, the EU has never used military means as a primary tool for its 
foreign policy and “cannot be described as a pure military power, neither in a classical 
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nor in a newer sense”,313 it is also true that the significant EU developments in the field 
of security and defense have made the Union an actor which cannot be regarded either as 
a pure civilian power anymore. 
      If we consider the characteristics of the PRC as a strong military actor since its 
creation but in particular through the impressive building up of its military capabilities in 
the last two decades, it is clear that the difference between the two partners with regard 
to these issues is structural: at the same time their evolving strategic approach to defense 
and security – an area that was regarded as a possible opportunity for closer cooperation 
in a more multipolar perspective when the EU-China Partnership was established314 - is 
a factor which cannot be neglected in the framework of the future interaction between 
Brussels and Beijing. 
    Because of the difficulty of simply categorizing the EU as a civilian or military 
power Manners conceptualized the EU as a normative power, that is a power which is 
able to define what is “normal” in world politics and acts as “a changer of norms in the 
international system”. As he wrote: “the ability to define what passes for ‘normal’ in 
world politics is, ultimately, the greatest power of all” because that means, more 
specifically, shaping the key norms which govern international life over and beyond law 
and formal rules.315 The concept of normative power is not new: Carr defined it as a 
“power over opinion”; Galtung as an “ideological power” which makes an actor 
“committed to regard universal norms and principles as the focus of its relations with 
other actors”.316 
There is a strong normative element in the European notion of civilian power: for 
Normative Power Europe (NPE) as with Civilian Power Europe (CPE) “the underlying 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law are still 
important but its ideological power and ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in 
international relations is most significant”.317 As Manners has underlined, the EU’s 
unique combination of “historical context, hybrid polity and legal constitution” makes the 
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Union normatively different than other actors  because it “exists as being  different to pre-
existing political forms, and this particular form pre-disposes it to act in a normative 
way”.318 
An issue  which is extremely  relevant  vis-à-vis the strategic EU approach to China 
is how this “normative way” is reflected in the European foreign policy making.319 The 
introduction of the so-called “conditionality clauses” - which imply that human rights, 
democratic principles and the rule of law are “essential elements of EU aid and political 
agreements with third countries - should be, in principle, a significant factor for the 
interaction between the Union and China; however, the EU external relations have been 
balanced by the intergovernmental dimension of the EU foreign policy which is 
influenced also by the realist views of the member states.320 
Even though it is questionable whether the EU is an effective and consistent 
normative power, what is relevant for the analysis of our subject is that in its attempt to 
be a normative power the EU has placed the promotion of universal rights at the centre 
of its foreign policy, trying thus to act as an example for other states both in what it does 
inside the EU and what it tries to stand up in foreign policy.321 Overall, we can say that 
the EU as an international  actor is now a power which “typifies the merger of a civilian, 
military and normative identity”.322  
This theoretical debate provides us with some important elements of reflection in 
the perspective of the EU’s Strategic Relationship with China. Notwithstanding realist, 
state-centred views undermining the idea of the EU as an effective actor, the evolution of 
the Union and the development of its Foreign and Security Policy have allowed it to 
become a significant player in world politics. At the same time it has been widely 
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recognized that the EU is a “sui generis geopolitical entity”, a sub-system of international 
relations” which has nonetheless been affecting international politics on a global scale.323  
       In this perspective the distinction between the EU’s civilian and normative 
power elements can be considered a useless dichotomy because “the concept of normative 
power, rather than being distinct from civilian power is already enabled in the former” 
and there is no ontological separation between the two.324 The idea itself of CPE and NPE 
has been put under scrutiny by scholars who found firstly that the debatable element in 
these concepts is that of Europe as power.325  
If we consider the centrality in the EU’s external relations of the issues of rule of 
law, democratization of human rights protection and advancement it is clear that this 
approach of NPE is intrinsically problematic in the partnership with China, which is partly 
a revisionist power with regard to the Western-centred set of international principles, 
norms and practices that we usually refer to as the international liberal order. At the same 
time this approach of NPE is not easily negotiable because it pertains to how Europe, as 
a power, is constructed: also Manners has reiterated that “the most important factor 
shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does and says but what it is”.326 
When CPE and NPE are analyzed, the focus on actorness, on agency is crucial - instead 
of that on its ontological components - in order to understand the Union’s global role: 
“the EC/EU emerged from an idea of Europe and so was moulded into the type of power 
model that was desired”.327 This model constructed the EU as intrinsically superior, in 
particular in its identity as NPE which, rather than implying universality, created a 
“dichotomous other as morally inferior”, perpetuating in this way a “North-South 
dichotomy whereby the South is portrayed as a victim and the North as its humanitarian 
saviour”.328 In this perspective it has been argued that “both CPE and NPE have been 
constructed, at least in part, as a strategic operation” aimed at concealing and legitimating 
“its power political interests in the guise of humanitarianism”.329  
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This is a theme which has significantly resonated in the Chinese analytical debate: 
the critique of NPE has been focused by Chinese authors, such as Pan Chengxin, on the 
EU’s key policy of “constructive engagement” regarded as a normative project 
implemented through “the discursive construction of a European Self“ which makes the 
“Chinese Other” in European self-image.330 What is particularly relevant here is the 
acknowledgement of the power implications of NPE which shapes and legitimates a 
particular EU’s foreign policies in order to enhance the role and the influence of Europe 
as an international actor.331 From this perspective the practice of “routinized 
relationships” with “significant others” – as in the case of China – validates and gives 
substance to NPE agency. We will see in the next chapter how these Chinese analytical 
positions have deconstructed the EU policy of “constructive engagement”, in its “overly 
ambitious goal of transforming China”,332 as a concept “ill-defined in theory” and 
“inevitably fraught with contradictions in practice”. 
It is useful to take into consideration these arguments because they underline how 
this European approach can set the EU’s actorness on a collision course with the PRC 
which, in terms of identity, is still influenced by a historical victor-victim syndrome and, 
in terms of agency, is increasingly determined to act as a normative power in order to 
change some basic tenets of the international liberal order. In this sense the European 
determination of being perceived as a promoter of values such as democracy, 
multilateralism and human rights is indeed being put under scrutiny by a more assertive 
“Normative Power China” which considers this approach as affecting some of its core 
interests such as stability and non-interference and creating a dysfunctional playing field 
for the possible definition of common strategic goals in the framework of the EU-China 
Partnership. 
The critique of Europe’s construction as both a normative and civilian power has 
been based not only on the above-mentioned arguments against a Western-centric 
approach but also on the idea that it served to minimize the shortcomings of the EU role 
as a military power and as an actor in the realm of power-politics.333  As we have seen, 
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the recent evolution of the EU in the security and defense sector – as underlined by the  
Global Security Strategy – tends to make these arguments partly outdated.334  
The construction of positive perceptions of CPE and NPE has made it possible for 
the EU to exert influence by “soft balancing” on some occasions the other two major 
poles of the “strategic triangle”. In this respect it is partly true that “whatever its origin, 
Europe today is no longer about peace; it is about projecting collective power”.335  
The 2016 Global Security Strategy seems to confirm that the “mixed nature of the 
Union’s foreign policy personality” is based not only on a process of structural and 
functional integration of  civilian and military capabilities but, more importantly, on a 
strategic approach whereby “material and value judgements are intertwined”.336  
In this transitional phase the growing strategic role of the EU as an international 
actor responds to the complex relationships between ethics, interests and power by 
considering “both the justifications for the exercise of power and the problems this 
generates”337. This model - which combines not only civilian elements of power but also 
military, social and material elements - reflects the fact that the process of European 
integration has been and is a normative endeavour which has characterized so far the EU 
as a predominantly civilian power consistently supporting the importance of multilateral 
cooperation and of international and supranational institutions.338 The last decade has 
seen the international system evolving towards what has been called an “interpolar 
world”, where multipolarity and interdependence tend to merge:339in this context both the 
EU and China are not only key actors but also actors whose identities are - as we have 
seen - characterized by specific elements and dynamics which form a significant 
background for their international role and their strategic interaction.  
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3.10 Identity, sovereignty, actorness: the potential for conceptual gaps between 
China and the EU 
 
In this chapter we have tried to analyze China and the European Union from the 
point of view of those essential components which shape their identity and actorness not 
only as prominent players on the world’s scene but also as counterparts in the framework 
of their Strategic Relationship.  
On the basis of the epistemological/hermeneutical assumptions delineated in the 
first part of the chapter we have focused on the ideational elements which influence what 
they are and what they do as international actors. In line with one of the key 
epistemological arguments delineated, it has been necessary to outline how the two 
protagonists of the relationship perceive themselves – the multifaceted dimension of their 
identity – and how this identity is reflected in their actorness. In doing so we have tried 
to develop our analysis on the basis of an epistemological interaction between the phase 
of “interpretation” and that of “application”: this aims at better identifying the sources of 
the conceptual gaps which affect the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 
As we have seen, a first significant conceptual gap which divides the PRC and the 
EU is the concept of sovereignty. As most authors recognize, a significant conceptual gap 
on sovereignty exists between the “fundamentalist” Chinese views and the European 
“reformist” ones. To make the issue more complex, the traditional European position on 
this subject has been evolving in recent times on the basis of the “sovereignist” views of 
some of its member states. This is a distinctive aspect of the issue of the EU’s identity 
and actorness: that is, the identity and actorness of its member states. While the EU has 
been recently experiencing an intense debate on the question of sovereignty, “it is not 
expected that China will relinquish or modify the understanding of sovereignty in its 
political dictionary”.340  
At the same time, we have seen that there are critiques of the Chinese concept of 
sovereignty, such as Blumenthal’s, which clearly affect arguments which assume that 
“the antagonistic approaches to sovereignty have not prevented the construction of a 
strategic partnership” between the EU and China,341 as Pan Zhongqi has written. It seems 
indeed problematic - in particular in a phase of growing strategic competition - to agree 
 




with the opinion that “excluding sovereignty and human rights issues, China and the EU 
can usually find common language”.342  
The idea of sovereignty and the concept of human rights stem from the identity of 
China and the EU and profoundly influence their actorness. For this reason, as Zhongqi 
Pan himself has to admit, “the conceptual gap on sovereignty seems destined to cast a 
shadow over China-EU relations in the foreseeable future“; he also recognizes that, to a 
certain extent, “the maturity and stability of the relationship is contingent on how both 
sides manage their views on sovereignty. It would therefore be wishful thinking to expect 
that the relationship will easily overcome the current hurdles associated with their 
conceptual gap on sovereignty“.343 
What we have tried to underline in this chapter is that - in order to analyze the 
Strategic Relationship between Brussels and Bejing - is necessary to better understand 
the two counterparts of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in terms  of their identity 
and actorness. As we have tried to demonstrate, significant conceptual gaps, such as that 
related to the concept of sovereignty, stem from these essential components of the two 
actors.  
We have recognized, in the framework of this fundamental but preliminary 
reflection, the role of ideational factors for the two strategic partners because “identities 
and interests contribute to shaping each other through a continuous process of interaction 
and mutual constitution”.344 
In this sense the “dilemmas of identity” continues to be a key aspect in the EU-
China strategic interaction, as European and Chinese authors have underlined over the 
years.345 The increasing difficulties in the Partnership are also linked - as Reuben Wong 
has argued - to the redefinition of the identities and roles of the EU and the RPC in the 
evolving international order. As its role expands, China is “forced to re-evaluate its 
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identity and preferences, choosing to selectively remember or forget symbols of the past 
and present”, while the identity of Europe as NPE sets it “on a course of collision” with 
Beijing.346 
After this analysis, mainly devoted to “who” the two actors of the Strategic 
Partnership are, in the next chapter we will need to analyze “what” China and the EU 
have done and can do in the framework of their Partnership in terms of strategic 
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The EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: antecedents, motivations, 
evolution. 
 
This chapter aims at exploring some essential elements of the China-EU 
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” by investigating firstly the notion of strategic 
partnership as elaborated by the EU as an instrument of its external relations. Against this 
background we will focus on this specific relationship by analyzing the different 
dimensions which are supposed to make it “comprehensive and strategic”. In doing so we 
will have to investigate, on the one hand, the EU-China Partnership’s antecedents, 
evolution, motivations and on the other, how it has been conceptualized and 
operationalized by both parties “on paper” and in practice.  At the end of this analysis, 
we will try to draw some conclusions as to the material elements, conceptual gaps and 
normative divergence which affect the strategic dimension of the Partnership in a phase 
of its development which is characterized by a paradigm shift in the interaction between 
China and the European Union. 
In order to understand the conceptual framework which influences the EU-China 
Strategic Partnership we have to underscore once more that, while the People’s  Republic 
of China is a traditional state actor, the European Union can be regarded as a “subsystem 
of international relations” which has a significant “capacity to generate external collective 
action”. At the same time, as we have seen, the EU is regarded as “a major power 
impacting upon contemporary relations (…) which occupies a certain position in the 
international hierarchy of power”.347 Last but not least, we regard in this context the EU 
as a “unitary actor” because we have argued that it has an identifiable foreign policy 
which is distinct from that of its member states and is produced through “unique 
subsystems”.348 
As we know, the peculiar structure of the European Institutions does not envisage 
a “EU government continuously responsible for policymaking”.349 Its functioning in 
terms of foreign policy is based on two “subsystems”: the intergovernmental one which 
is “comprised of the member states coordinating external action through the European 
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Council and the various incarnations of the Council of Ministers (the Council)”; the other 
subsystem, the supranational one, “comprises the European Commission as the primary 
actor, although the Council exerts influence by setting the policy agenda to which the 
former adheres”.350 The European Parliament is part of the supranational subsystem and, 
even though – as Scott Brown observes – it has “no ability to formulate policies 
independently or to block the preferences of other actors”351 it has often been a very 
important contributor to policy discourse on relations with China. 
The clarification of the specific nature of the European Union as an international 
actor is necessary to better understand the interaction that has been taking place in the 
framework of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Even though we 
consider the EU a unitary actor, it is important to be aware of the set of relations that, in 
parallel, link EU member countries to China on a bilateral basis. This is a relevant aspect 
that we will address more in detail later on in chapter 7. 
In general terms, we have to recognize, as a preliminary consideration, that there 
has been a rather vague conceptualization of the notion of “strategic partnership” both in 
the EU and China. As May-Britt U. Stumbaum and Wei Xiong have written,352 the 
process of conceptualization and operationalization of the term “strategic partnership” 
has been defined on the basis of different aspects. The first aspect - taking historical, 
political, cultural factors into consideration - focuses on the elements that have shaped 
the two actors of the Partnership. After having analyzed in terms of identity and actorness, 
“the EU and China [as] global powers in the making”353 we will focus in this chapter on 
the Strategic Partnership as a dynamic process subject to continuous external influence 
stemming from the development of the two partners, an evolving international context 
and new policy paradigms.  
On this basis we will analyze which concept of strategic partnership has been 
defined by the EU and China and which mutual expectations have been linked to it. We 
will then focus on the substance of the Strategic Partnership in terms of its relational and 
structural strategic dimension. We will finally try to assess whether and how the different 
conceptualizations and operationalizations of the Strategic Partnership, “exaggerated by 
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the dynamics of two emerging powers in an ever-changing interpolar world”,354 have 
materialized not only in conceptual gaps about the nature and objectives but in an 
increasing ideational and normative divergence between Brussels and Beijing which put 
under scrutiny the paradigm of “constructive engagement”.  
 
4.1 The strategic partnerships of the EU 
The EU-China Strategic Partnership is not unique in the context of the Union’s 
external relations and foreign policy making. As several authors have pointed out, the EU 
has been “a relentless generator of framework agreements and strategies, and is 
consistently searching for settled, stable, and predictable frameworks within which to 
define and pursue its international relationships and activities”.355 In the context of the 
EU “political and contractual relations”, more recent agreements between the Union and 
third countries tend - as Keukeleire and Bruyninckx note - to strengthen “the political or 
strategic dimension of the relationship and widen and concretize the scope of cooperation 
and dialogue”: this approach is aimed at reflecting the growing importance of the partner 
countries “as well as the increasing political character of the EU as an international 
actor”.356 
The proliferation of EU’s “strategic partnerships” seems to have become “a 
standard operating procedure, that is to periodically upgrade the label of the EU’s 
relationship with other major powers”.357 In this respect, as a EU senior official has 
observed, this network of relations “tells much about the increasing ambitions of the 
Union as a global player and, at the same time, underlines all the difficulties of deepening 
and better structuring in terms of substance this modus operandi”.358 In this sense the 
EU’s set of partnerships reads more as a “catalogue of policy domains that are on the 
agenda of their meetings rather than as well-formulated strategies to pursue well-defined 
objectives through intensive and purposeful common actions”.359 The main question that 
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we have to answer in this respect is whether for China, as for other BRICs, the label 
“strategic partnership” functions as a “rhetorical façade which masks the reality that the 
EU, in fact, has failed to transform” this kind of relationship into a truly strategic 
partnership.360 
As Giovanni Grevi has rightly pointed out, “the very concept of strategic 
partnership is ill-defined and the formal list of the…partners is too heterogeneous to 
provide direction”. For this reason - it has been often argued - the EU approach in this 
respect “owes less to a clear-sighted masterplan than to the travails of a process which 
seems to have evolved in a partly accidental way”.361 Moreover, with regard specifically 
to the EU-China relations, we have to take into account that the Strategic Partnership has 
not been codified in a single document and this - as Scott A.W. Brown has observed362 - 
has partly obscured some of its objectives and implications.  
At the same time this approach “provided flexibility for the EU to characterize new 
dialogue and cooperative efforts as evidence of the growing Strategic Partnership, giving 
substance to its stated objectives of helping China emerge as a responsible actor”, in 
particular in multilateral settings.363 From a theoretical point of view, the concept of an 
EU Strategic Partnership has not only be criticized as ill-defined but also as “relatively 
empty of political substance”; it has indeed been accused of being an “amorphous 
concept” which has led “a somewhat awkward life in EU diplomatic parlance”.364  
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With limited theoretical elaboration on the concept of strategic partnership in the 
field of Political Science and International Relations Theory, some authors have tried to 
take advantage of definitions developed in the business sector. However, the only 
elements which seem useful and applicable elsewhere in the theoretical work developed 
by this area of study are that strategic partnerships imply mutual long-term goals and 
commitments, are often “highly complex” and are the outcome of extensive 
negotiations.365  
The difficulty of defining a strategic partnership is underlined also by Jonathan 
Holslag who adopts in this regard a realist approach by arguing that “a strategic 
partnership is what States made of it”.366 Expressing the opinion that “strategic 
partnership have more to do with form than with purpose”,367 Holslag believes that, in 
spite of different interpretations of the concept of strategic partnership, it is possible to 
identify some essential defining features: a strategic partnership should be based on 
explicit common interests and expectations which are formulated for the long term. The 
aims of such a partnership “need to be multidimensional and operationalized in the 
economic, political and military areas of interest”.368 Holslag argues that another key 
feature is that a global range is needed; moreover, the incentives related to it should be 
“of such a nature that they cannot be achieved without partnership and serve to distinguish 
it from other relationships”.369  
Guenther Maihold370 has argued that the cultural idea of partnership carries not only 
expectations of equality in rights, tasks and influence in the development of the 
partnership but also an assumption of “exclusivity”. Although this is clearly not the case 
for the EU and China, which have been expanding their networks of strategic partners, 
Maihold introduces an argument which is not trivial: a truly strategic dimension cannot 
easily include a large number of partners unless the very concept of strategic partnership 
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is in fact reduced to a kind of higher level and longer term bilateral form of relationship 
and cooperation. 
An interesting view on the defining criteria of a strategic partnership is offered by 
Grevi: he agrees with those authors who argue that a real strategic partnership should 
include basic elements such as “comprehensiveness, reciprocity, empathy and normative 
proximity, duration and the ambition to reach beyond bilateral issues”.371 By putting this 
kind of relationships in a global context, Grevi, in addition to the above-mentioned 
parameters, argues that truly strategic partnerships are “those that accompany current 
power shifts with a shift towards positive-sum and not zero-sum relations among mayor 
powers”.372 The above mentioned criteria can undoubtedly offer useful benchmarks to 
assess the strategic dimension of a partnership. On this basis, a crucial guiding principle 
should be that, as Grevi rightly points out, “partnerships are strategic when they pursue 
objectives that go beyond purely bilateral issues and help foster international 
cooperation”.373 
If we consider the very diversified set of countries with which the EU has developed 
strategic relations, it is fair to recognize that no common criteria have been identified 
whether in terms of the partners’ power status, their normative affinity or the core EU 
interests pursued through such partnerships.374 Two more significant rationales, however, 
seem to underpin the EU concept of strategic partnership, namely the normative proximity 
and/or the political and economic clout of the partners: this approach, as Grevi notes, 
could differentiate the notion in two categories - partnerships of choice and partnerships 
of necessity - even though each EU partnership “includes an uneven mix of elective 
choice, inescapable necessity and also quite practical convenience, depending on the 
issues at stake”.375 
With a view to our subject of research and considering the conceptual framework 
we are trying to delineate, the “interest-values continuum” is clearly another important 
element to be thoroughly assessed on the European front; references to this continuum 
can be found in all the main EU policy-papers regarding the Strategic Partnership and it 
has been clearly reiterated as a key element of the EU’s external action by the High 
Representative, Federica Mogherini, in the 2016 Global Strategy  for the European 
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Union’s Foreign and Security Policy.376 The first paragraph of the document itself states 
that, in order to navigate a “difficult, more connected, contested, and complex world”, the 
EU will be guided “by our shared interests, principles and priorities. Grounded, in the 
values enshrined in the Treaties…”.377 In this respect, as an EU policy planner has 
commented, “the new Global Strategy represents a significant step forward for shaping a 
strategic approach which is firmly based on a re-defined interests-values continuum in 
light of the macro-trends affecting the international system: this will undoubtedly affect 
also the development of the Union’s partnerships”.378 
This continuum is a key component of the Union’s approach to the strategic 
dimension of its external relations but it does not have, as we will see, the same 
prominence in the Chinese approach to the concept of strategic partnership. This 
difference of perspectives derived also from the fact – as Scott A.W. Brown has pointed 
out – that “the perceived importance of the Strategic Partnership was greater on the EU 
side, as it expected this to facilitate greater discussion of key issues while China 
anticipated that it would result in less discussion”, shielding the PRC government from 
pressure on sensitive topics.379  
Another difference – a conceptual gap in the opinion of Stumbaum and Wei Xiong 
– is that “in timeline and speed applied to the question of when a strategic partnership 
shall bear fruit”.380 For the Chinese approach a strategic relationship is intrinsically 
characterized by a long-term perspective while the European thinking has more recently 
evolved towards some degree of “strategic impatience” which could be regarded as a 
further signal of the evolution of the traditional approach of “constructive engagement”, 
substantially centered on long-term objectives.  
The difficulty in defining this complex dimension of the EU’s external relations 
was epitomized by Herman van Rompuy who said, not without some sense of humour : 
“ we have strategic partners, now we need a strategy”.381 For this reason Biscop and 
Renard have argued that strategic partnerships should be based on a preliminary strategic 
review including the following elements: “know thyself”, that is identifying values, 
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interests and the desired kind of strategic interlocutor; “knowing the other”, assessing 
potential partners and “knowing the rules of the game”, that is a better understanding of 
the dynamics which shape the international system in this evolving phase.382  
 
4.2 Before the Strategic Partnership: the initial phase of EU-China relations 
 
As we have indicated in the Introduction of this thesis, the timeframe that we have 
chosen is that comprised between the establishment in 2003 of the EU-China 
“Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” and the present. Of course, as it has been often 
pointed out, historical periodizations “are always at risk of appearing somewhat 
arbitrary”383 but , in our case, we deem it important to analyze the period in which the 
relationship has been regarded by both sides formally as a “strategic partnership” in order 
to analyze its reality and its aspirational dimension.  
It is necessary, however, to consider some key events pre-dating the declaration of 
the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” because of their significant impact and 
influence on the definition of the strategic dimension of the partnership itself. In particular 
two “inflection points” in the evolution of the EU-China relationship, prior to 2003, are 
relevant for the arguments that we are going to develop in this chapter: the Tiananmen 
square events of June 1989 which focused the world’s attention on the crucial issue of 
human rights and political freedom in China and the introduction by the EU in 1995 of 
the concept of “constructive engagement”.  
The Tiananmen crisis and its aftermath brought to the forefront of the EU-China 
relationship the key question of human rights which is still a fundamentally unresolved 
problem in the Strategic Partnership. The 1995 Commission policy paper entitled “A 
long-term policy for China-Europe relations” recognized the rise of China as a source of 
“enormous opportunities and challenges to the international system”384 and introduced 
for the first time the concept of “constructive engagement” which has been a defining 
element of the EU’s strategic approach vis-à-vis China. These two key antecedents still 
influence the EU-China relations and set the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in a 
context which can help to clarify some of its key components.  
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As Jing Men has observed, the initial development of bilateral relations between 
the EU and China was rather slow: only in 1975 were diplomatic relations established, 
even though the People’s Republic of China had been founded in 1949 and the European 
Communities had come into existence a decade later.385 This was due to the fact – as 
David Shambaugh has remarked – that “Brussels-Beijing relations were to a large degree 
derivative from their respective relations with Moscow and Washington” and the strategic 
competition between the two superpowers obstructed the cooperation between the two 
sides of the recently established relationship.386 Moreover, as Jing Men notes, “neither 
side had an independent motive for developing relations with the other”.387 These 
substantial limits reduced the scope of the EU-China cooperation: by the end of the Cold 
War only two relatively important agreements had been signed: a trade agreement in 1978 
and one on trade and economic cooperation in 1985. 
The late 1970s were a period of historical transformation for both the PRC and the 
EC: the end of the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao Zedong gradually opened a 
period of domestic political stabilization which was marked by the emergence of the 
figure of a new leader, Deng Xiaoping, who was to be the architect of the long season of 
economic reforms which had such an extensive and profound impact on the further 
development of China. In Europe the 1970s, years of crisis both in socio-economic and 
political terms, witnessed some important developments in the process of European 
integration: after the enlargement in 1973 with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the 
United Kingdom, the European Council was formalized in 1974 and, more importantly, 
in 1979 a European Monetary System was devised and the first direct election of the 
European Parliament took place. In this evolving context, as Moeller has written, the 
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the EC can be regarded to some 
extent as the acknowledgement of each other’s “future international potential.”388 
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The 1980s has been considered as a period of “normalization”389 of the EC-China 
relationship which witnessed not only an increase in economic, cultural, military and 
scientific exchanges but also the emergence of a “new perception of international politics 
as an increasingly multi-polar system in which both China and Europe could constitute 
poles in their own right”.390 During the 1980s, notwithstanding reciprocal positive 
perceptions, the EC-PRC relationship “appeared to be high on rhetoric and low on 
substance” lacking a truly strategic approach on either side.391  
 
4.3 The Tiananmen crisis and its long-term consequences 
The end of the decade brought about, however, the first major crisis in the Europe-
China relations following the tragic events of Tianamen Square which took place in a 
broader context of radical change in the international system, following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall which led to the demise of the bipolar 
order. From this perspective the decisions taken at the time of the Tiananmen crisis by 
the leadership of the Chinese party-state – under the direct guidance of Deng Xiaoping 
himself – represent a crucial turning point with lasting implications for the international 
relations of China: the key issues of democratization, political reform, and human rights 
– which were at the heart of the crisis – are still relevant in many regards and continue to 
impinge on the strategic dimension of the Partnership. Even though the tragic events of 
the 4th of June 1989 trigged economic sanctions and an arms embargo that the EC 
promptly adopted, following the US lead in this respect, only one year later the 
relationship with the PRC began once again to be normalized on the European front.392 
As Scott Brown has written, it is true that the “relatively quick violation and eventual 
cancellation of certain sanctions by member states demonstrated that Tiananmen had not 
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revised the prevailing interpretation of China as an economic opportunity.393 However, in 
spite of these successful efforts at normalizing the relations with Beijing, negative 
perceptions in the West were historically increased after the Tiananmen crisis, which 
marked a fundamental turning point also for the process of political reforms in China.394 
It is fair to note that the PRC, sensitive in that delicate phase to the urgent need of “threat 
reduction” in terms of perceptions, reasserted its “good neighbor” policy based on the 
fear of international isolation.395  
This period can be regarded indeed as a crucial juncture in Chinese contemporary 
history: the two-year process which began with the Tiananmen “incident” and ended in 
1992 - with a stabilization of the Chinese leadership and CCP’s move in a more 
conservative direction - basically decoupled, as Willy Wo-Lap Lam has pointed out, the 
economic reforms of the emerging “socialist market economy” from the process of a 
gradual transformation of the political system, that Zhao Ziyang and the reformist wing 
of the party had favored.396  It is fair to note, in particular in light of the ideological 
approach propounded by Xi Jinping, that the “cardinal principles” (keep to the socialist 
road; uphold the dictatorship of the proletariat; uphold the leadership of the Communist 
Party; uphold Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought”) which, after Tiananmen, 
aimed at safeguarding the leadership and dominance of the CCP in a logic of regime 
survival are still considered valid by the Chinese party-state.  
While the Tiananmen events did not disrupt the evolution of the EC-China relations 
in a dramatic way, they had long-term consequences not only with regard to specific 
measures such as the arms embargo but also in terms of overall perceptions of the Chinese 
regime. In the 1990s these perceptions - fueled by events such as the Taiwan crisis in 
1996 - reinforced in the West the positions of the supporters of a policy of containment 
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towards a rising China.397 However, this debate in Europe was less significant than in the 
United States: when talks with the Chinese authorities were resumed after the Tiananmen 
crisis and the sanctions were lifted, the European Parliament regarded these decisions as 
intended also “to allow the Community to operate with greater effectiveness, especially 
in the area of human rights”.398 As Christiansen has written, “after Tiananmen the EU 
was forced to put the relationship with China into a broader political and human rights 
context. But soon a fear of losing the China market to US and Japanese competition 
especially in investment led to a political readjustment”.399 
The Tiananmen crisis exposed key issues such as the respect of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms which are still unresolved in the framework of the EU-China 
Partnership. It is interesting to note that – if the European and American reactions to 
Tiananmen differed to some extent – also the United States, after a first muscular reaction, 
softened its stance towards China and in 1992 confirmed a policy of “comprehensive 
engagement”400 based on the fundamental assumption that economic cooperation and 
integration would ultimately lead to political liberalization of the Chinese political 
system. The Clinton Administration, at the beginning of its first term critical of Bush’s 
“soft approach”, from 1994 on adhered substantially to this cooperative China policy.401 
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In this context the “convergence paradigm” was supported by the declarations of the 
Chinese regime itself: on occasion of the lifting of the European sanctions the Council - 
justified its decision to move in that direction by referring to the assurances given by the  
PRC that it was “irreversibly committed to a policy of reform and openness” and to human 
rights, as its accession to the main international human rights conventions and its 
participation to the UN Commission on Human Rights could prove.402 
In the years after the Tiananmen crisis, the European approach aimed at 
“constructive engagement” began to take shape in a context in which China was ready to 
devise a policy vis-à-vis Europe aimed at further reducing threat perceptions and 
reinforcing the goal of a more multipolar international order. In doing so the Chinese 
leadership chose to focus its diplomatic efforts on the major European member-states 
rather than on the EC itself,403 following an approach which has remained an important 
constant over the years. 
The possible commonalities between Beijing and Brussels that were identified in 
that period by the Chinese leadership were a transition from a bipolar to a multipolar 
system; the promotion of peace and stability through consultation and the recognition of 
the UN’s leading role in conflict resolution; the high complementarity in economic 
terms.404 As Finamore writes,405 President Jiang Zemin, during a visit to Paris in 1994, 
further elaborated on these concepts by listing his “four principles for the development of 
relations between China and Western Europe”. Probably the most meaningful thing in 
this list is the title because the Chinese leader did not refer in it to the EC as a specific 
entity and international actor preferring to use a vaguer term – from a geo-political point 
of view – such as “Western Europe”.406 
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The economic driver was undoubtedly an important aspect for the resumption of  
EC-China relations after Tiananmen and in this process the role played by Germany was 
significant in shaping the EC policy of “constructive engagement” vis-à-vis China. 
 
4.4 “Constructive engagement”: the creation of a long-term paradigm of 
cooperation between Europe and China 
 
Germany’s China policy after the Tiananmen events was extremely pragmatic and 
trade-oriented – as was, on a lesser scale, that of Italy – and benefited from the lack of 
contentious issues with the PRC. This was not the case for the United Kingdom in 
connection with the future status of Hong Kong, or for France because of its arms sales 
to Taiwan in the early 1990s. Even though economic priorities were prominent in 
Germany’s relations with the PRC, Berlin tried to develop a more comprehensive vision 
for this relationship which was held to be within a broader national Asian strategy, the 
first to be defined by a European country. The German China policy was based on some 
key principles: “one China policy”, an understandable objecvtive for a recently reunified 
Germany; “change through trade” which reflected the belief that respect for human rights 
and democratization would come as a result of China’s economic cooperation and 
integration with the rest of the world; and “silent diplomacy” which stemmed from the 
previous principle as an attempt of avoiding open confrontation with Beijing on sensitive 
issues such as human rights.407 Germany’s Asia and China policies were influential in 
shaping an EC approach to China centred in substantial terms around the concept of 
“constructive engagement”. The process of “Europeanization” of Germany’s China 
policy is evident also in the sequence of the main reference documents: in 1994 the 
European Commission’s communication entitled Towards a new Asia strategy followed 
a 1993 German paper on the strategic relations with Asia.408 In 1995 the Commission 
issued a new policy paper , A long-term policy for China-Europe relations, which, by 
recognizing the rise of China as a source of “enormous opportunities and challenges to 
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As Jing Men has written, the Commission’s 1995 paper - which marked the opening 
of a new stage in bilateral relations – indicated “an understanding by the EU of the rising 
importance of China in the world and pointed out the need to improve relations with 
China” through the establishment of a long-term relationship which “should reflect 
China’s economic and political influence in the world and the region”.410 In this 
perspective the paper underlined that: “the rise of China is unmatched amongst national 
experiences since the Second World War. China is increasingly strong in both the 
military-political and economic spheres. Abroad China is becoming part of the world 
security and economic system at a time of greater economic interdependence and when 
global problems, from protection of the environment to nuclear non-proliferation, require 
coordinated commitment from governments worldwide”.411 
Against this background, the element of novelty represented by the introduction of 
the new concept of “constructive engagement” was not clarified, however, by the 
Commission which in its policy paper referred to it with regard to the political relations 
with China; only later on, the scope of this guideline was expanded to include all the main 
elements which characterized the EU’s overall approach to China.412 The approach 
encapsulated in the notion of “constructive engagement” was undoubtedly influenced by 
the “primacy of trade” which represented the major driver of Europe’s relations with 
China at the time.413 What is also important to note, however, is that in its communication 
the Commission employed “a discourse based on rules, norms and values not only in 
relation to political objectives, but also with regard to economic ones”.414  
More problematic, especially if seen in retrospect, was the European approach to 
the crucial issue of human rights, which substantially reflected Germany’s policy of 
“silent diplomacy and change through trade”. The key criterion chosen by the 
Commission was that of “effectiveness” which had to be based on a “combination of 
carefully timed public statements, formal private discussions and practical cooperation”: 
this approach was motivated by the assumption that “human rights tend to be better 
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understood and better protected in societies open to the free flow of trade, investment, 
people and ideas”.415  
The conceptual basis of European policy has been regarded, as Moeller has written, 
basically as “an attempt to reconcile the abstract human rights imperative with real 
economic interests on the ground”.416 This was the outcome, as we have seen, of 
“horizontal Europeanization” and of “bottom-up projection”417 of a national China policy, 
namely that of Germany, because of the difficulties or even failures of the national 
policies of the other two major European member states, France and the United 
Kingdom.418  
Moreover, as Leon Brittan argued, the idea that there was “no alternative to 
engagement with China”419 was largely legitimized by the “comprehensive engagement” 
policies pursued in the United States during the 1990s and early 2000s by the Bush and 
Clinton administrations. If it is partly true, as Casarini and Finamore argue, that the policy 
of constructive engagement proved to be flexible enough to allow Europe to devise an 
approach vis-à-vis China which combined “elements of civilian and normative power 
with more traditional realpolitik”,420 we need to problematize the long-term implications 
of such an approach also in connection with the subsequent establishment of the Strategic 
Partnership between the European Union and China.  
As Christiansen, Kirchner and Wissenbach have written, “the 1995 EU policy paper 
set out the stage for the subsequrnt developments and already covers most of the topics 
that would remain on the EU-China agenda until today, in particular trade and economic 
cooperation, political dialogue and human rights […] The paper introduced a key theme 
that would remain in the subsequent documents: European trade and investment was 
believed to lead to a more open and democratic China”.421 
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The promotion of political values and the advancement of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is a crucial ontological and deontological dimension for the 
internal and external relations of the European Union which has been operationalized in 
the framework of the policy of “constructive engagement”, a key antecedent of the EU-
China “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, which has contributed to shape some 
fundamental assumptions on which the Partnership has been based.  
In this context it is interesting to note, as Scott A.W. Brown has written, that “there 
have been no significant debates over the implications of China’s rise within the EU. The 
clear preference at the conceptual level of the relationship has been for an engagement 
strategy…Engagement policies have persisted with few deviations, primarily because 
policymaking has not been constrained by protracted debates over the implications of 
China’s rise”.422 This is a very important argument that elucidates also some key tenets 
of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: this is why we needed to focus on it before 
addressing the main topic of our research, that is how the EU-China Strategic Partnership 
has been defined and evolved over time and what is its truly strategic dimension. 
 
4.5 The birth of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: its context and 
motivations 
 
In 1998 the European Commission issued a document entitled “Building a 
comprehensive partnership with China” which reiterated concepts of engagement by 
stressing that “China’s emergence as an increasingly confident world power is of 
immense historic significance, both to Europe and to the international community as a 
whole”. In this context the EU should aim at “engaging China further, through an 
upgraded political dialogue, in the international community” and “supporting China’s 
transition to an open society based on the rule of law and the respect for human rights”.423  
The idea of an “all-round strategic partnership” between the EU and China – as 
Jonathan Holslag writes – was uttered for the first time, at a bilateral level, in June 2003, 
by French President Jacques Chirac and Chinese President Jiang Zemin who “expressed 
their joint objective of promoting a multipolar world order” while the United Kingdom 
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and the People’s Republic of China had started a strategic consultation mechanism in the 
same year.424  
The European Commission upgraded the existing Comprehensive Partnership to 
the level to a Strategic Partnership by issuing in September 2003 a policy paper entitled 
“A maturing partnership - shared interests and challenges in EU-China relations” which 
emphasized shared interests not only in bilateral relations but also in global affairs by 
recognizing that “the EU and China have an ever-greater interest to work together as 
strategic partners to safeguard and promote sustainable development, peace and 
stability”.425 The following October the joint statement of the EU-China Summit 
underscored that “the expanded intensity and scope and the multi-layered structure of 
China-EU relations” was “an indicator of the increasing maturity and growing strategic 
nature of the partnership”.426  
At the end of 2003 the European Security Strategy (ESS) - which officially named 
the instrument of strategic partnerships for the first time - included China among the EU’s 
six strategic partners. It is important to note that in the same year the first Chinese “EU 
policy paper” was issued by the PRC government: as Jing Men observes, even though 
this document came eight years later than the first EU policy paper on China, “this was 
nevertheless the first policy paper targeting a specific country or a region ever produced 
by Beijing, suggesting that China attached great importance to its relations with the 
Europeans”.427  
It is also interesting to compare, as Jing Men does, the content of the two policy 
papers. Against the strong focus on the EU side on human rights and China’s transition 
to an open society, only a short paragraph was devoted to the issue of human rights in the 
Chinese document. In this respect it is meaningful to note that the Chinese policy paper 
admitted that on some issues there were differences in understanding between the two 
sides even though it was stressed at the same time that there was “no fundamental conflict 
of interest between China and the EU and neither side poses a threat to the other”.428 Here 
we can see that from the very beginning of the Strategic Partnership, in particular in the 
Chinese document that set the stage for it, there was awareness of “differences in 
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understanding” but the response to it was just a realistic consideration that no concrete 
threat or interest represented a hurdle preventing such a relationship from developing. 
The perception of the challenges of moving the EU-China relationship beyond a mainly 
commercial and economic dimension is present in the EU documents which reflect, at the 
same time, a renewed paradigm of engagement hopefully leading to greater democracy, 
openness and transparency in the Asian country.  
As Richard Maher has written, a more open and politically liberal China was 
regarded in 2003 by the EU, “in addition to the normative appeal of consolidating 
democratic institutions and practices”, as a potential reliable partner on a set of key issues 
of mutual concern429. As it was tellingly underlined in the statements of the Franco-
Chinese meeting between Chirac and Jiang Zemin, geopolitical aspirations motivated the 
upgrading of the relationship at a strategic level.430 In this perspective the President of the 
European Commission Romano Prodi called for a “new world order” for the management 
of global affairs and David Shambaugh defined at the time the Strategic Partnership as an 
“emerging axis” in the framework of evolving international relations.431  
Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security 
Policy later in 2003 made a speech in Berlin in which he elaborated on Prodi’s statements 
by underlining that: “no single country, however powerful, can deal with all the problems 
alone…A stronger Europe with a common strategic vision is also a Europe capable of 
consolidating relationships with the other great partners”.432 After the visit to China of 
President Prodi in April 2004, the new President of the European Commission, Manuel 
Barroso - who visited China in July 2005 - confirmed this EU vision of the Partnership 
by saying that “the development of a strategic, mutually beneficial and enduring 
relationship with China” was “one of the top foreign policy priorities for this century.”433 
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On the Chinese side, government officials and analysts considered the EU “as a 
possible counterweight to the United States and an important element in a global system 
in which power and influence would be distributed more evenly”.434  Chinese Premier 
Wen Jiabao, in a 2004 speech, defined the Partnership itself and its main elements: 
“comprehensive” referring to “all-dimensional, wide ranging and multi-layered 
cooperation” in various fields, including the economy, science and technology, politics 
and culture. “Strategic” in this context implied “long-term and stable…EU-China 
relations” which transcended “the differences in ideology and social system” and were 
“not subjected to the impacts of individual events that occur from time to time.”435 Wen 
Jiabao defined the concept of “partnership” as cooperation “on a equal footing, mutually 
beneficial and win-win” based “on mutual respect and mutual trust” and aimed at 
“expanding converging interests” and seeking “common ground on major issues”.436 
In the period after the launch of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership the EU-
China relations enjoyed a phase of “honeymoon” for a couple of years, as Jing Men has 
written.437 Exchanges of visits by top leaders became more frequent, even though a 
summit meeting mechanism, aimed at strengthening cooperation and communication 
through top level annual events, had been in place since 1998.  
In October 2003 the 6th EU-China took place in Beijing438 and in December 2004 
the 7th Summit took place in The Hague.439 In parallel with the establishment of the 
summits mechanism, since the 1990s Beijing and Brussels had developed other 
significant cooperative arrangements such as sectoral agreements and political dialogues 
“affecting the full range of their relations, from trade and financial affairs to the 
environment, energy, education, consumer and labour safety, space cooperation and civil 
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society. In 2005, after the 8th Summit which took place in Beijing,440 the first meeting of 
the EU-China Strategic Dialogue was held in London in December of the same year. The 
first phase after the launch of the Strategic Partnership developed in a context infused 
with optimism.441 Beyond these very positive expectations the analysis of the EU and 
Chinese policy papers underlines, as Christiansen, Kirchner and Wissenbach have argued, 
that in 2003 “both sides declared a strategic partnership focusing on the common ground 
despite […]actually quite different visions of the partnership. Interestingly, neither side 
consulted with the other ahead of their respective publication, a typical blind date”.442 
 
4.6 The institutionalization of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: a work in 
progress 
 
Just after two years from these positive expectations, however, growing frictions 
and disputes – ranging from the protracted EU arms embargo to the rapidly increasing 
European trade deficit with China and the protection of intellectual property – started to 
put under scrutiny some important aspects of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 
In 2006 the sixth EU policy paper – which was divided in two separate documents443 – 
reiterated, on the one hand, Europe’s engagement with China and its commitment to 
support its transition, while on the other it underlined that the Union needed “to leverage 
the potential of a dynamic relationship with China based on our values.”444  
At the same time, both sides recognized the necessity to revise their cooperation 
framework which dated back to 1985. The negotiations for a new Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) started in January 2007 and still need to be finalized. 
Nonetheless the framework was further expanded by the launching of two senior-level 
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fora to promote wider and deeper cooperation: the High-level Economic and Trade 
Dialogue, established in 2007 at the 10th Summit – which focuses on areas such as trade, 
investment, intellectual property rights and market access – and the High-level Strategic 
Dialogue, begun in 2010, which addresses issues ranging from climate change and 
nuclear non-proliferation to regional security”. 
Notwithstanding the increasing level of cooperation and dialogue there has been no 
comprehensive agreement in which the Strategic Partnership has been codified since its 
launch in 2003.445 As Chen Zhimin and John Armstrong have pointed out,446 while the 
above-mentioned agreements “laid the basic foundations for the EU and China to co-
operate in economic and other individual sectoral areas, and the unilateral policy papers 
served to drive the relationship to a higher level, the two sides have not yet provided a 
comprehensive bilateral legal framework to guide and regulate the significantly 
broadened relationship”. Without a comprehensive strategic agreement the widening and 
deepening of the bilateral relationship has been coupled with a peculiar process of 
codification, through which bilateral co-operation practices are codified in legal, political 
and policy norms. For the most part, this has been “achieved through the accumulation of 
bilateral agreements, joint statements, unilateral policy papers and efforts to negotiate the 
reconfiguration and streamlining of engagement in the form of an overarching partnership 
and co-operation agreement between the EU and China”.447 
If the increasing institutionalization and codification of China-EU relations have 
suggested in the past that both sides were keen for the relationship to be managed in a 
more harmonious fashion, this should not disguise – as Chen and Armstrong argue – “a 
number of outstanding difficulties brought into focus by increased mutual awareness (of 
each other’s systems and global strategies) and sensitivity (brought about by increased 
interconnection). What the rhetoric of ‘strategic partnership’ encounters in reality is the 
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4.7 The development of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in practice and on 
paper: convergence or divergence? 
 
A good reference for this kind of analysis are the joint statements made after each 
annual Sino-European summit even though, as Holslag notes, statements “do not 
guarantee implementation, and summit organizers might inflate the aims on paper 
compared to the ambitions in reality”.449 The analysis of the summit statements can offer, 
though, an overview of the evolution of the priorities and areas of co-operation along with 
the joint interests which are identified with an either bilateral or international range. In 
his analysis – which encompasses only the summit joint statements of the first period of 
the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (2003-2007) Holslag points out some features 
that will continue to characterize the statements of the following years: the low number 
of identified interests compared to the proposals for interaction. Against a limited number 
of joint interests, “needs” or “necessities”, the objective of increasing “dialogues” and 
“exchanges” was often underlined in the statements even in areas where common interests 
were not clarified.450 Holslag has argued that - in determining whether China should be 
considered a strategic partner - the EU’s key parameter has been the existence of an 
institutional framework, increasingly developed and complex, which is epitomized by the 
regular holding of annual summits between Brussels and Beijing. However, the main 
problem in this respect has been that interaction has thus been taken for granted, while it 
has been much more difficult to properly define the needs and interests that ought to 
underpin the Strategic Partnership.451  
Against this background it is interesting to consider an important argument made 
by Giovanni Grevi with regard to the nature of the EU strategic partnerships: for the 
Union the first function of a strategic partnership, Grevi has written, “is a reflexive one, 
namely the self-assertion of the EU as a partner, an actor or a pole in a challenging 
international system. From this standpoint, the very fact of announcing a strategic 
partnership sets up the two parties as pivotal mutual interlocutors, upgrading their status 
in mutual relations and beyond. Establishing a strategic partnership therefore carries 
political value for both parties but it may do so in different ways, at different stages”.452    
As we have seen, this discrepancy in the significance given to their strategic partnership 
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by China and the European Union was clear from its establishment and has been 
underscored by the different degree of ambition expressed by the two counterparts in 
terms of their strategic objectives. In this respect we can say that China has always had a 
realistic view of its Strategic Partnership with Europe: Beijing has fairly consistently 
promoted the idea of “seeking common ground while reserving differences”.  
At the same time, Chinese analysts have often underlined that – in spite of the 
contentious issues such as the arms embargo, the Market Economy Status, increasing 
trade disputes – “the China-EU partnership should not be undervalued ”because it is an 
essentially important institution that helps stabilize China-EU relations. Moreover, 
through its impressive set of dialogues and cooperative activities, the Partnership 
contributes to the development of world economy and global security”.453   
As Grevi has pointed out, from an EU’s standpoint “strategic partnerships fulfill 
not only a ‘positional’ role – setting the EU on the map as a key global player beyond 
trade and economic issues – but also what has been defined as an ‘integrative’ role. 
Performing as a strategic partner requires the EU to improve coherence between the 
different instruments in its toolbox and between action at the EU and national level”.454  
The issue of the Union’s cohesion in its strategic approach to China vis-à-vis the 
national policies of its member states is a key aspect because the Strategic Partnership not 
only has created substantial expectations but also has put the credibility of the Union on 
the frontline.455 For this reason, Grevi has argued, the practice of strategic partnerships 
can expose “the relative fragility of the Union at both the institutional and political 
level”.456  
In this respect the 2008-2009 global crisis had a very significant impact on the 
dynamics and perceptions within the Partnership. After the crisis, attitudes vis-à-vis 
Europe were influenced, not insignificantly, by widespread Chinese perceptions of the 
potentially declining role of the EU as a global strategic actor. As authors such as Jing 
Men,457 Piecke and Chang have underscored458 ”whereas for more than a decade, policy 
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makers and Europe specialists in China had regarded the EU as an example of regional 
integration and as a promising new ‘pole’ in the global order…, in the wake of the 
Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, and the ‘Brexit’ referendum, many perceive the EU as 
a troubled actor unfit to deal with the existential challenges confronting it, let alone play 
a credible leadership role beyond its own borders”.  
As Roland Vogt argued, the “crisis of the European model” stemming from the 
crisis made the EU “much less interesting to Chinese decision-makers than before”459 
bringing about a dramatic change in official Chinese perceptions, with a profound reversal 
of traditionally optimistic attitudes towards the Union.460 Until the 2008-2009 inflection 
point Chinese perceptions of the EU and of EU-China cooperation had been largely 
positive despite periodic setbacks and challenges in the development of the Partnership.461  
The traditionally positive Chinese vision of the process of European integration 
began to be put under scrutiny from 2011 onwards, by a debate in China on the EU’s 
future, divided into two main camps.462 On the one hand financial experts and the more 
ideological Chinese political scientists “saw the crisis principally caused by structural 
problems within the EU which it was unable to address”; on the other many Europe 
specialists and economists continued to underline “the historical success story of the EU”, 
believing in the economic “logic” of the EU and remaining “cautiously optimistic about 
its future”.463  
Later developments such as the migration crisis, terrorist attacks and particularly 
the rise of populist/sovereignist/nationalist political dynamics and sentiments in Europe 
– of which Brexit has been the most significant outcome – “have revealed that truly 
profound problems are facing the EU” and raised in China “strong doubts about the EU’s 
capacity to root out these problems in the foreseeable future”.464 This debate on the 
“decline of the EU” focused on three essential problems which made the EU a 
“compromised global actor” in Chinese eyes: deepening economic and political divisions 
between the core and the periphery of the Union; a lack of the “required institutional 
effectiveness and flexibility to implement the necessary reforms and reinvent itself”; a 
“legitimacy gap” which made the Union “increasingly incapable of reaching and 
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convincing European citizens”.465 This Chinese debate has been focused also on the 
“increasingly inward-looking attitudes in several parts of the Western world” which 
contrasted “sharply with developing and emerging countries, including China itself, 
which in many ways are becoming more outward-looking, firmly embracing 
globalization as a means of achieving progress”.466 These European attitudes have been 
regarded as unproductive by Chinese observers because they fuel “the perception in the 
developed West of a ‘threat’ from emerging countries like China, which is often seen as 
a ‘winner of globalisation’ - and therefore as a wrongdoer bearing primary responsibility 
for the adverse effects of globalization”.467  
What is particularly relevant in this analysis of the Chinese evolving perceptions of 
the EU, and in the connected debate in terms of policy-making, is the acknowledgement 
that Beijing’s “ambitious international agenda at a time of increasing global 
uncertainty”468 continues to include an ongoing strategic reflection on the merits of 
building an effective Partnership with the EU. As Chang and Piecke have noted, there are 
in China expectations that the EU and its Member States can “rethink the basic 
assumptions underlying their China policies” by exploring new approaches of 
engagement that match China’s shifting perceptions, policies and political realities.469  
As Sautin has pointed out in this regard,470 this Chinese debate expressed “also 
vocal frustration with the EU, which might not have an ‘American-style strategic 
competition mindset’ vis-à-vis China, but individual member states persist in bringing up 
‘values’ issues with China that are both deep-seated and unfavourable towards the 
Chinese people”. Notwithstanding these changed perceptions, the EU has continued to be 
described, overall, as a force for global peace (not a term used for the US) and the Chinese 
side has regularly reiterated at the official level its desire to forge a Strategic Partnership 
with the EU.471 
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These revised Chinese views on the role of the EU have had implications for the 
development of the “political dimension” of the Strategic Partnership which should be a 
key component of the structural interaction between Brussels and Beijing. If in the 
summit joint statements of the first period of the Comprehensive Partnership economic 
issues dominated the agenda, in the last decade the joint statements have underlined an 
expanded political-diplomatic agenda with new priorities mainly related to multilateral 
issues also in the security sector, while human rights and the rule of law have continued 
to remain remarkably marginal.472 In this sense, the predominant trade bias which 
characterized the first years of the EU-China Partnership has been partly circumscribed; 
nonetheless, if the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has to evolve from its “relational 
dimension” - in which the economic backbone of the relationship has been fundamental 
– to a “structural” strategic partnership, it is necessary that it seeks “to make bilateral 
dealings not only compatible with but also conducive to stronger multilateral 
cooperation”.473 
We can see from Holslag’s analysis that while trade priorities tended to be 
translated into clear policy objectives, the wording of the international security and policy 
clauses remained limited to “observing” and “welcoming” rather than resulting in 
agreements on co-operation initiatives;474 and the increase in the number of bilateral 
priorities was larger than the growth in international objectives. In the initial period of the 
Strategic Partnership both parties sought to emphasize various features that set their ties 
apart from the EU-US or the PRC-US axis, such as the pledge for a multi-polar world 
order as well as the subsequent joint support for multilateral cooperation.  
Overall, as Holslag notes, the extent to which China and Europe have shared 
priorities that might distinguish their Partnership from other key relationships has been 
hard to measure: the United States seems to be the only other power that allows China 
and Europe to implicitly distinguish their Partnership from others.  
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At the level of discourse, since its launch there has been a marked gap between the 
proclaimed strategic nature of the Partnership and the extent to which strategic objectives 
have been defined or translated into concrete policies.475  
In this sense the key benchmark for further assessing the strategic nature of the EU-
China Partnership is its “structural dimension” contributing to enhancing global 
governance. As Grevi underlines, “effective strategic partnerships are those that seek to 
make bilateral dealings not only compatible with but also conducive to stronger 
multilateral cooperation. As such, they form part of a structural approach to foreign 
policy, shaping international relations beyond bilateral transactions”.476  
In a speech during his visit to Beijing in 2011 the President of the European Council 
Van Rompuy stated hopefully that “Europe and China can pave the way for global 
solutions and promote international peace and security across the world”.477 These 
expectations, reiterated in many declarations over the years by EU leaders, indicate that 
“the resilience of the ‘strategic partner’ concept has been remarkable”.478  
The analysis of the degree of convergence on multilateral issues between China and 
the EU can therefore offer significant indications on the character of “structural 
partnership” of their strategic relations. An area of the Partnership which goes beyond 
mere bilateral engagement is that related to the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation adopted in November 2013.  
As Francois Godemont and Abigael Vasselier have written, the Agenda 2020 “was 
indeed a genuine pledge to widen cooperation, putting peace and security as the first pillar 
of the relationship” by prescribing overall 94 “key initiatives” in areas covering peace 
and security, prosperity, sustainable development, and people-to-people exchanges.479 
Even though in the following years since its inception there have been many meetings 
and statements on these issues “there have been few formal agreements, and even fewer 
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really new agreements. Some initiatives have seen no implementation at all”480 while 
“some omissions from the list of dialogues stand out: Iran and North Korea”.481  In the 
economic field the conclusion of a Comprehensive Agreement on Investements - and its 
specific content - looks as a key test-bed also for its broader implications in signalling the 
further possible path of development of the Partnership. From the degree of 
implementation of the Agenda 2020 we can see limited results: this situation has 
reinforced the European perceptions “that only where issues fit a narrow definition of 
China’s interests…does cooperation move ahead”.482  
In a broader perspective the engagement of the PRC in global issues does not seem 
conducive to that kind of “structural partnership” which – according the criteria we have 
examined – should make a relationship of the EU with a counterpart truly strategic. What 
seems to be structural in this context is the lack of convergence within the EU-China 
Partnership in key strategic sectors which encompass civilian, security and military 
aspects such as, for instance, cyber security, although it has been the subject of annual 
dialogues and a EU-China Cyber Taskforce was established. At the 2019 Summit the EU 
recalled the importance of the application of international law and cooperation against 
malicious cyber activities, including on ICT-enabled theft of intellectual property, “for an 
open, stable and secure cyberspace.” It is meaningful, though, that while the Summit 
recognized that 5G networks will provide the backbone for future economic and social 
development, just before the Summit the Commission recommended that, when 
deploying 5G networks, all Member States should conduct a thorough risk assessment 
and take the appropriate security measures, aiming thus at building an EU coordinated 
approach to both risk assessment and management. Even though the Commission has 
stressed that it does not intend to target specific companies or countries, the contentious 
security debate on 5G was clearly the background of these recommendations.483  
Overall, the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership seems mainly to be 
confined to its “relational dimension” focusing on and trying to make progress, in the 
framework of its ever-expanding bureaucratic architecture, first and foremost on issues 
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of direct bilateral interest to China and the Union, even though global issues  also figure 
in the Partnership’s set of priorities. In this sense the Partnership, as a senior EU official 
has observed, has followed a more “realistic” path of development which, in fact, has 
been an “implicit recognition of the persistent difficulties in fostering a truly structural 
strategic dimension with a global reach”.484  
In a changed international context no convergence and closer EU-China 
cooperation on common endeavours and “rules of the road” has materialized as a possible 
response to the recent US distancing from international institutions and many multilateral 
commitments.485 This would have been in line with China’s traditional  stance on the 
international stage which “has made great play of its commitment to important elements 
of the global system,”486 regularly raising Europe’s hopes of seeing China as a partner 
that shared an interest in upholding a rules-based world order. Xi Jinping himself, in a 
speech made at Davos in 2016, had confirmed China’s determination to strengthen its 
multilateral contributions.487  
The Chinese approach seems to be characterized by a new assertiveness which 
selectively uses multilateral initiatives and organizations to advance national interests. 
The follow-up on the official statements with regard to the PRC’s multilateral 
commitments has been very limited and the areas of increased international responsibility 
taken on by the Chinese have been scarce, even though analysts such as Jiang Shixue 
underlined the positive interplay between the PRC and multilateral formats such as the 
G20.488  
The reasons for a certain degree of European scepticism on the potential of the EU-
China Partnership on global issues have been reinforced if one looks more in depth at the 
main areas of cooperation. Climate change, for instance - the object of several 
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declarations at EU-China summits and in the context of the Paris December 2015 
Conference - has seen fairly limited results in terms of EU-China commitments and joint 
action. It has also been victim of the contentious debate on other issues: in 2017 “China 
conducted extensive pre-summit dialogue with the EU but sacrificed the result during the 
June summit because of the ongoing dispute over market economy status for China”.489 
Moreover, if the Trump administration has sought to reverse previous US positions on 
climate change, “China itself has never signed up to any commitment in a legal sense. Its 
goals and instruments correlate strictly to its own economic interests, which also include 
making this sector a key asset for future exports (solar, wind, nuclear)”.490  
Also in other important areas of engagement on global issues China’s openness and 
commitment have been relative.491 Cooperation in the field of multilateral security issues 
should be an area where the development of EU-China relations could acquire a more 
structural character: nevertheless this crucial sector has so far proved to be in many 
regards a “mismatch of interests”.  
As Maher has pointed out,492 “in addition to being unable or unwilling to contribute 
much to each other’s immediate security interests and concerns, the EU and China have 
pursued different strategies in responding to some of today’s most pressing security 
problems”. If we consider two of the most important security issues of the last years - 
Iran’s nuclear programme and Syria’s civil war – we can see that they “have revealed 
divergent EU and Chinese preferences and policy approaches”.493 China’s response to 
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these two complex international issues showed a very limited degree of affinity with the 
EU’s approach, not only because China avoided using its leverage on these regimes but 
also because it used its veto in the UNSC to block Western-sponsored resolutions, as 
happened in relation to the Syrian crisis. This behavior confirmed the Chinese 
leadership’s strong suspicion of Western calls for humanitarian interventions, being 
convinced that any operation would turn into an effort at regime change similar to the one 
that took place in Libya in 2011. 494  
It is meaningful to note that in Syria China did not act to protect its own limited 
interests: as Maher has written, China’s “primary motivation for blocking Western 
proposals in the UNSC to unseat the Assad regime was to provide diplomatic cover for 
Russia”. The increasing degree of coordination between Beijing and Moscow in the 
UNSC on issues considered vital to each other was once more underlined by the fact that 
China vetoed – with Russia – a resolution sanctioning the Syrian regime after its use of 
chemical weapons in February 2017.  
Instead of trying any kind of meaningful diplomatic interaction with the EU the 
priority of Beijing during the Syrian conflict seemed to be centred on keeping a strategic 
understanding with Moscow aimed at defying the West together, so that neither might 
look isolated.495 
Considering that nuclear and ballistic proliferation is a key issue of global interest 
for the EU on which China is clearly influential, it is worth underlining that, in the case 
of both North Korea and Iran, the PRC - apart from repeated declarations of principle in 
the Summits joint statements - not only failed to cooperate with the EU but actually 
pursued a policy strictly centred on its national interests.496 A stark divergence from the 
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EU has been also registered with regard to the maritime disputes in the South China Sea, 
where the positions taken by the PRC are clearly in contrast with the Union’s international 
principles. This divergence is linked to the intrinsically different value given by the EU 
and China to multilateral institutions, as the Chinese approach to issues such as the 
ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) underscores. The 
joint statement of the 2019 EU-China summit reiterated once more rather anodyne 
language on global geopolitical issues such Iran, the Democratic Peoples’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), Afghanistan, Venezuela (included for the first time in a joint statement), 
the South China sea, Ukraine, while Syria and Libya were not  mentioned as was the case 
in the joint statement of the 2018 Summit.  
   On the basis of the previous analysis we can begin to draw some conclusions: the 
first one is that the degree of convergence or divergence on global issues which stems 
from the evolution of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership is - as a EEAS senior 
official observed497 - not a “quantitative” problem but a “qualitative one”. The potential 
for cooperation within the Strategic Partnership on global and multilateral issues might 
be revealed by the fact that Europe has significant interests in several regions where 
China’s geopolitical influence has been growing: the Middle East and North Africa, Sub-
Saharan Africa including South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Afghanistan, Latin America.   It 
is also true that when there have been some examples of positive coordination and 
collaboration between the Union and China in the field of security - such as, for instance, 
the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy joint operation and some other United Nations operations in 
South Sudan and Mali to which Beijing contributed -498 the EU did not feature as a direct 
partner of China in these UN operations.  
     Overall, the evolution of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, in 
particular if we consider the last decade, has not gone in the direction of deepening the 
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“structural character” of the strategic relationship notwithstanding the considerable 
“widening” of its “relational dimension”: as we have seen, the bureaucratic architecture 
of the EU-China relations encompasses by now a truly impressive set of sectors of 
cooperation, coordination and dialogue. It is fair to note that this development responds 
to the EU objectives of a “reflexive strategic partnership”, that is one which aims to “put 
the Union on the map” as a prominent international actor while it adds only partial value 
– in a more recent perspective – to China’s traditional search of status as a global 
superpower.     
    As we have seen, the degree of convergence on strategic issues is limited in terms 
of results and prospective trends. This situation derives not only from the divergence in 
the strategic interests of EU and China from a material point of view but first and foremost 
from a different ideational approach to their values-interests continuum which is a key 
element related to the identity and actorness of the two counterparts of the Partnership.  
These conceptual gaps are also reflected in the worldviews expressed by the two actors – 
in particular with regard to the evolving international order – when they address global 
and multilateral issues in the framework of the Partnership.  
These unsatisfactory trends rooted in a widening ideational disconnect between the 
strategic partners are visible in the language of the EU 2016 policy paper Elements for a 
new EU strategy on China in which the focus on reciprocity and respect for rules shapes 
an approach which put “ The EU’s own interests at the forefront of the relationship”.499 
As Christiansen has written, the EEAS policy paper addresses “relational” unresolved 
issues, by expressing “concern about China’s economic slowdown, rebalancing industrial 
overcapacity, and the lack of progress in market reforms and access for EU companies”, 
and by reiterating “demands on China in terms of levelling the playing field, market 
opening and fair competition, holding out the perspective of a EU-China Free Trade 
Agreement /FTA”. Even though the joint communication expressed the EU willingness 
of “managing constructively” the differences originated by China’s authoritarian 
response to domestic dissent, including in Hong Kong, it then clearly stated the relevance 
of the ideational dimension of the Partnership by confirming “the EU’s intention to 
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uphold universal values and the protection of human rights and China’s international 
obligations in this field”.500 
This document is important because it translated, on the one hand, the EU Global 
Strategy’s (EUGS) “principled pragmatism” into the EU-China context; on the other, 
“more openly than in most previous policy papers, the 2016 communication [underlined] 
the fundamental importance of member states falling in line with EU policies and rules 
to allow a ‘strong, clear and unified voice’, a veiled criticism of the 16+1 Central and 
Eastern European cooperation with China”.501 Another important aspect of the policy 
paper was its reference to the broader context in which the Partnership was set by 
articulating more clearly than before the “fundamental importance of trans-atlantic links, 
EU-US cooperation and coordination” and by putting the EU-China strategic relationship 
also in the framework of the EU’s other partnerships.502 
In this respect, the 2016 Elements for a new EU strategy on China underline some 
structural challenges within the Partnership because, as Grevi has argued,503 linking 
bilateral partnerships and multilateral cooperation can face normative hurdles. In this 
respect the policy paper reflected the growing European perception that China, as other 
EU strategic partners, did not really share the EU’s stated aim to strengthen a multilateral, 
rule-based order and delimit their national sovereignty in the process.  
     Emerging powers such as China have indeed tended to take a rather instrumental 
approach to international cooperation, favouring the emergence of a multipolar system 
primarily as an antidote to American or Western hegemony. In this perspective 
multilateral bodies are regarded “as useful in so far as they amplify their respective 
national positions, constrain or inhibit unwelcome initiatives and uphold the traditional 
principle of non-inference in internal affairs”.504  Brussels has become increasingly aware 
of the normative disconnect which has hampered substantial cooperation on global issues 
with Beijing, preventing the evolution of the EU-China relationship towards a more 
“structural” Strategic Partnership.  
This disconnect has been regarded as the outcome of a process which has amplified 
the distance between the interests-values continuums of the two partners in the last  years 
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and it has been reflected by the paradigm shift affecting the prospects of the Partnership.  
However, these relevant aspects of “ideational and normative disconnect” have never 
been openly addressed in the official dialogue and interaction within the Partnership, 
remaining thus an underlying factor of divergence which increasingly undermines its 
prospects. This is an implicit challenge, as we will argue in the concluding section of this 
chapter, also for the search and definition of a new paradigm guiding the future strategic 
relations between Brussels and Beijing.  
 
4.8 An emerging “turn to realism” in the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership 
 
As we have seen, China and the EU are “global actors in the making” whose 
identities and actorness reflect, on the one hand, their historical and cultural backgrounds, 
on the other, their changing international role and worldviews: for this reason the concept 
of strategic partnership as an instrument in the toolbox of these two emerging global 
players has been evolving over the years.505 The growing European awareness of a 
substantial stalemate in the development of the Partnership, both in its relational and 
structural dimensions, has led in the two last years – along with the implications of an 
evolving international context – to a rethinking and, hopefully, a rebalancing of the 
strategic relations between Brussels and Beijing. 
The need for this rebalancing is related, as we have argued, to the respective 
dynamics of the two actors, including China’s impressive and complex path of 
development, which influence the ongoing conceptualizations of their strategic 
partnership. The European position seems at the same time to reflect the analytical and 
political debate which in the last years has been underlining that “the Sino-European 
partnership begs for more realism”.506  
In this respect the paradigm seems to be shifting from “constructive engagement” 
to a EU China policy based on more “realist engagement” or even to a mix of cooperation 
and competition. What is certain is that the “myth of convergence” with regard to the 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has been increasingly questioned on the basis of an 
“experience of difficult – or sometimes inexistent – relations”. As we have seen, “new 
agreements are missing, even on trade and economic issues which are at the core of the 
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interest for Europe; the agreed Agenda 2020 for political and security cooperation is 
fulfilled” only in a limited way, with “human rights and humanitarian aid as the most 
disappointing areas”.507  
If we look at the EU-China Partnership as a “relational” strategic partnership – that 
is, centered on bilateral cooperation – we have seen that convergence has been decreasing 
on the “bargaining topics” which have become “active points of contention, and (could) 
lead to retaliation and damage in other areas”; this risk can be increased by the practice 
of “negative linkage” as was the case in 2017 when contentious trade issues prevented an 
important EU-China joint declaration on climate change. 
The language used by the EU on occasion of the 2019 Summit and 2020 Leaders´ 
meetings has confirmed a growing requirement for reciprocal opening, with a strong 
European focus on the need of preserving the international rules-based trade system and 
enhancing bilateral trade and investment.508At the “Leaders’Meeting” of September 2020 
- chaired by President Michel on the EU side and President Xi on the Chinese and attended 
by the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and by Ursula von der Leyen, President of the 
European Commission, and, for the Council presidency, German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel – the rather critical EU positions on the “state of the Partnership”, already 
expressed at the 22nd EU-China summit of June 22, have been reiterated. If the leaders 
welcomed “the progress on the ongoing negotiations for the EU-China Comprehensive 
Agreement on Investments (CAI)”, the EU emphasised at the same time that “more work 
was urgently needed on the issues of rebalancing market access and on sustainable 
development”.509 The European leaders stressed “the importance of a level playing field 
also in the areas of science and technology, calling for high ethical standards in the areas 
of technological developments, product safety and innovation”.510 The EU demand for 
“reciprocity” – which has become a keyword embedded throughout the recent statements 
on China – has been gradually reinforced by the fact that China, the world’s second largest 
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economy thanks to global trade and finance rules, still refuses to fully recognize the 
consequences of its spectacular rise: in Xi Jinping’s words, “China’s international status 
as the world’s largest developing country has not changed”.511   
In this chapter we have tried to underline that the roots of this gradual paradigm 
shift within the EU-China Partnership can be traced back to the crucial turning point 
brought about by the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The crisis, with all its consequences, 
weakened, on the one hand, Chinese perceptions and expectations that Europe not only 
could be a strategic interlocutor for making the international system more multi-polar but 
also a key counterpart for the “new type of great power relations advocated by Xi 
Jinping;512 on the other hand, it gradually strengthened in the Union a debate which – 
focusing on the economic balance of power between China and Europe - made a forceful 
case for “reciprocal engagement” whereby the “benefits of developing the relationship 
should be shared between the two sides of the aisle”.513  
As a senior EU official has observed,514 in this perspective the main outcome, also 
in terms of messaging, of the two last EU-China summits seems to be the increasing 
awareness from the European side that there is a need of “rebalancing” the Strategic 
Partnership which should be based on a “realistic, assertive and multi-faceted EU 
approach.” As the European Commission’s press release stated on the occasion of the 
2019 summit “while China’s economic and political influence makes it a vital partner for 
the European Union, as well as vice-versa, there is a growing appreciation in Europe that 
the balance of challenges and opportunities presented by China has shifted”.515  
In this sense there has been an asymmetry between Brussels and Beijing in the 
awareness and response to the main problems affecting the Partnership: while from the 
European side there has been an increasing recognition of the challenges posed by the 
complex development of the Partnership, China has tended to avoid a substantial 
problematization of its Strategic Relationship with Brussels.  
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If in 2009 the Chinese Premier Wen Jabao underlined the need for a review of some 
tenets of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, in the last decade there has been a 
decreasing Chinese focus on it. If we consider the conceptualization of the Partnership, 
the EU in the last four years has indeed elaborated a new Global Strategy and a new 
“China strategy”, from the Chinese side there have been no comprehensive policy papers 
or major statements on the EU-China relations in the same period. This is the outcome, 
as we have seen, of Chinese perceptions shifting from the traditionally positive 
consideration of the EU-China Partnership to more critical views which caution about 
“the content and deliverability of a Sino-European Strategic Partnership, almost 
exclusively questioning the EU’s ability to deliver the promise of a strategic 
partnership”.516 However, during 2019, as a reaction of growing negative European views 
on the PRC coupled by trends of increased international competition, the Chinese 
leadership has taken more proactive positions to underline the specific relevance of the 
strategic relations with the EU. 
At the heart of this process, as we have argued, there is a thorough reassessment of 
the EU’s “constructive engagement paradigm”, in particular of its fundamental 
assumption that China, developing ever more dense relations across the world, would 
eventually converge towards common standards in terms of market economy and rule of 
law. This shift, driven by the European perception that there is a deep and still-growing 
imbalance between Europe and China is reflected in the main EU documents on China of 
the last four years. As we have seen, the EU’s 2016 “Elements for a new strategy on 
China” – which still remain the “cornerstone of EU engagement”, as the March 2019 EU-
China Strategic Outlook of the European Commission has underlined - called for China 
to take action on a number of key issues: the reform process, reciprocity, the CAI, open 
and rules-based connectivity, global public goods and security, rule of law and human 
rights, and sustainable development.517 On the basis of a “further EU policy shift towards 
a more realistic, assertive, and multi-faceted approach which “will ensure that relations 
with this strategic partner are set on a fair, balanced and mutually beneficial course”, the 
EU’s 2019 Strategic Outlook clearly puts forward a vision of China which has important 
implications for the very concept of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership itself:  
 
516 May-Britt U. Stumbaum and Wei Xiong, ibid.,166. 
517 The fact that the 2016 China Strategy called also for increased cohesion and efficiency of the EU 
in pursuing these objectives has already had some concrete follow-ups such as, for instance, in the EU 




“China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner 
with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with 
whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in 
the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting 
alternative models of governance. This requires a flexible and pragmatic 
whole-of-EU approach enabling a principled defence of interests and 
values”.518 
 
This approach takes clearly into account the narrowing space for discussion 
between Europe and China on strategic global issues, with a prominent focus restricted 
to bilateral issues, economic or normative. The EU has been experiencing significant 
difficulties, as we have underlined, in implementing a broader strategic agenda, with the 
debate on global issues “largely confined to those where both China and the EU are 
unavoidable actors, if very dissimilar ones”.519  
This latter aspect confirms that in the “structural” dimension of the Strategic 
Partnership there is a substantial and persistent element of divergence between the two 
actors when the “interests-values continuum” is taken into consideration. In its recent 
efforts of rebalancing the Strategic Partnership the EU seems indeed determined to assert 
both its values and interests. At the highest level the centrality of the “continuum” was 
confirmed in the 2016 EU Global Strategy which states:520  
“We will be guided by clear principles. These stem as much from a realistic 
assessment of the current strategic environment as from an idealistic 
aspiration to advance a better world. Principled pragmatism will guide our 
external action in the years ahead. Our interests and values go hand in hand. 
We have an interest in promoting our values in the world. At the same time, 
our fundamental values are embedded in our interests. Peace and security, 
prosperity, democracy and a rules-based global order are the vital interests 
underpinning our external action”. 
 
This interests-values continuum is regarded as driving the EU role as “a responsible 
global stakeholder”, but, at the same time, the Global Strategy underlines that 
“responsibility must be shared and requires investing in our partnerships. Co-
responsibility will be our guiding principle in advancing a rules-based global order”. It is 
 
518 “EU-China-A Strategic Outlook”, Communication of the European Commission to the European 
Council, Brussels 12 March 2019. The Strategic Outlook also posits that “the tools and modalities of EU 
engagement with China should also be differentiated depending on the issues and policies at stake. The EU 
should use linkages across different policy areas and sectors in order to exert more leverage in pursuit of 
its objectives”. 
519 Godemont and Vasselier, 29. 
520 Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe, A Global Strategy for the European Union’s 
Foreign and Security Policy, Brussels June 2016, at http://europa.eu/globalstrategy/en. 
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meaningful that the new Global Strategy – when it refers to the Partnership’s “structural” 
dimension related to the “vast majority of global governance issues” – mentions firstly 
“the UN as the framework of the multilateral system and a core partner for the Union” 
and immediately after “other core partners such as the US”; only at the end does it refer 
to “regional organizations” and to “like-minded and strategic partners in Asia, Africa and 
the Americas”.521 China is not explicitly mentioned as a “core-partner” and is supposedly 
included in this third category of strategic partners. 
The main EU documents on the Strategic Partnership reject the reduction of norms 
and values to a by-product of material interests with an approach which is also in line 
with the normative role that the Union has traditionally intended to play. If ideational and 
normative considerations and references to the coexistence of values and norms with 
material interests are present in the main EU documents, some high-profile Chinese 
documents too connect a discourse of interests with one which emphasizes ‘‘the basic 
norms governing international relations’’,522 particularly those based upon the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.523 The normative stances held respectively in Beijing 
and Brussels – which do not seem to be conducive to normative affinity – have never 
been the subject of a true conceptual and operational “clarification” between Brussels and 
Beijing. This would be important because China’s normative perspective is increasingly 
influenced by its identity and priorities as a global actor which not only often considers 
the EU’s rules and norms as an obstacle for its objectives but also rejects the Normative 
Power Europe approach.524 This lack of normative affinity prevents, as we have seen, 
cooperation between the two strategic partners on “structural” strategic issues: this is due 
to a set of reasons ranging from the “conceptual gap” which divides the notions of 
sovereignty of China and the EU to a Chinese tendency of increasingly placing the PRC’s 
law and norms above international law, norms and principles.525 This “ideational and 
 
521 Ibid. 
522 Xi Jinping, New Asian security concept for new progress in security cooperation, speech 
delivered at the 4th Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, 
Shanghai, 21 may 2014. 
523 Salvatore Finamore, “Normative differences in Chinese and European Discourses on Global 
Security: obstacles and opportunities for cooperation”,163. 
524 Godemont and Vasselier, ibid., 29. 
525 Ibid. As these authors rightly point out “the rule of law will remain central to the EU’s approach; 
as long as there is an EU built on this basis, this will form the basis of its international approach”. For this 
reason “even during these years of great difficulty for the EU, China has found it difficult to circumvent 
the complex of rules and conventions that bind European states – and prospective EU members – together. 
Yet it still operates on a vision where Europe is a set of sovereign states with a regional organization that 
happens to be the EU”. 
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normative distance” between Brussels and Beijing significantly undermines the potential 
of the Partnership and requires the EU and the PRC to address the profound asymmetry 
defining their interests-values continuum with inevitable repercussions on their 
conceptualization and operationalization of the Partnership. 
In this perspective, as Oertel has argued,526 there has indeed been a new consensus 
within the EU on the systemic challenges that China poses to Europe. As the EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the 
European Commission Borrell has pointed out,527 “at the June summit with China, the 
EU expressed its disappointment to Beijing about the lack of progress in implementing 
the agreements reached at the previous meeting in 2019. The President of the European 
Council, Charles Michel, made it clear that Beijing had not honoured its commitments to 
ensure access to the Chinese market on a reciprocal basis and reduce aid to state-owned 
companies, and had thus placed European companies at a clear competitive 
disadvantage”. He also reiterated the important goal of concluding by the end of 2020 the 
EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investments, that the EU has been negotiating 
since 2013.  
The assessment of the “relational dimension” of the Partnership made by the High 
Representative is a very strong signal for the future EU’s stance on this set of issues: 
It is becoming increasingly clear that China is taking advantage of our 
economic relationship…Keeping things as they stand (lack of reciprocity and 
unequal conditions) is not an option. Our relationship is too asymmetric for 
the current level of Chinese development. This needs to be redressed.528 
 
In EU statements mounting concerns have been confirmed – in addition to the 
economic ones - about China’s assertive approach abroad, as well as its breaches of 
international legal commitments and massive violations of human rights in Hong Kong 
and Xinjiang. Overall, “there is growing scepticism about the future trajectory of the 
relationship, which provides an opportunity for a more robust and coherent EU policy on 
China”.529  
 
526 Janka Oertel, “The China Consensus: How Europe is Growing Wary of Beijing”, European 
Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, September 2020.  
527 Josep Borrell, “The Sinatra Doctrine. How the EU should deal with the US-China competition”, 
IAI papers no 20, (September, 24 2020). 
528 Josep Borrell, “The Sinatra Doctrine. How the EU should deal with the US-China competition”, 
IAI papers no 20, (September, 24 2020), 8; European Commission, Report on Trade and Investment 
Barriers - 1 January 2019-31 December 2019, June 2020, 
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/158789.htm  
529 Oertel, “The China Consensus”, ibid. 
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This new EU policy trend - shaped by an underlying “turn to realism” - is still in 
the making and will be the outcome not only of the dynamics between the Union’s sub-
systems but also of the positions of the major member states, first and foremost Germany 
which historically was the country which influenced in the most significant way the EU 
China policy. In its search of a new paradigm the EU – according to the High 
Representative – should be aware of a context in which the recent global crisis “acted as 
a catalyst for exacerbating an underlying [US-China] rivalry that will become the 
predominant geopolitical trend in the post-virus era”.530  
Responding to the challenge of finding a “middle ground”, Josep Borrell has argued 
that in order “to avoid becoming entrenched between the US and China, the EU should 
look at the world from its own point of view, defending its values and interests, and using 
the instruments of power available to it”.531 At the same time the High Representative has 
underscored that the Strategic Relationship with Beijing should be pursued on the basis 
of a stronger unity within the EU: 
“Unity is vital in every area of our relationship with Beijing because no 
European country is capable on its own of defending its interests and values 
against a country the size and might of China…A balanced EU–China 
relationship is essential to address and eventually resolve major world 
problems”.532 
 
The “doctrine” delineated by Borrell recognizes that the PRC has become 
“gradually more assertive, expansionist and authoritarian” and that the new Chinese 
assertiveness has been reflected by a significant change in attitude: “this ambition for 
leadership is the main difference compared with past eras. China’s aim is to transform the 
international order into a selective multilateral system with Chinese characteristics, in 
which economic and social rights would take precedence over political and civil 
rights”.533  
This important reflection paper meaningfully criticizes the Chinese strategy 
“deployed on several fronts” of “undermining international rules” and rejects China’s 
expansionism, visible from the South China Sea to the Himalayan border. The third key 
point underlined by the High Representative for the revised EU’s strategic approach to 
China is the recognition that a new EU China policy cannot be merely based on 
 
530 Josep Borrell, “The Sinatra Doctrine. How the EU should deal with the US-China competition”, 
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“constructive engagement” because it has not led to convergence between Brussels and 
Beijing: “on the contrary, there has been greater divergence in recent years. China is the 
paradigm that has disproven the theory that economic and political openness are two sides 
of the same coin” as tend to underline the crackdown in the PRC “of any signs of 
dissidence, a rise in human rights abuses, increased repression of human rights defenders, 
journalists and intellectuals, the violation of basic rights of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang” and 
the deterioration of the situation in Hong Kong.534  
In a perspective in which the EU “must look at the world from its own point of view 
and act to defend its values and interests”, Borrell has based his doctrine on two pillars: 
“continuing the cooperation with Beijing in order to address global challenges …while at 
the same time strengthening the EU’s strategic sovereignty by protecting technological 
sectors of our economy which are key to ensuring the necessary autonomy and promoting 
international European values and interests”.535  
In this sense the “doctrine” proposes a sort of principled and more realist 
engagement with China which, however, does not address in depth the structural elements 
– including the ideational and normative ones – that constrain the strategic development 
of the Partnership. The search of a “middle ground” aimed at reinforcing the strategic 
autonomy of the EU is not an easy objective for the EU:536 “independence from two 
competitors/rivals does not mean being at equal distance from them” because the 
“common history and shared values with the US” mean that Europe is closer to 
Washington than to Beijing.537  
The further development of the Partnership represents therefore a challenging test-
bed for a EU’s “strategic sovereignty” able “to defend European values and interests by 
means of a united front”. In this sense, as we have tried to demonstrate in this chapter, the 
sustainability of a more realist EU China policy is related to a process of “paradigm 
clarification” – within the Union and vis-à-vis China - which fully reckons with the degree 
of complexity of a strategic relationship which is characterized, on the one hand, by 
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535 Borrell, “The Sinatra Doctrine. How the EU should deal with the US-China competition”, 7. 
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structural divergence in its material, ideational and normative components and is 
increasingly constrained, on the other, by an international context in which the role of the 
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At the heart of EU-China ideational divergence: the issue of human rights 
 
In this chapter we will address one of the most complex issues in the whole Sino-
European relationship from the specific standpoint of its significance in the framework 
of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. As underscored by Duncan 
Freeman and Gustaaf Geeraerts539: 
 
The issue of human rights has been one of the most sensitive elements in 
the EU-China relationship. It has been difficult to deal with in the official 
relationship between the EU and the Chinese government and has also 
been controversial in public opinion and in the media. The question of 
human rights often appears to be the aspect of their relationship where the 
differences between Europe and China are the greatest and most 
destabilizing.   
 
Human rights are indeed a crucial test bed to assess the structural strategic 
dimension of the Partnership on the basis of the degree of convergence or divergence on 
what can be regarded as a “constitutive issue” because of its nature intrinsically linked to 
the interests-values continuum of the two actors. For this reason normative contrasts 
between Europe and China have nowhere been so evident as in this field, underscoring 
profound differences not only in the two political systems but also in their cultural and 
societal spheres.540 As Richard Maher has written,541 “stark differences in political values 
and ideology have limited and will continue to limit the scope and depth of any EU–China 
strategic relationship. China rejects many of the norms, principles and values that the EU 
embraces and seeks to promote around the world, including western-style constitutional 
democracy, the rule of law and independent news media. Europe’s relationship with 
China tests the EU’s commitment to democracy and human rights, which are central to 
its identity and ostensibly at the centre of its foreign policy”. 
From this perspective the evolution of the Partnership’s Human Rights Dialogue 
underlines one of the major conceptual gaps in the relations between Brussels and Beijing 
stemming from the normative differences in this field which are “of a very fundamental 
 
539 Duncan Freeman and Gustaaf Geeraerts, “Europe, China and Expectations for Human Rights” 
in Pan Zhongqi (ed.), Conceptual Gaps in China-EU Relations . Global Governance, Human Rights and 
Strategic Partnerships (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012).  
540 Finamore, Engagement as a Foreign Policy Strategy in EU relations with China, PhD 
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nature and…deeply engrained both in the cultural underpinnings of Chinese society and 
the dominant state ideology”.542  In this sense, as Finamore has rightly pointed out, the 
PRC’s behavior vis-à-vis human rights is “not only a matter of political expediency and 
often lack of administrative and judicial capacity, but also of fundamental differences 
between Western and Chinese understandings”. Within the Strategic Partnership the 
recognition of this important conceptual gap has been to some extent minimized by the 
two actors from different standpoints: on the one hand Europe, developing its 
“constructive engagement policy”, has expected China to gradually converge towards 
Western human rights standards mainly because its socio-economic development was 
regarded as potentially conducive also to political and cultural change. However, as 
Freeman and Geeraerts note, “of all liberal fallacies, none is more curious than the 
assumption” that China should be like the West because it has been getting rich like the 
West: this expectation is “as facile as the thesis that capitalism necessarily leads to 
liberty”.543 On the other hand, if it is important to recognize – in line with our theoretical 
and epistemological premises - that the differences in the conception of human rights 
result from the divergent cultures, histories and official policies of the two strategic 
partners, it is equally important not to look at human rights as a set of issues considered 
in isolation because “since the 1990s the Chinese Government has officially accepted 
much of the international conceptual and formal institutional framework in which human 
rights are discussed”.544 It is therefore against this background that we need to analyze 
the relevance of human rights for the evolution of the EU-China Strategic Partnership 
without neglecting the influence of the broader context of China’s new assertiveness as a 
global power and its evolving domestic politics. 
The persistent difficulties of the human rights dialogue within the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership reflect first and foremost the broader conundrum 
represented for the PRC by the normative integration of the main human civil and political 
rights545 such those contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR). The lack of ratification of the ICCPR – which has been defined “the most 
authoritative legal instrument in the field of civil and political rights” and “probably the 
 
542 Maher, “The Elusive EU-China Partnership”, ibid. 
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most important human rights treaty in the world”546 – is indeed a meaningful case-study 
in this respect: it confirms a substantial ideational divergence  which makes extremely 
complex selectively integrate core principles and rights of this kind in the PRC’s 
constitutional order, since they are still partly incompatible with some key-components 
of the Chinese system in its present ideological, political and legal configuration.547 
In this respect the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue is not conducive to a 
incremental adaptation of the PRC to a current “human rights standard” which would 
have systemic implications for the Chinese party-state in terms of stability, sovereignty, 
legal structure and societal dimension. Within the Dialogue it should be recognized that 
the Chinese party-state is, under the present circumstances, still based on a set of 
structural elements which makes it unwilling to internalize civil and political rights such 
as those protected by the UN Covenant.548 The progress of the EU-China dialogue on 
human rights is therefore dependent on a complex and uncertain process of change and 
overall evolution of the Chinese party-state in a direction which should make compatible 
and “sustainable” the internalization of this kind of rights. As we will see, this does not 
seem to be the trend of more recent years and certainly it is not a priority of the present 
Chinese leadership. The dynamics of the EU-China human rights dialogue have been 
influenced by this broader context, as reflected by the evolving European policy approach 
and by the Chinese leadership’s increasing sensitivity to any process of internalization of 
norms and principles which can challenge the core interests and the preservation of the 
Chinese regime.  
The chapter argues that, in this context,  the key conceptual gap on human rights 
between Brussels and Beijing will continue to generate an extremely complex asymmetry 
in the bilateral relationship in terms of convergence of the interests-values continuum of 
the two strategic partners, thus undermining the “structural” strategic dimension of their 
 
546 China signed on 5 October 1998 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
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Partnership. At the same time the acknowledgement of this situation should put under 
scrutiny a EU human rights policy still largely based on the paradigm of “constructive 
engagement” which faces an increasing Chinese resistance towards the potentially 
transformative impact of internalizing in the PRC’s legal and political system a set of 
rights that are at the heart of the EU’s identity and normative project but contrast with the 
identity of the Chinese party-state.  
 
5.1 The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in an evolving international and 
domestic context  
 
On the European front, human rights have always been a key component of the 
EU’s interests-values continuum because they represent a constitutive element of the 
Union’s identity and they “play a crucial part in the legitimization of the EU as a polity 
and of its role as a foreign policy actor”.549 Article 3 of the Treaty on the European Union 
considers human rights as an independent goal of Europe’s external action for their 
intrinsic value: the EU has developed policies which through “means of encouragement 
and dissuasion”550 have tried to preserve the consinstency of the European approach in 
this field over the years. In this respect the new EU Global Strategy has reiterated the 
EU’s willingness to “champion the indivisibility and universality of human rights” and 
to551 “live up to the values that have inspired [the EU’s] creation and development. These 
include respect for and promotion of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of 
law. They encompass justice, solidarity, equality, nondiscrimination, pluralism, and 
respect for diversity. Living up consistently to our values internally will determine our 
external credibility and influence”. 
     In the PRC’s domestic and international behaviour vis-a-vis the human rights 
regimes we can find some constant guiding principles characterized by an overarching 
revisionist vision based on a “relativist” approach and a strong preference for economic 
and social rights v. civil and political rights, collective rights v. individual rights, 
obligations v. rights, the protection of sovereignty and non-interference v. the promotion 
of human rights.  
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In the 1980s China’s participation in various international human rights regimes 
and institutions was marked by sustained growth: the PRC became a member of the 
Commission on Human Rights (UNHCR) in 1982552 and subscibed and ratified major 
human rights treaties.553 China’s process of treaty ratification during three decades has 
underlined, in principle, its commitment to having its behaviour increasingly bound by 
human rights norms and “its domestic conduct exposed to intense international scrutiny 
and appraisal”.554 Treaty ratification has thus gradually expanded China’s cooperation 
with international treaty bodies and special procedures through its participation in the 
Human Rights Commission (UNCHR, since 2006 Human Rights Council-HRC) sessions 
and conferences; its regular submission of reports of implementation; its collaboration 
with OHCHR special rapporteurs and working groups; its interaction with the HRC on 
the Universal Periodic Reviews (UPR).555 This process of treaty ratification - which 
confirmed China’s selective approach to human rights core treaties - has been 
substantially stopped, with the meaningful postponement, year after year, of the 
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The 
process of ratification has been smoother and faster when the treaties concerned protected 
rights which were closer to the Chinese vision of human rights and which did not affect 
the stability of the Chinese political and legal system. Overall, the PRC’s approach has 
been characterized by a “revisionist strategy”, aimed at reshaping the human rights 
discourse itself by rejecting a “comprehensive notion of human rights” that considers 
political and civil rights, socio-economic rights, individual and collective rights and 
national developmental rights as “mutually interdependent and indivisible”.556  
 
552 During that decade the Chinese government signed seven international human rights treaties: the 
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Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees; and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). Ambrosetti, China‘s ratification of the UN International 
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years: by 2010 China had ratified 25 major human rights “legal documents under the UN framework”, 
seven of which between 2000 and 2010. Li Meiting, “China, Pariah Status and International Society”, 130. 
554 Ibid, 131. 
555 Ambrosetti, ibid. 
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During the phase of increasing treaty accession in the 1980s and 1990s – which 
culminated with the signing of the two UN Covenants – China’s international behaviour 
had partly become more sensitive to the idea of human rights because of their possible 
negative impact on the PRC’s national interests and its international reputation.557 As 
Deng Yong has written,558 the effects of the violent repression of the demonstrations in 
Tienanmen Square in June 1989 and the international pressure put on China by the liberal 
democracies, which had reaffirmed “human rights as a foundational principle of the post-
cold war world order”,559 underscored “a gap between the CCP polity and the rights-
respecting great-power community”.560 As Deng writes in this regard, “after the cold war, 
human rights have been embraced to such an extent as to exemplify an international norm, 
commonly understood to be collective understanding of the proper behaviour of actors in 
the international society”.561 The PRC has constantly rejected a Western-centred notion 
of human rights but in its historical phase of reforms, opening and integration in the 
international system, the PRC’s regime felt that the human rights issue - with “remarkably 
persistent, if diverse, effects on China’s relations”562 - could become a serious “liability” 
at the international level.  
This background helps us to better understand why, for instance, China chose to 
accede in 1986 to the Convention Against Torture (CAT), which protects one of the most 
fundamental and non-derogable of rights:563 the response quoted by Kent in this regard, 
‘‘because of [China’s] obligations as a large power’’, seems to stress the PRC’s sensitivity 
to the recognition of its international status. Moreover, as Lee points out,564 “when the 
Convention was signed in 1988, China was still relatively unsophisticated in its 
appreciation of the international human rights regime and how the mechanisms at the UN 
worked (and in particular of the role and voice of NGOs). But above all, it was pre-
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Tiananmen and China had yet to feel the full force of international opprobrium for 
China’s abuse of human rights that then ensued and has continued to these days”.  
In this sense, in the post-Tienanmen period the “rejuvenated human rights norm 
in world politics represented an unprecedented source of disadvantage the PRC had to 
wrestle with in its international relations”.565 This background resulted in tenacious 
international scrutiny of China’s human rights during the 1990s and in partly negative 
political images, which the Chinese leadership particularly resented on the grounds that 
it “continued to invite prejudiced treatment that significantly disadvantaged its national 
interests”.566 The PRC’s response to this situation of “human rights stigma” was a mix of 
compliance and contestation. In post-Tienanmen China, in parallel with an impressive 
improvement of the economic welfare of the country’s population, a significant process 
of strengthening of socio-economic rights and - to a much lesser extent - of individual 
freedoms took place. The perception of the role played by human rights within the 
evolving international system of the 1990s was thus a major factor in favouring the 
Chinese leadership’s decision to sign the International Covenant on Economic Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the two other fundamental components, along with the Universal Declaration 
on Human Rights (UNDHR), of the so-called “ International Bill of Human Rights”. In 
this way the PRC recognized implicitly and with persistent reservations, that “no matter 
how imperfectly promoted, human rights have become a source of the states’ international 
legitimacy in ways analogous to how some of the original Eurocentric ideas evolved into 
the underpinning values of the globalized Westphalian interstate system”.567  
While not openly acknowledging that human rights constitute an essential 
component of a “new standard of civilization”,568 the Chinese regime implicitly 
recognized the influence of the standard of human rights not only “as a source of 
legitimacy and authority, but also [as] a constraining power that inflicts restrictions on 
states”.569 As Li Meitiling writes, “the case of human rights in China is a typical example, 
which displays both the positive and negative impact of the human rights standard”.570  
 
565 Lee, “China and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, 78. 
566 Lee, “China and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, 77. 
567 Ibid. 
568 Li Meiting, ibid., 117. This author notes in this respect that “the standard of human rights, as 
a normative dimension of the new standard of civilization, complements the material power and legal 
dimensions in explaining the sources of state legitimacy and authority as well as political boundaries 
and membership criteria in international society.” 
569 Ibid., 123. 
570 Ibid., 124. 
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China rising in the 1990s as a global power on the world’s scene perceived – 
especially after the intense international scrutiny originated by the Tienanmen crisis – that 
the signing of the two UN Covenants was necessary to reaffirm the legitimacy of its 
regime and its status as a “responsible stakeholder” of the international system.571 In that 
period “potent claims for respect of human rights from multilateral institutions, leading 
democracies and NGOs did erode China’s psychological and institutional barriers to 
receptivity to the international norm”572 while, with regard particularly to socio-economic 
rights, the efforts in the 1990s to improve China’s rights-respecting records grew out also 
of the necessity of domestic reforms. However, this pragmatic approach continued, on 
the one hand, to include contesting what the PRC regarded as “Western domination of 
the human rights discourse and self-serving deployment of the standard itself; on the other 
hand, it tried “to steer attention toward its own areas of comparative advantage in social 
and economic rights”,573 while continuing to promote, at the same time, relativism on the 
whole concept of human rights.  
In the 1990s - a period of “intense scrutiny” for China in the field of human rights 
- the EU’s approach to the issue of human rights in China was substantially driven by the 
key paradigm of “constructive engagement”: as we have seen, in the aftermath of the 
Tiananmen crisis sanctions were approved by Brussels against the Chinese regime but 
they were rapidly lifted just after one year, apart from the arms embargo. As Finamore 
observes, historically the EU “has been generally reluctant in using sanctions as an 
instrument of its human rights policy” and “despite its importance in the EU’s foreign 
policy” human rights conditionality has not played “a major role in its relations with 
China”.574 Dialogue has been Europe’s main instrument for interacting with China on 
human rights: framework indications of this approach were already contained in the 
European Commission’s communication on human rights, democracy and development 
cooperation of 1991.575 Reaffirming the universal value of fundamental rights, the 
document stated that, in choosing its policy options, “the Community will whenever 
possible give preference to the positive approach of support and encouragement” while 
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promoting “frank and trusting dialogue on human rights”.576 This general approach was 
specifically applied to China in 1995 by the Commission’s first policy paper on China 
which warned against the risks of “relying solely on frequent and strident declarations” 
which could “dilute the message or lead to knee-jerk reactions from the Chinese 
government”.577 This approach, based on a “combination of carefully timed public 
statements, formal private discussions and practical cooperation”, has substantially 
characterized over the years the Human Rights Dialogue with China which stands out as 
the only “regular, institutionalized dialogue devoted solely to human rights between the 
European Union and a third country”.578 This policy of engagement has not been 
significantly affected by the increasing recognition – already underlined in the 2001 
policy review document - that there existed a growing divergence between Brussels and 
Beijing in particular on the protection and promotion of civil and political rights and 
fundamental freedoms. This is still, as we will see, the major stumbling block in the EU-
China Dialogue on Human Rights. 
 
5.2 Civil and political rights as a persistent, structural element of divergence in the 
EU-China Human Rights Dialogue 
 
China since the mid-2000s has perceived its selective approach to human rights 
as more “sustainable” in terms of international pressure and recognition of its status as a 
major “stakeholder” of the international system.579 This change of attitude of the Chinese 
authorities has been motivated by a set of realistic considerations which has, to some 
extent, circumscribed the perception, as Li Meiting writes, that “conformation to the 
human rights standard… is an important source of state legitimacy and soft power” and 
of “international recognition conferred by states that uphold the same sets of values and 
rules”.580 The concept of a “human rights standard” can be a useful analytical tool 
because, even though the PRC does not subscribe to such a concept, the Chinese regime 
has been acutely aware of it and of its implications. China’s rise on the world’s scene has 
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made the Chinese regime’s position on human rights more assertive: the impressive 
growth of China’s “comprehensive power” along with the degree of China’s economic 
integration and “market civilization” - which have been regarded as “critical to the 
formation of a new ‘standard of civilization’ in an age of globalization”581 - have 
increasingly linked the human rights discourse to its compatibility with China’s core 
interests and guiding principles.582  
In the late 1990s the Chinese signing of the UN International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) had also raised in Europe expectations that this key treaty - 
once ratified - could be a facilitating factor for a new process of political domestic reforms 
conducive to gradual internalization of the principles and norms contained in the 
Covenant. Notwithstanding this important signing, however, a fundamental  - although 
not openly declared - reversal of any real process of democratization and political reform 
had taken place in the PRC after Tiananmen. Even though the signing of the ICCPR and 
of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 
contributed to reinforce “the benign narrative…of the Chinese reform process as a 
preliminary phase for substantive changes in the political and institutional structure of the 
Chinese party-state,583 from the late 1990s on the focus of China’s debate on domestic 
reforms has indeed gradually shifted away from the most sensitive issues of a possible 
political evolution.  
As Jonathan Spence and other historians have noted in this respect,584 in the 1990s 
“the Chinese leadership adroitly kept on adopting policies which could be read as a 
message of renewed commitment to a broader reformist agenda.”  When the 15th Party 
Congress (the first Party Congress after the death of Deng Xiaoping) was convened in 
September 1997 – a year before China’s signature of the ICCPR – “the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) seemed interested in carrying on with Deng Xiaoping’s 
unfinished agenda on political reforms but the real thrust of Jiang Zemin's report was only 
on economic reforms.” As a matter of fact, political reforms “trailed behind economic 
reforms and the Chinese leadership was much more liberal and willing to borrow 
capitalist economic experiences but very reluctant to follow Western political 
 
581 The specific argument of the influence in this context of “market civilization” has been developed 
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practices”.585 When we consider the debate on political reforms at the time, it is necessary 
to bear in mind, as Jonathan Spence has argued586, that “after Tiananmen, when the 
Chinese communist leadership has talked about political reform, it did not refer 
to the Western democratic arrangements… To Deng Xiaoping and his successors, the 
Western model represented a recipe for instability, destruction of socialist norms and 
values and possible political crisis…During the reforms process Beijing was prepared to 
accept modern technology, science, investment and trade from the West for the sake of 
its four modernizations, being a lot more reserved and resistant to Western political 
traditions, values and practices.”587  
This approach was substantially confirmed by the CCP Congresses between 1997 
and 2012, while the 19th Congress can be regarded as a closing point for any possibility 
of political reform not compatible with the renewed Leninist orthodoxy of the Chinese 
party-state. As Maher has written, the CCP has consistently portrayed democracy as 
unsuitable for China, and alleged that Western ideas and values are “dangerous”, 
“subversive” and a threat to China’s social cohesion and stability588.  
The internal thinking of the Chinese leadership was exposed by the leak of a secret 
memo known as Document no. 9 that was circulated among high ranking party cadres in 
2013: “the document listed ‘seven perils’ considered by the Chinese leadership to 
represent threats to its authority, including ‘western constitutional democracy’, the 
promotion of ‘universal values’ of human rights, Western-inspired ideas of news media 
independence and civic participation, strong pro-market or ‘neo-liberal’ economic 
policies, and ‘nihilist’ criticisms of the Communist Party’s past”.589 As Godemont and 
Vasselier have observed,590 the focus at the 19th Party congress was on “checks and 
oversight” in the context of “an authoritarian modernization of the centralized party-state” 
and of its paramount leading role for the Chinese state and society. In the light of the 
outcome of the 19th  Chinese Communist Party congress, principles of liberal democracy 
and the connected individual civil and political rights have been confirmed not only as 
incompatible but also threatening the foundations of the Chinese party-state.  
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In the context of an increasingly complex interaction with this “rejuvenated” PRC, 
on the European front it is important to underscore the tendency of a number of member 
states of completely delegating “to the EU their capacity to discuss human rights with 
China, limiting themselves, at best, to submitting lists of cases to the EU”.591 This attitude 
– to a large extent driven by opportunistic reasons – instead of reinforcing a common 
EU’s position in the interaction with China on human rights in fact seems to relegate only 
to the rather bureaucratic dimension of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue and of the 
Summits joint statements a key issue for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 
It is clear that in this context the difficulty of establishing a substantial and 
constructive dialogue on civil and political rights and fundamental freedoms is also 
reflected in the postponement sine die of China’s ratification of the ICCPR. The question 
has gradually faded away in the last years as a point of reference in the Chinese public 
debate: the process possibly conducive to this event has registered very few significant 
steps forward in terms of legislative measures and policies aimed at achieving this goal.592 
As we have seen, the elements of context influencing China’s signing and possible 
ratification of the ICCPR have changed over the years along with the perceptions, 
objectives and “trade-offs” related to the internalization of the Covenant. Moreover, in 
1998 China “might not have fully appreciated the significance of what it was doing in 
terms of accepting international norms”.593 As Lee had already written thirteen years ago, 
it seems still true that “what is less likely is that ratification will be driven by a desire to 
embrace civil and political rights as is generally understood.”594 In this context 
manifestations of persistent attention to the issue of ICCPR ratification from 
representatives of the Chinese “civil society” have decreased and by now these initiatives 
seem “voces clamantium in deserto”595 which try to underline human rights as a 
component of China’s “civilizational” heritage and the need to ratify the ICCPR in light 
of the PRC’s role as a great power on the world’s scene.  
Any perspective of ratification is at present unrealistic because this decision 
would imply for China acceding to a very substantial international regime and to make it 
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binding for its domestic legal system596, exactly what the present Chinese leadership 
wants to avoid with regard to its approach to the issue of human rights.  
 
5.3 The EU-China Human Rights Dialogue: conceptual gaps leading to a structural 
stalemate? 
 
The main trends that we have tried to delineate in the previous sections have 
influenced the evolution of the issue of human rights in the framework of the 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and they are vividly reflected by the results of the 
37th round of the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue which was held in Brussels on 1-2 
April 2019.597 The fact that this was the 37th time that Brussels and Beijing have jointly 
addressed the issue of human rights without substantial change in their respective 
positions obviously confirms – beyond the repetition of the bureaucratic procedures – that 
there are persistent diverging views in an area that has been regarded as a critical test for 
cooperation since the inception of the Strategic Partnership.   
If we read through the EU Commission statement released after the meeting we 
can see that the two sides were interested first and foremost in presenting and supporting 
the respective positions without finding much common ground in terms of shared views 
and action598: from the positions expressed by the two strategic partners we can see 
emerging – once more – the conceptual dichotomies which have characterized, over the 
years, the interaction of Europe and China on human rights. As the EEAS press release 
underlines “the EU Special Representative on Human Rights… stressed the importance 
of the universality, indivisibility and interdependence of human rights”. Here we can find 
the first traditional dichotomy between Brussels and Beijing on the basic concepts of 
human rights: European universalism versus Chinese relativism. 
The debate between the EU and China on the so-called “universality” of human 
rights and the cultural diversity of the contexts in which they have to be implemented 
clearly reflects a broader debate. The “universal” dimension of human rights is a dynamic 
“deontological” perspective and not merely a static “ontological” concept, in the sense 
that it reflects also the aspirations and the objectives of the “human rights project” (and 
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of its philosophical, moral and political implications) rather than a supposed reality of 
how human rights are universally perceived and understood.599 By addressing this 
subject, several authors have underlined that an “interpretive” approach is a prerequisite 
in order to provide, as Tamara Relis notes,600 a critical account of some important 
remaining gaps in our reflection upon international human rights theory and practice.601 
The idea of the “universality” of human rights has been questioned by arguing that human 
rights have been regarded as universal because they are an important component and a 
product of that kind of cultural hegemony that Richard Rorty defines the “Western 
Enlightenment project”.602 In light of our epistemological assumptions, we cannot but 
agree with the consideration that the background underlying the more recent concept of 
“universal” human rights is in fact the outcome, as Ardeshiri603 writes, of a historical, 
political and cultural process. The European position does not reject the idea that 
fundamental human rights are the stratification of a very long process of moral, cultural, 
political, social and economic advancement of a set of principles, identities rules and 
standards applied to our individual and collective life: for this reason they do not simply 
reflect an existing reality but they represent the outcome of this transformative process. 
“Universal” rights cannot be therefore identified in “natural” rights because they do not 
stem from a state of nature codified by natural law based upon universal principles of 
rationality and of human good.604  
As Charles Beitz has written, the idea of the “universality” of human rights 
“understood as the property of belonging to or being claimable by any person ‘as such’ 
in any society simply in virtue of their humanity” is not unproblematic. Naturalistic 
theories on human rights have been challenged by “agreement theories” which take into 
account the cultural, social, legal diversity related to human rights. In this sense human 
rights are “the expression of a set of important overlapping moral expectations to which 
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different cultures hold themselves and others accountable”.605 In this respect it is 
interesting to note the theoretical affinity of this approach with Qin Yaqing’s reflection 
on the “relational identities” of international actors shaped by their essence and practice 
as “cultural communities”. 
The position of the EU can be considered close to a concept of “universality” of 
human rights as the product of the cultural and political consensus, over time, which has 
been substantiated and formalized through International Law. This normativity has 
created a “core group” of fundamental human rights - irrespective of their historical 
origins – which is perceived as substantially uncontroversial also from the point of view 
of  cultural diversity: their “universality’ is indeed represented by the international 
recognition of their validity erga omnes. From this perspective the EU position has 
responded to the challenge of cultural diversity also by implementing human rights, as 
Healy puts it, “in culturally inflected ways”, without at the same time compromising the 
fundamental standards which are inherent to their advancement. As Michael Freeman 
notes, an approach sensitive to these needs in terms of application has been followed by 
several international human rights institutions “which have generally accepted that 
universal human-rights standards ought to be interpreted differently in different cultural 
contexts”.606  
Since the advancement of human rights is still a “work in progress” the potential 
“universality” of a larger number of human rights is nowadays confronted by international 
relations which are increasingly less Western-centred in terms of diffusion of power and 
value systems. As we have seen, in this context the Chinese human rights concept takes 
a clearly relativist approach which questions not only the universality of human rights but 
also their interdependence.607 The Chinese position in addressing these issues reflects also 
an approach which has been shared by the proponents of a human rights vision based on 
“Asian values”.  
This is an element of context which will continue to influence the overall attitude 
of the Chinese authorities vis-à-vis the need of political and legal changes related to a 
further process of internalization of human rights. As Li Meiting has underlined in this 
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respect “just as the Western countries associate human rights with liberal democracy”, 
China will continue to inject “its own civilization values into the concept of human rights 
and international norms at large”.608 On the international stage, China has escalated its 
challenge to the universality of human rights by successfully supporting the passage of 
a resolution at the Human Rights Council that has replaced state accountability for 
protecting human rights with a model that centers on “cooperation among states.” 
At the same time, it is important to consider that - since “the concept of human 
rights respects autonomy - it not only allows but also celebrates considerable cultural 
diversity”, which is a fundamental characteristic of  some important trends which are 
making the international system more multipolar and multicultural. In this complex and 
evolving context extreme cultural relativism can, on the contrary, be used “as a tool to 
advance an agenda aimed at safeguarding the interests of ruling classes, social and 
economic groups or an outmoded concept of national sovereignty”. In this way cultural 
relativism, as Freeman notes, risks of being “biased against the weak”: the debate on 
cultural relativism has indeed often failed to recognize the difference between states and 
cultures and to analyze the complexity of cultures. For this reason, some of its categories 
– such as imperialism, Western cultural hegemony etc. – can be easily deconstructed. 
In this perspective the ambitions of the European Union of  being – as an 
international actor – also an “ethical power” has raised its awareness that extreme cultural 
relativism609 can seriously undermine the whole “human rights project” because it can 
play – as Elvin Hatch 610 points out – “into the hands of oppressors and supporters of the 
status quo”. Moreover, the absence of shared foundations and standards is seen as 
problematic for a project which necessarily has to be based on ethics and politics, because 
it reflects – as Rorty has written – an idea of the International Society conceived as a 
“moral community”.  
The PRC’s approach to human rights is undeniably inscribed in a conceptual 
framework still characterized by a specific Chinese “hierarchy of human rights” in which 
they are seen not as a limit but as an instrument of state power and, for this reason, 
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submitted to the preeminent role of national sovereignty and to the staunch defence of the 
principle, from an international point of view, of “non interference”.611 The priority given 
by China to an “absolutist” concept of sovereignty (and its corollary of non interference) 
has made its approach diverge substantially from that of the EU on the occasion of major 
crises with humanitarian implications: the case of Darfur was emblematic in this sense. 
During the crisis in Darfur the EU regarded the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine 
as an innovative response to major humanitarian crises which was justified by the 
assumption not only that a “passive strategy of dealing with violations of sovereignty” 
was no longer sufficient but also that “an active strategy that addresses the pathology 
itself…, both pragmatically and by the very conception of modern sovereignty” was 
required. 612  
While the PRC did not oppose the humanitarian intervention in Kossovo in 1999 - 
in a phase of active convergence towards human rights standards, as the signature an year 
earlier of the ICCPR had underscored - the decade which opened the new Millennium 
witnessed increasingly assertive state-centric attitudes of China and Russia and of other 
emerging global powers. Darfur was a particularly contested example of this inability to 
act because of diverging views on non-interference and the doctrines of humanitarian 
intervention and the R2P.613 A very reluctant position was indeed expressed by the PRC 
towards the R2P doctrine614 by underscoring that ‘‘there must not be any wavering over 
the principles of respecting state sovereignty and non-interference’’ and by making a clear 
distinction between R2P and humanitarian intervention.615 Since the EU has set ‘‘the 
promotion of democracy, good governance and the rule of law as one of its policy 
objectives’’,616 China’s view of state sovereignty and the principle of non-interference 
“are in direct tension with the EU’s conviction that foreign interventions, even foreign 
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military interventions, can be both necessary and legitimate to prevent or stop gross 
human rights abuses and atrocities”.617  
Europe and China’s different positions on sovereignty and non-interference vis-
à-vis humanitarian intervention have been evident on the occasion of crises such as 
NATO's operations in Lybia and the civil war in Syria. From a Chinese point of view 
humanitarian intervention has been seen with growing suspicion, as a means often used 
by Western powers to induce regime-change for so-called humanitarian reasons. China 
has promoted the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference over universal 
human rights also because of its sensitivity to “opening itself to outside criticism of its 
own domestic political system and practices”, including its own record in terms of 
political and religious freedoms and treatment of ethnic minorities. In this way, Maher 
has argued, “China’s policy of non-interference has enabled it to deflect foreign criticism 
of its own internal actions, avoid entanglements in the domestic affairs of other countries, 
and remain neutral over contentious and controversial issues”.618 It is also undeniable that 
realpolitik motivations - linked to “China’s need to secure export markets and maintain 
access to oil, gas and other raw materials” - has led it to engage and enter into partnerships 
with regimes which have very problematic records in terms of democracy and human 
rights standards.619   
In this context the R2P doctrine has been regarded by the PRC as also the by-
product of an approach mainly propounded by Western liberal democracies - with 
inherent double standards, risks of misuse and, in some cases, possible hidden agendas. 
China has always refused620 not only to accept an evolving definition of sovereignty 
which implies that human security cannot be regarded simply as a national concept but 
has also perceived the R2P doctrine as being shaped by “the global North” against an 
increasingly influential “global South” in which China still positions itself. The objective 
of making the R2P a significant step in the direction of shared norms supporting a broader 
notion of "actionable" international legality/lawfulness,  has  clearly been stalled in the 
more recent years because of the lack of a more consensual application of this doctrine. 
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As Karen Smith observes, the UN Security Council “is likely to become even less 
amenable to taking strong measures against governments or groups accused of 
perpetrating mass atrocities. The apogee of R2P may already have passed”.621 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, it is meaningful to note that the 2016 EU 
Global Strategy has forcefully restated that the EU “will act globally to address the root 
causes of conflict and poverty, and to champion the indivisibility and universality of 
human rights” stressing once more the connection between its strategic goals and the key 
dimension of universal and indivisible human rights. 
In the framework of the EU-China Dialogue the attempt to avoid the implications 
of the substantial divide between the concepts of human rights of the two strategic 
partners – as has been often the case on the occasion of EU-China summits – is evident, 
in the report of the latest session of the Dialogue, in the enumeration of a rather diversified 
set of human rights issues, ranging from the rights of the child to counter-terrorism , 
without any sign of a true convergence on common strategic objectives, as a EU official 
has observed.622 The EU addressed, once more, the key issue of the EU-China Human 
Rights Dialogue by highlighting “the deteriorating situation of civil and political rights in 
China, marked by the arrest and detention of a significant number of human rights 
defenders and lawyers”.623 Expectations of progress in this domain are extremely limited 
because the Chinese party-state’s approach to civil and political rights, - which are highly 
individual - is based, as Kent has written, on a view of society ”as an organic whole whose 
collective rights prevail over the individual, the idea that man exists for the state rather 
than vice versa and that rights, rather than having any absolute value, derive from the 
state, have been themes prevailing in old as well as new China”.624 
This other fundamental dichotomy with the European approach has been reinforced 
by the recent political trends in the PRC but it also rooted, from a legal point of view, in 
article 51 of the Chinese Constitution which posits that the Chinese citizens “in exercising 
their freedom and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state or society”.625 
The constitutional text, moreover, limits the enjoyment of fundamental rights by 
corresponding duties, as in article 33 of the Constitution which reads: ”Every citizen is 
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entitled to the rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the 
Constitution and the Law”.  It is interesting to note that in 2004 an amendment was added 
to this same article to declare that “the state respects and safeguards human rights”: it 
introduced for the first time in Chinese official legal terminology the term “human 
rights”.626 Notwithstanding this important addition, it is undeniable that the PRC’s 
Constitution still has, in several regards, a significant level of incompatibility with civil 
and political rights such those contained in the ICCPR.  
The pre-eminence of state interests over the rights of the individual as well as that 
of collective rights over individual rights is a constitutive part of the Chinese approach to 
human rights that has not changed over the years. It has not changed as well China’s 
strong focus on economic and social rights: during the last meeting of the EU-China 
Dialogue this priority was confirmed by the Chinese delegation which “focused on 
achievements in economic and social rights, in particular as regards employment, poverty 
alleviation and social protection”.627  It is interesting to note that China’s commitment “to 
this class of rights ahead of civil and political rights”628, made the process of ratification 
of the ICESR rather expeditious: the treaty – which had been signed on the eve of 
President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Washington on 27 October 1997 – was ratified in 2001 
while the freezing of any prospects of structural political reform explains the stalemate 
on the ICCPR.629  
           In response to the Chinese delegation’s focus on economic and social rights during 
the 37th Dialogue session the EU, “while acknowledging that China has made progress 
on economic and social rights, …insisted that equal weight should be given to political 
and civil rights”.630 Furthermore, the European side underscored that “international laws 
and standards are universal and must be applied accordingly”: for this reason the EU 
expressed, once more, its expectations that China would “expedite the process of ratifying 
 
626 Zhang Chi, ibid., 91. The set of constitutional amendments passed by the national People’s 
Congress in 2004 have indeed inserted for the first time in the Chinese constitution an explicit pledge “to 
respect and protect human rights”. 
627 “The European Union and China held their 37th  Human Rights Dialogue”, ibid.  
Katie Lee, “China and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Prospects and 
Challenges”, Chinese Journal of International Law (2007) 6, 449. 
628 Ibid. 
629 As Zhang Chi writes, the ICESR’s ratification and the incremental implementation of its 
provisions are in line with the party-state’s enactment of Karl Marx’s admonition that “rights could never 
go beyond the social economic structure and the social culture”. Zhang Chi, ibid., 86. 
630 “The European Union and China held their 37th  Human Rights Dialogue”, ibid. 
162 
 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed by China in 1998, and 
implement the recommendations of UN human rights bodies”.631  
On the basis of the elements that we have already delineated it is not surprising 
that, 21 years from the signature of the treaty, China has not yet ratified the ICCPR: the 
evolution of the PRC’s approach to human rights based on traditional relativist arguments 
- which “emphasize a country’s cultural, societal and economic conditions in determining 
its human rights practices”632 - makes realistically this perspective “incertus an, incertus 
quando”. In parallel, at the domestic level, the public debate on civil and political rights 
has been substantially sidelined by the authorities while there have been constant attempts 
of the government to minimize the societal demand for this kind of rights. Even though 
comments and recommendations related to ratification of the ICCPR were advanced by 
numerous UN member states both at China’s 2013 and 2018 Universal Periodic Reviews 
(UPR), the present “impasse” is due to “the slowing down and weakening of the two 
driving factors which had facilitated in the 1990s the signing of the two UN Covenants, 
namely the perception of an instrumental role played by human rights both for the 
recognition of China’s international status and for its process of domestic reforms”.633 In 
the last two decades, China has tried to minimize the role of human rights as “a yardstick 
for international standing”634 and its process of domestic reforms, as we have seen, has 
not certainly been driven by priorities related to the civil and political dimension. 
Addressing the interconnection between the advancement of human rights and the need 
for structural reforms, Risse and Sikkink pointed out that “stable improvements in human 
rights conditions usually require some measure of political transformation and can be 
regarded as one aspect of liberalization processes. Enduring human rights changes, 
therefore, go hand in hand with domestic structural changes.”635 
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The significant conceptual gap on human rights has been also underlined by the 
fact that China, during the 2019 session of the Dialogue, “emphasized the outcome of the 
Universal Periodic Review of China and stressed its approach to interpreting international 
laws and standards in the light of its national conditions”.636 The outcome of the two last 
Universal Period Reviews, beyond the formal statements on China’s improvements and 
constructive and cooperative attitude, has indeed been rather problematic for Beijing. The 
degree of sensitivity and contestation which defines some of the above-mentioned issues 
had already been underlined in 2013 by the Chinese authorities’ approach in the 
framework of Beijing’s cooperation with the Human Rights Council on its second  
Universal Periodic Review (UPR)637 and within the bilateral and multilateral human 
rights dialogues Beijing has been engaged in.  
Even though the Chinese participation in the URP had been broadly described in 
the report of the working group on the UPR as “constructive and cooperative”,638 it was 
stressed then - as underlined by major NGOs - that there was “a continuing record of 
human rights abuses”639 stemming from systemic unresolved problems related to civil 
and political rights. China’s third Universal Periodic Review - held in Geneva in 2018 -  
took place in a context of increasing reports on the internment of ethnic Uyghur Muslims 
in Xinjiang “re-education camps”.640 Preoccupations in this regard were echoed by the 
EU in the last session of the Human Rights Dialogue which “addressed the issues of the 
protection of freedom of religion and belief, the rights of persons belonging to minorities, 
and the situation in Xinjiang and Tibet. The EU raised (the issue of) the system of political 
re-education camps which has been established in Xinjiang as a worrying development” 
expecting China to allow meaningful, unsupervised and unrestricted access to Xinjiang 
for independent observers, including for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
and UN Special Procedures”.641 In the framework of the Dialogue the EU also reiterated, 
in line with recommendations contained in the annex to the UN Human Rights High 
Commissioner letter on China’s UPR,  its opposition to capital punishment in all cases 
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and without exception” and also “stressed that all detained individuals must be allowed 
to be represented by a lawyer of their choosing, be given the possibility of meeting their 
family members, have access to appropriate medical assistance when required, and have 
allegations of their torture and mistreatment promptly investigated”.642 Other issues 
raised by the European Union in the Dialogue included torture, judiciary reform, China’s 
Foreign NGO Activity Management Law, labour rights, freedom of expression on-line 
and offline, and the freedoms of assembly and association reflected also the growing 
concerns on the human rights situation in China expressed by many NGOs, such as 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. The international concerns for the 
human rights situation in the PRC have recently led to the establishment of a coalition of 
321 civil society groups, including Amnesty International, which have requested the 
United Nations to urgently create an independent international mechanism to address the 
Chinese government’s human rights violations.643 These concerns have been forcefully 
stressed on the occasion of the 2020 June EU-China Summit and the subsequent 
September 14 Leaders Meeting: “on Hong Kong, the EU reiterated its grave concerns at 
steps taken by China to impose national security legislation from Beijing” considering 
that “those steps [are] not in conformity with the Hong Kong Basic Law and China’s 
international commitments, and put pressure on the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
the population protected by the law and the independent justice system”. Overall, the EU 
reiterated “its concerns on the deteriorating human rights situation, including the 
treatment of minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet, and of human rights defenders, as well as 
restrictions on fundamental freedoms”.644  
From the analysis that we have developed in the previous sections, China’s 
approach to human rights offers an overall picture whereby the PRC “complies as best it 
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can when it is in its interest to do so but uses whatever techniques at its disposal to resist 
intrusion into its domestic arena when it is not…In many respects, therefore, when it 
comes to a fundamental human right, the impact of the international treaty on China’s 
domestic regime appears limited and only one of a number of influences being brought 
to bear upon decision-making”.645 
The conceptual gaps which characterize the relationship between Brussels and 
Beijing in this field “have yet again exposed the fundamental normative conflict over the 
particularity and universality of human rights between China and the democratic West. If 
China were ever to fully embrace the liberal democratic version of human rights, a 
political transformation or at least a major political adjustment would have to take place 
in the superstructure of Chinese society first.”646 The overarching sensitivities of the 
Chinese political and legal system continue to stem by the pre-eminence of state 
sovereignty over human rights and by ideological and “cultural preferences for social 
stability, a tendency to favour the interest of the group over the individual and the lack of 
a strong tradition of individual rights”.647 Moreover, we cannot underestimate the basic 
problem that, as Meiting Li notes, in the framework of the gradual evolution of the 
Chinese legal system, “China’s laws have functioned as a protective mechanism for 
human rights, but at the same time also provided shields for the Chinese government’s 
infringement upon human rights”.648  
Even though the Chinese regime had recognized that “international human rights 
are not just another norm to be dismissed or bargained away” because they are “a 
constitutive principle of contemporary international society” which “demarcate political 
boundaries and set standards”649, the PRC has shown in the last decade an assertive 
attitude vis-à-vis human rights. The PRC has increasingly projected its considerable 
global power within UN human rights institutions reversing an approach which had been 
low-key, watchful and above all defensive. China is nowadays not reticent about its 
preferred understanding of human rights and has built new diplomatic capabilities in the 
human rights field which make it increasingly confident and assertive in its dealings with 
Western governments on these issues.  
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The crisis related to the special status of Hong Kong has underlined that this 
fundamental divergence is particularly complex not only with regard to the issue of the 
“institutions of democratic governance” but also for the application of the guiding 
principle of the rule of law within the Chinese system. While it has been increasingly 
relevant for some aspects of the Chinese economic and legal system there has been a 
strong opposition to its application to civil and political rights, even when they are granted 
by international agreements as is the case of Hong Kong. The supremacy of the political 
dimension inherent to the structure of the communist party-state prevents the thorough 
internalization of a set of fundamental rights and freedoms as those contained in the Hong 
Kong Basic Law safeguarding the principle of “one country, two systems”.   
The Chinese decisions on the status of Hong Kong confirms the selective process 
chosen by the Chinese authorities which continues to be characterized by a pattern of very 
limited normative convergence coupled with contestation.650 “Against the international 
pressure on its political and civil rights conditions, the Chinese government has 
consistently asserted the determination of the pace of human rights progress and the scope 
of external oversight to be strictly a matter of sovereignty.”651 
This situation highlights some basic contradictions in the evolution of the Chinese 
system with regard to human rights: on the one hand, we have seen that China’s 
ratification of most core human rights treaties and instruments has gradually increased 
and expanded Beijing’s cooperation with international human rights treaty bodies and 
special procedures.652 On the other, even though China has selectively agreed to be 
assessed by the special procedures in certain areas, becoming more sensitive to 
international monitoring, it “remains reserved on certain touchy areas such as religious 
freedom, political freedom”653 along with freedom of expression and of information.  
On the basis of the analysis that we have developed in this chapter we can say that 
in the framework of the EU-China Dialogue the degree of divergence on many key human 
rights issues - first and foremost the dimension related to fundamental civil and political 
rights and freedoms – has been widening in the recent past short of a comprehensive true 
dialogue centred on the differences between the two partners in terms of conceptual 
approach, setting of priorities and definition of policies in this field. Awareness of the fact 
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that the Chinese leadership seems not interested in speaking “the same human rights 
languages as the Western democracies do” by accepting “the underlying principles and 
values at varied degree in various areas of rights,”654 is a necessary prerequisite to try to 
make the EU-China Dialogue more realistic and more productive. Europe’s recognition 
that China’s approach to human rights is and has been a mix of selective compliance and 
persistent contestation can be the basis for the search of a necessary clarification aimed 
at addressing the present EU-China’s “human rights conundrum” which significantly 
affects the “qualitative development” of the Partnership. 
 
5.4 Implications for the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership of the conceptual gaps 
on human rights between the EU and China  
 
The implications of this “human rights conundrum” for the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership are significant from a twofold point of view: it 
impacts on the structural strategic dimension of the relationship and makes extremely 
complicated to reconsider the interaction between the two partners also in terms of policy.  
The relevance of the human rights dimension for the Partnership has been clearly 
reiterated by the European Commission in EU-China Strategic Outlook of March 2019: 
“The ability of EU and China to engage effectively on human rights will be 
an important measure of the quality of the bilateral relationship. The EU 
acknowledges China's progress in economic and social rights. However, in 
other respects, the human rights situation in China is deteriorating, notably in 
Xinjiang and regarding civil and political rights, as witnessed by the 
continuing crackdown on human rights lawyers and defenders. The human 
rights of EU and other foreign citizens in China must be protected. The high 
degree of autonomy enshrined in the Hong Kong Basic Law needs to be 
respected”.655 
 
The divergence that characterizes the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue derives 
from a interests-values continuum on which there are few points where the two partners 
overlap. This serious disconnect impinges directly on the “structural dimension” of the 
Strategic Partnership by making increasingly difficult – if not often impossible – the 
cooperation on some key multilateral and global issues between Brussels and Beijing.  
For instance, the complex interaction between human rights and sovereignty/non-
interference offers a significant benchmark to underline how the diverging visions in this 
 
654 Ibid., 147. 
655 “EU-China-A Strategic Outlook”, Communication of the European Commission to the 
European Council, Brussels 12 March 2019, 2. 
168 
 
field limit the structural strategic dimension of the Partnership with regard to most 
security issues. Notwithstanding the bureaucratic efforts towards incrementally 
improving interaction  in the framework of the Human Rights Dialogue, the analysis that 
we have tried to develop in this chapter points out that the constraints which limit the 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this field stem from the contrasting identities, 
value-systems and actorness of the EU and China. If China is not operating as a norm-
maker in the field of human rights yet, its diplomatic activism in this field illustrates that 
it is not a passive norm-taker either: as we have argued, a conflict between Normative 
Power Europe and Normative Power China is looming. 
Against this background emerges also the inadequacy of the policies which 
continue to be followed in the field of human rights in the framework of the EU-China 
Dialogue and Strategic Partnership. The “realist turn” which has begun to characterize 
the EU approach in its strategic relationship with China has raised the awareness that, 
from the Chinese point of view, the Dialogue has basically been “a place to park issues 
discreetly in order to avoid stronger criticism from the EU in multilateral fora”.656 In this 
respect the Chinese approach has been coherent because, from the beginning, Beijing 
regarded this objective as prominent in the interaction with Europe on human rights.  
The EU-China Dialogue – which was initiated specifically at China’s request - 
used to take place until 2006 before the March session of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights and the October session of the UN General Assembly Third Committee on the 
basis of Beijing’s expectation that the EU “would refrain from co-sponsoring resolutions 
on China at the UNCHR”.657 This Chinese utilitarian imprinting tends to confirm the 
limits of the scope of the EU-China interaction on human rights from its outset and 
throughout the subsequent period. 
From the European perspective, as Finamore points out, “the EU’s strategy is also 
a prime example of its logic of engagement: a policy driven primarily (albeit not solely) 
by normative goals related to the socialization of a third country, conducted via an array 
of foreign policy instruments…”.658 This approach has not been immune in its 
implementation of some elements of realpolitik - which have occasionally diluted its 
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coherence - stemming from “exogenous factors such as divisions between member states, 
the role of the United States, and overriding economic and security interests”.659  
However, the present stalemate on human rights within the Partnership is the 
consequence of a delay in reconsidering – in light of the evolution of the EU-China 
Dialogue – the limits of the paradigm of constructive engagement also in this field. As 
Freeman and Geeraerts have argued, the EU’s human rights policy has been indeed based 
on some wrong suppositions: not only the assumption that the socio-economic 
development would bring about political change in terms of convergence with the 
Western standards but also the idea that human rights “as they are conceived in Europe 
are beneficial or even necessary for economic development”.660  
As they have written, “rather than converging, as many Europeans expect, views 
on human rights may actually be diverging. The dialogue which is supposed to occur is 
not necessarily producing greater understanding on either side. Both Europe and China 
may have to reconsider how they approach the question if there is to be an effective 
exchange that benefits both sides”.661 
In these trends we see reflected once more how the “civilizational dimension” 
continues to shape the positions and views of the two strategic partners with regard to 
human rights: Europe in this field has been influenced in some regards by an underlying 
vision of progress which stems from the Enlightenment roots of the “human rights 
project” but also by the holistic approach of its juridical tradition. For China the millenary 
cultural tradition of Confucianism still influences the pre-eminence of rights connected 
with “relationships and roles within relationships”, denying that “the sole unit of ethical 
or political assessment is the individual”.662 Coupled with the more recent Marxist-
Leninist ideology this background explains - as we have seen - the existing dichotomies 
which take shape through contrasting normative projects.663 At the same time, it is 
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interesting to note that a prominent theorist such as Qin Yaqing argues that it is important 
in a process of “relations in motion” - as it is also the case for human rights - to deny any 
pretext through which to subjugate the “self” in the name of the collective: a view which 
problematizes some traditional Chinese interpretations of human rights.664   
The complexity of this background has been dramatically made evident by the  
democracy/human rights crisis in Hong Kong where the clash of cultural and political 
values has sent a powerful message also in the perspective of the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. If the state of denial on the stalemate of the 
Dialogue on Human Rights has been so far sustainable for the PRC and even functional 
to the preservation of its core interests, it could increasingly put under pressure its 
interaction with Europe. The EU, on the basis of the interests-values continuum that the 
Global Strategy and other EU relevant policy documents have confirmed, cannot 
compromise on one of the truly key components of its identity and normative project.  
In parallel, the human rights dimension impinges directly on the core interests of the 
Chinese party-state in terms of preservation of its political and ideological identity.  
For these reasons, the two partners should be aware that the “state of denial” of 
the EU-China “human rights conundrum” weakens the “reflexive dimension” of the 
Strategic Partnership just as it does – in light of the analysis that we have tried to develop 
in this chapter – its structural strategic dimension. This awareness, which needs to address 
and try to reduce the ideational gap between Brussels and Beijing in this field, is the 
necessary basis for a hopefully effective reshaping of the EU-China Human Rights 
















“Putting the Strategic Partnership on the map”: the approach of the EU and 
China to multipolarity and multilateralism 
 
We have looked in the previous chapter at the issue of human rights as a crucial 
benchmark to assess how the divergence of the interests-values continuum of the EU and 
China affects the strategic dimension of their partnership at a structural level. This 
strategic dimension, we have argued, cannot be assessed only on the basis of the bilateral 
interaction of the two partners: it also depends on the ability of Brussels and Beijing to 
cooperate on multilateral and global issues because this makes the objectives and the 
scope of their interaction more comprehensive and more connected to key dynamics of 
the international system and thus potentially more strategic. The cooperation on 
multilateral and global issues developed within the Partnership can indeed connect its 
strategic dimension to the set of other strategic relations and actors which contribute to 
influence and shape the international system: this broader interaction also helps to define 
the third strategic dimension of the Partnership – the reflexive one – by putting the two 
partners “on the map” of international relations as primary actors.  
In this perspective a fundamental factor is represented by the worldviews of the 
two strategic partners because the way they “put on the map” their relationship is clearly 
affected by how they see and consider the map of contemporary international relations 
and their place in it. In this sense the analysis of the approach to multipolarity and 
multilateralism of the European Union and China is another significant benchmark to 
assess the degree of strategic convergence/divergence within the Partnership and how this 
also affects the two partners’ contribution to global governance in the interaction with 
other strategic actors and institutions on the world’s scene.  
As Davis Scott has rightly pointed out,665 it is useful to compare how the EU and 
the PRC view the international system through key concepts such as multipolarity and 
multilateralism “precisely because both of them are significant actors able to impact on 
the structure and workings of the international system”. 
In the following analysis we will advance some basic arguments: the first is that 
the references to multipolarity and multilateralism have had a very different place in the 
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framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: the focus on multipolarity has 
indeed been only a Chinese objective – never shared in any official EU-China document 
– while the importance of multilateralism has been underscored in many joint statements, 
even though with different interpretations of the concept by the two strategic partners. 
For this reason, we will argue, the approach to multipolarity and multilateralism of the 
EU and China can be regarded as another example of the conceptual gaps and normative 
disconnect which influence the strategic objectives and dimension of the Partnership. In 
this perspective we will analyze whether – as Zhang Xiaoming has argued – the EU is 
“multilateralism oriented, while the Chinese are multipolarity oriented”666 and which kind 
of implications these respective approaches have for the Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership.  
 
6.1 The concepts of multipolarity and multilateralism in the European and Chinese 
debate 
 
As David Scott has written, we know that in IR the terms multipolarity and 
multilateralism represent  
different types of statements concerning the international system. The term 
‘multipolarity’ is a measurement of the distribution of power as concentrated 
in several poles of power, those poles being Great Powers. The term 
‘multilateralism’ is a process; a way of acting that involves several states (big, 
medium, or small) working together as a matter of practice.  
 
In this sense multipolarity is a “structural-descriptive measurement word for the 
existence of several centres of power, multiple ‘poles’, in the international system”:667  it 
describes a ‘‘distribution of (economic, political and military) power’’668 among the main 
international actors and can imply ‘‘the emergence of new poles in the third world’’669 
and, in a Chinese interpretation, ‘‘a world order where countries balance against the 
prevailing power’’.670 From an analytical point of view the term is centered on a particular 
 
666 Zhang Xiaoming, “Multipolarity and Multilateralism as International Norms”, in Pan Zhongqi, 
(ed.), Conceptual Gaps in China-EU Relations, 174. 
667 David A Scott, ibid., 5. 
668 Gudrun Wacker, “Similarities and differences”, in Stanley Crossick, and Etienne Reuter (eds.) 
China–EU: A common future, (Singapore: World Scientific,  2007), 213. 
669 Liselotte Odgaard and Sven Biscop. “The EU and China: Partners in effective multilateralism?” 
in David Kerr, and Liu Fei (eds.) The international politics of EU–China relations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007),  68. 
670 Zhao, Suisheng,  “China rising: Geo-strategic thrust and diplomatic engagement” in Zhao 
Suisheng (ed.) China–US relations transformed: Perspectives and strategic interactions (London: 
Routledge 2008), 38. 
173 
 
distribution of strength in the international system and is the outcome of a process which 
has been defined as multipolarization, while the policies designed to facilitate such a 
process are referred to as multipolarism.671 Multipolarity is a term which has acquired a 
specific significance in the more recent debate on the evolving trends in international 
relations which seem to evolve towards a greater diffusion of power driven by a long-
term process of multipolarization of the structure of the international system itself. After 
the two-bloc bipolarity of the Cold War where power was concentrated between the only 
two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and the so-called unipolar 
moment in the post-Cold War 1990s, where the “preponderant power” of the United 
States seemed to have brought about a kind of unipolarity, the concept of multipolarity 
has been often associated with the “rise of the rest”, that is the power shift from the West 
to non-Western rising actors such as China.  
This is a very important theme, as we will see, in the Chinese debate on multipolarity.  
Multipolarity and multilateralism have been regarded by authors such as Zhang 
Xiaoming also as “conceptual norms” in international society:672 international norms are 
thus regarded as largely accepted normative principles in international society which “can 
both enable and restrict state behavior”673 and such a concept can be used - as Peter 
Katzenstein argued - “to describe collective expectations for the proper behavior of actors 
with a given identity. […] Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe 
(or regulate) behavior, or they do both.”674 
 Scott too considers multilateralism as a manifestation of cooperative idealism and 
of IR liberalism-functionalism: he defines it as “a way of operating in the international 
system” and as a process which – on the basis of Ruggie’s view - “coordinates behaviour 
among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct”.675 Scott’s 
consideration that the EU’s nature as “a regional organisation with some supranational 
powers and some increasing capacity to operate multilaterally as an international actor” 
seems to underestimate the fact that “the European regional integration has been so far 
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“the most successful model of multilateralism in the world and the EU has been the 
champion of multilateralism”,676 as China itself has often recognized. To some extent, 
multilateralism militates in favor of a democratization process of the international society 
because it implies a way of operating which involves “a wider range of other states than 
just other Great Powers” including also regional and international organizations.677  
In addition to these definitions it is important to consider – as Scott does – how 
the EU and China have referred to these concepts not only in their joint statements and 
documents in the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership but also in their 
public diplomacy language aimed at larger audiences in the international community. In 
this perspective “EU and PRC usage of these two terms in their public 
diplomacy language says something about each of these two actors, as well as something 
about the structural processes and trends affecting the international system as a whole and 
within which these two actors are operating”.678 In this context Scott rightly points out 
that there has been “a clear difference of emphasis and of timing between the EU and 
PRC use of these two terms” with the PRC having focused much more frequently on the 
notion of multipolarity than the EU.679 Even though there has been an apparent degree of 
convergence in the last decade with both strategic partners “frequently invoking 
multilateralism”, it is also true that there is still a strong divergence “between a normative 
(values) EU use of multilateralism terminology versus a more instrumental PRC use of 
multilateralism terminology”.680  
An aspect that we will need to investigate in this respect is whether there “may be 
an important long-term identity-related process of socialisation going on, in which the 
PRC’s deployment of multilateralism in its public diplomacy language is now starting to 
move from an instrumental to a normative usage, perhaps in part resulting from the PRC’s 
interaction with the EU”.681 As we will see in the next chapter, initiatives such as the “one 
belt, one road” could be examples of this new Chinese multilateral approach.  
In this process the concepts of multipolarity and multilateralism have also been 
shifting and have been subject to further re-conceptualization as identities and the very 
nature of the international system shift. As we will see, the approach of the EU and the 
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PRC to multipolarity and multilateralism “shines a light on the identity that each actor 
sees for itself” not only within the strategic partnership but also in the international system 
and on the image that the two partners want to show the world.682  
In line with our epistemological premises the focus on the role of language in 
considering the approach of China and the EU to the concepts of multilateralism and 
multipolarity underlines once more that “norms, ‘values’ in other words, are highly 
contextual, politically and culturally laden, both in the abstract and in the actuality of 
language encapsulation”.683 In this sense, as Qin Yaqing has written, values are also 
products of “cultural communities of practice”. For this reason it is interesting to consider 
how the identities and public images of international actors emanate from “a universe of 
discourse” which can be regarded as a “multiverse” in its pluralist cultural declinations.684 
The influence of “performative speech” as the basis for normative conduct is undoubtedly 
an aspect of the complex interaction of Europe and China in the framework of a 
relationship which has been gradually shaped not only by the constant production of 
statements, documents, policy papers but also of “role conceptions” driving the evolution 
of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  
In this sense a preliminary conceptual clarification and the consequent analysis of 
how the notions of multipolarity and multilateralism have been used and empirically 
deployed by the EU and the PRC remind us what Renard and Biscop have written in their 
study of EU multilateralism and multipolarism: “in international politics, rhetoric and the 
choice of words are never innocent”.685  
 
6.2 The approach to multipolarity of the EU and China  
 
The analysis of multipolarity in the framework of the EU-China Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership is an important perspective because the creation of the Partnership 
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in 2003 took place in a context of significant contrast between the United States and 
Europe - in particular with two prominent member-states of the Union such as France and 
Germany - in relation to the war in Iraq. In a logic of balancing the “predominant power” 
and growing assertiveness of  Washington, the Chinese leadership regarded at the time 
the strengthening of the relations with EU as a strategic objective aimed at multipolarizing 
the international system. As Zhang Xiaoming has noted686, “for a long time, the future 
configuration of power in the international system has been a central concern of Chinese 
leaders and researches, and they are enthusiastic about promoting  multipolarization on 
the world stage”. In this respect Zhang Yongjin pointed out that  
“The future configuration of power in the international system (guoji geju) is 
a central concern of the Chinese, which has produced a diverse range of views 
and pluralistic perspectives. The original ideas of guoji geju have often been 
traced back to Mao’s conception of ‘Three Worlds’ and to the concept of 
strategic triangle in the 1970s. Following the end of the Cold War, discussions 
of guoji geju in China have evolved into a discourse of the emerging 
multipolarity in post-Cold War international relations, through which Chinese 
elites have been trying intellectually to come to terms with the transformation 
of global order and in which they have identified rationale in terms of their 
strategic policymaking”.687 
 
This approach reflected a fundamental strategic objective of the PRC as an 
emerging power: by taking a rather instrumental approach to international cooperation, 
Beijing aimed at “favouring the emergence of a multi-polar system primarily as an 
antidote to American or Western hegemony”.688 In this perspective Cui Liru has argued 
that China considers itself to be operating in a multipolar international configuration after 
the 2008 crisis which marked the turning point from a unipolar to a multipolar system. 
His view reflects an important Chinese debate which regarded the shift from a unipolar 
to a multipolar system as having originated by America’s decline in a context in which 
the “centre” weakened to the point that it was “unable to easily exercise hegemonic 
authority like it did in the post-Cold War era”.689 
In this perspective multilateral bodies have been regarded by China “as useful in so 
far as they amplify the respective national positions, constrain or inhibit unwelcome 
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initiatives and uphold the traditional principle of non-inference in internal affairs”690. 
Fundamentally China’s approach has expressed a realist view in its consideration of the 
possible impact of its rise on the international system. In this context, polarity - a 
traditional structural notion mainly used to explain the possibility and consequences of 
“balancing” in the case of hegemonic transition - was a concept largely referred to in the 
Chinese theoretical debate with the basic assumption that the world was moving towards 
a more multi-polar international order. As Salvatore Finamore has written, “the rhetoric 
of multipolarity has appeared prominently in China’s political discourse since the end of 
the Cold War, and it is a cornerstone of Beijing’s view of international politics, especially 
in the realm of high politics and security relations”.691 
If the Chinese approach has been characterized by realist considerations, it is useful 
also to note the ideational background of China’s discourse on multipolarity which 
“resonates with the anti-hegemonic rhetoric of the Century of Humiliation and … 
reinforces its defence of the principle of non-interference, weaving together concerns for 
international security and stability with a claim for justice and equity in global affairs”. 
Jiang Shixue, echoing key arguments in favor of a multipolar transformation of the 
international system often discussed by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, has 
underscored the potential of convergence between China and Europe in “defending 
fairness and justice” as driving elements for multipolarization.692  
In the 1990s, multipolarity (duojihua) emerged as a constant conceptual reference 
in the Chinese foreign policy elaboration. As the father of post-Maoist China Deng 
Xiaoping stated: ‘‘in future when the world becomes three-polar, four-polar or five-polar, 
the Soviet Union […] will still be one pole. In the so-called multi-polar world, China too 
will be a pole. We should not belittle our own importance: one way or another, China will 
be counted as a pole’’.693  
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As Scott underlined,694 at the beginning of the new decade Chinese scholars stressed 
“the importance of multipolarization for China’s strategic calculations”: in 2001 Wang 
Jisi argued that “the key notion and belief in China’s conceptualization of international 
politics today is “multipolarization”’   while Ren Xiao stated that “no other theoretical 
reasoning has greater impact upon actual Chinese foreign policy” than 
multipolarization.695 This approach was presented as “a pragmatic line that China has to 
walk in a multi-polar era taking shape faster than we had foreseen”, defining “world 
multipolarization, as the requirement of history”.696 At the highest political level Hu 
Jintao confirmed in a major foreign policy speech in 2001 that multipolarity constituted 
an important base for Chinese foreign policy.697 In the Chinese view a multi-polar world 
was better and more stable than a unipolar one, and it was therefore conducive to 
furthering the Chinese national interest.698 President Jiang Zemin proclaimed in 2000, 
“multipolarity is better than unipolarity and political multipolarization is of great 
significance to world peace, stability and development”.699 
In the following years the Chinese discourse on multipolarity was characterized 
by tones increasingly critical of US hegemony: as Finamore has observed, the goals of 
multipolarity, described by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs “in clearly normative 
terms”, assumed that multipolarization helped “weaken and curb hegemonism and power 
politics”, served “to bring about a just and equitable new international political and 
economic order” and contributed “to world peace and development’’.700  Considering 
multipolarization as an inevitable historical process, the document of the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented it in an implicit but transparent anti American key 
by stating that ‘‘at present […] an individual country is pursuing a new ‘gunboat policy’ 
in contravention of the United Nations Charter and the universally acknowledged 
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principles governing international relations in an attempt to establish a monopolar world 
under its guidance”.701  
As Zhang Xiaoming has noted, it was the US unilateralism and hegemonism - 
strong at the beginning of the 2000s - that influenced, and not incidentally, the 
establishment of the Sino-EU Strategic Partnership, in 2003.702 Accordingly, the PRC 
regarded an integrated and united Europe as an important pole in a multipolar world.703 
In this respect - as Dan Bingran observed - “during the Cold War era, Europe was 
regarded first as a force to be united in the ‘Three Worlds’ doctrine, then as a balancing 
force against Soviet hegemony. This interest continued after the Cold War…, as Europe 
[was] looked upon as a potential pole in the future multipolar world order which China 
favours”.704 This interest in Europe as a pole was also evident in the 2003 Chinese policy 
paper on the EU, which praised the Union’s power and influence in the world, stressed 
the converging views of the PRC and the EU, the lack of conflicts of interest and their 
shared willingness to fight for a “more democratic and multipolar world”.705  
In the relationship with China, as Bart Gaens has written, the fundamental goal of 
the EU of “advancing the EU’s identity as global actor” included the projection of its own 
regional integration model to the rest of the world:706 for the EU the Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership was therefore aimed also at integrating China more fully into 
multilateral global governance, as Michael Yahuda has written.707 
While in the first half of the 2000s the Chinese approach to multipolarity was 
therefore articulated through a sort of “cooperative rebalancing” of which the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership could be an instrument, at the end of this period the 
call for “the establishment of a multipolar world” was driven by the conviction in the 
Chinese leadership that the progress toward it was “irreversible” because the international 
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balance of power was changing.708 If the establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership with the EU had been part of China’s balancing calculations involving other 
poles of power, after the 2008 economic crisis a more assertive PRC perceived that 
“central to the multipolarization discourse are Great Power relations” - as was 
underscored by the formula “Great Powers are the key (daguo shi guanjian)” - 709  which 
included emerging non-Western powers such as the BRICS. In this evolving context, 
support for greater international multipolarity was thus also confirmed as one of the 
overarching objectives of China’s foreign policy in a logic of search for status and 
recognition as a great power on the world scene. China expressed its views clearly in this 
respect in documents such as Beijing’s 2008 National Defence White Paper: 
“Economic globalization and world multi-polarization are gaining 
momentum… The rise and decline of international strategic forces is 
quickening…and groups of new emerging developing powers are arising. 
Therefore, a profound readjustment is brewing in the international system”.710 
 
Along the same lines the 2010 China’s National Defense paper stated once 
more that “progress towards…a multi-polar world is irreversible” while in the wake of 
US and European growing economic difficulties, Chinese commentators argued in an 
increasingly assertive way that “a new phase of multipolar world power structure will 
come into being in 2009, and the international order will be correspondingly 
reshuffled”.711 In the Chinese approach to multipolarity the original anti-hegemony 
component (fan ba) has remained “a key Chinese imperative” previously directed at the 
Soviet Union and then at the United States, aimed at weakening and curbing 
hegemonism.712 Even though such a process has been often officially described as not 
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being aimed at the US and its power by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs – which 
regularly repeated that the PRC “efforts to promote the development of the world towards 
multipolarization [were] not targeted at any particular country” – it is clear that for China 
“one of the basic goals of multi-polarity is to prevent the United States from becoming 
the one and only hegemonic power in the world and to preempt its possible negative 
impact or pressures on China”.713 This approach has been regularly reiterated by 
institutions which influence the analytical debate and reflect official policy-making such 
as the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences whose member Jiang Shixue has underscored 
in this respect that “though China and the EU do not hold the same positions on all 
international issues, both sides oppose the single-polar world pattern and hegemony [and] 
advocate establishing a multi-polar world pattern as soon as possible”.714  
In relation to this Chinese debate it is fair to note that in the West, particularly in 
the US, the problem of polarity has been thoroughly analyzed mainly by neo-realist 
theorists in close connection with the questions of balance of power and hegemony. As 
David Scott has written, such compensatory balancing is why the PRC considers that the 
United States has been unable to retain its so-called unipolar moment gained in the wake 
of the collapse of the Soviet Union: “amid long-term ‘decline’ (shuai luo), US 
‘unipolarity’ (danjihua) is envisaged as giving way to multipolar settings for the coming 
century”.715 As we have seen, the official PRC view is that this is a structural 
process716 which - notwithstanding a persistent asymmetrical distribution of power 
between the US and the PRC - supports a plurality of power centres that can compensate 
this situation, as long as they do not balance against China.717 While China’s multipolar 
focus has aimed at restraining the United States, it is meaningful to add that the Chinese 
approach values the status quo with regard to the structure of the UN Security Council, 
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opposing its enlargement to other permanent members with veto power. At the end of the 
second decade of the new millennium, even though post-Cold War American “uni-
polarity” has been weakened,718 Washington’s leadership is still for the EU a point of 
reference, notwithstanding some controversial positions at transatlantic level and in the 
face of the competition of a global China. At the same time, the Chinese interest in the 
European model of multilateralism in the Post-Cold War era has been gradually replaced 
by a “global multilateralism” centered on the reinforcement of the United Nations (as 
opposed to unilateralist actions of a US-led NATO). 
On the European front, the EU’s approach to multipolarity has been overall 
limited, “intermittent” in the declarations of some EU representatives but substantially 
absent in the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China. It is 
meaningful that the concept of multipolarity was not used either in the 2003 European 
Security Strategy or in the 2016 Global Strategy, while in both multilateralism is a 
prominent conceptual point of reference. Instead of a strategic vision on multipolarity the 
EU’s approach has been characterized by statements in the framework of its public 
diplomacy rhetoric but the concept is not elaborated in any of its policy documents. It was 
mentioned by EU Commissioners such as Pascal Lamy – who regarded multipolarity as 
an “objective and a principle” of EU external policy - and Peter Mandelson who argued 
that “in this multi-polar world, the challenge for the EU and China is to create a strategic 
vision of the kind of partnership we want … The EU is an essential component of a 
multipolar world”. Javier Solana stated that in an “increasingly multipolar world”, where 
“a stronger Europe with a common strategic vision is also a Europe capable of 
consolidating relationships with the other great partners” like the PRC719.  
Some recognition of multipolarity in EU official documents can be found in Joint 
declarations with strategic partners such as India (as David Scott underlines, the phrase 
“global actors in the multipolar world” was used several times over the years720) while 
 
718  Andrew Bacevich, The Limits of Power (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008). On the “hubris” 
of the United States as international hegemon this author develops an interesting critique.  
719Pascal Lamy, “Trade Policy, the Convention and External Relations”, SPEECH/02/585, 22 
November 2002, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/september/tradoc_118895.pdf;  
Peter Mandelson, “The Larger Trend: China, Britain and Europe”, 8 September 2009. 
http://www.bis.gov.uk/the-larger-trend-china-britain-and-europe-in-a-multilateral-world; Javier Solana, 
“Europe in the World in 2057” in Maurice Fraser (ed.) European Union. The Next Fifty Years (London: 
Financial Times Business, 2007), 38.  
Also see Charles Grant and Tomas Valasek, Preparing for the Multipolar World: European Foreign 
and Security Policy in 2020 (London: Centre for European Reform, 2007). 
720 David Scott, ibid. 
183 
 
the Maturing Partnership EU document referred to some extent to multipolarism with its 
analysis that “China’s geopolitical vision of a multipolar world, and the Chinese 
perception of the EU as a partner of growing importance, also provide a favourable 
context” for the EU-China strategic Partnership, in which “the EU as a global player on 
the international scene, shares China’s concerns for a more balanced international 
order”.721  
Further elaboration on the role of multipolarity for the EU was made by the EU 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso who - acknowledging “some virtues in a 
multipolar international society” – delineated multipolar concepts in one speech in 2011: 
“the bi-polar system of the world before 1989 has been replaced by a multi-polar, more 
unstable and more unpredictable world … if Europe wants to play its role in this new 
world, our nation states must realize that they do not have the power or influence to do so 
alone”.722 At the same time he warned that “it would be unwise to overlook the risks 
associated with multipolarity”. Drawing lessons from the past great powers competition 
originated by “attempts to create a multipolar balance of power” 723 Barroso expressed 
the opinion that a multipolar world would not “solve all the problems we face today. 
Europe tried a multipolar balance of power in the nineteenth and early years of the 
twentieth century … but let us not forget that multipolar systems are based on rivalry and 
competition”.724 In the framework of “a multipolar, more unstable and more 
unpredictable world” the President of the EU Commission underlined that the EU “having 
delegitimized multipolar power politics in the European continent” had to “work to 
prevent the emergence of this [multipolar] model on a global scale”.725  
Overall we can see from the EU statements and official positions that, in the 
framework of the Partnership, dialogue on the concept of multipolarity has not taken place 
because the Union has never “supported multipolarity. Its traditional close relationship 
with the US explains this reluctance. Although it has developed independent policies in a 
number of areas… it cannot ignore its close strategic links with the US since most of its 
members, including France, are also part of NATO”.726 
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The conceptual gap in this field is grounded not only in different historical 
legacies, identities, concepts of sovereignty, value-systems but also, as Zhang Xiaoming 
argues, in the fact that “China has been the newcomer to the Western-dominated 
international society” the “great outsider” whose rise is regarded as a challenge to the US-
led international order. If we consider multipolarity as a norm, China has not yet been a 
norm-shaper and it is not likely at all that it will be helped in this regard by the EU, which 
has not been converging with the Chinese vision of the structure of the international 
system. It is true – as Scott argues – that the “multipolarity pattern now emerging is not 
so much a matter of fixed permanent alignments. Rather, this post-Cold War multipolarity 
involves diffused and fluid alliances of the moment coalescing around different issues 
and with differential power capacities across the hard power–soft power spectrum”.727 If 
multipolarity retains “its basic structural sense of pointing to differentiated power 
distribution in and across the international system, with new rising centres of power that 
include the EU and the PRC”,728 it is interesting to consider what Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
said on multipolarity in one speech appropriately titled The EU, China and the Quest for 
a Multilateral World: “China and the EU are obviously interested in the nature of global 
politics in the 21st  century. Some have talked of building a ‘multipolar world’. For the 
EU, however, it is not the number of poles which counts, but rather the basis on which 
they operate. Our vision is a world governed by rules created and monitored by 
multilateral institutions”.729 This brings us to an analysis of the EU and China’s approach 
to multilateralism, but it has been important, before this further step, to address the 
diverging views of China and Europe on multipolarity not least in light of the practical 
consequences for the EU-US-China “strategic triangle” in terms of multiple relationships, 
partnerships and alignments between the various poles of power in the international 
system.  
 
6.3 The approach to multilateralism of the EU and China 
 
If we consider how multilateralism has been regarded and implemented by the 
two strategic partners we can see clearly diverging trajectories and visions. As Finamore 
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rightly points out “while the European Union is a prime example of multilateralism, as 
well as one of its staunchest advocates in international relations, the notion of 
multilateralism has entered China’s political discourse only in relatively recent times”.730  
Multilateralism has been mainly regarded by the PRC as a way to promote 
multipolarization: in fact China’s taste for multilateralism is “recently acquired and rather 
tentative”731 and reflects the fact that the leaders of the People’s Republic traditionally 
‘‘stressed the importance of bilateralism and were reluctant to endorse multilateralism 
because of China’s concern over possible erosion of national sovereignty’’.732  
The more recent embrace of multilateralism on the part of Beijing is the outcome, 
to some extent, of its realist considerations aimed at supporting multipolarity; in this 
respect it ‘‘masks a divergence between a normative (values) EU use of multilateralism 
terminology versus a more instrumental PRC use of multilateralism terminology’’.733 The 
adoption of a more multilateral approach has indeed been driven in the 21st century by 
the tactical acknowledgement of China’s leaders that “multilateralism may be a more 
effective and acceptable way of pursuing the anti-hegemonic goals which they 
traditionally sought to achieve through the construction of a multipolar world order”.734 
In this Chinese view, multipolarity is seen as a potentially necessary condition for 
multilateralism, but it is important to note that whereas ‘‘the global balance of power may 
limit hegemonic unilateralism, [..] it does not by itself stop unilateral strategies by the 
different poles’’.735 
The conceptual and operational disconnect between the EU and China on 
multilateralism stems from the fact that it has been for the Union a fundamental modus 
operandi which reflects a set of political values  shaping the EU identity and actorness. 
The promotion of ‘‘an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation’’ 
is indeed a ‘‘constitutional goal’’ of the Union, enshrined in Article 21.2(h) of the Treaty 
on the European Union. The EU’s approach to multilateralism, rooted in its identity and 
actorness as a civilian and normative power, has thus become for the Union not only a 
fundamental way of operating but also of being: its concept in fact “is engrained into the 
DNA of European politicians, since the Union is itself a multilateral construction”.736 The 
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habit of constant negotiations in the various EU institutional frameworks “through a 
process of internal multilateralism in the flow of EU policymaking and adjustments”737 
has made “multilateralism a way of life in Europe738 based on what has been defined a 
“normative disposition for multilateralism”.739 The structural dimension of EU’s 
multilateralism -  defined by Keohane as “supralateralism” for its intrinsic characteristics 
which has made the Union a “champion” of it - is underscored also by the EU focus on 
multilateralism as “both a means and an end” for a European foreign policy  aimed at 
avoiding the dangers of ‘‘multipolar power politics’’.740  The analysis of how the EU 
multilateralism has shaped in a profound manner the process of European integration sets 
in the right context arguments such those which have tried to explain it as a response to 
American unilateralism under the Bush Presidency of 2001–2009.741 This can be regarded 
as an element of context that reinforced at the time the European multilateralist attitudes 
and – as we have seen – a facilitating factor for the establishment of the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: however, the Union’s commitment to 
multilateralism pre-dates the “American unipolar momentum” of the early 2000s and has 
not been driven by contingent forces. Equally limited is the argument which links 
European multilateralism to a supposed “EU failure in grasping the nettle of hard power 
multipolarity game playing”: in order to respond to “this rising multipolarity” - according 
to authors such Renard - it would be “in the interest of the EU … to promote an 
international order based on systemic and rule-based multilateralism because the EU is 
simply unable to play [multipolar] realpolitik with other global players”.742  
The argument that the priority given by the Union to multilateralism was 
motivated by the fact that the EU did not possess the hard power capabilities necessary to 
play the “great power politics game” is both rather simplistic and outdated: the “raison  
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d’être” of the process of European integration is in fact the refusal of the mere power-
politics logic which twice in the 20th century brought about the destruction of Europe and 
the loss of its world leadership. Moreover, with its post-modern multilateralist approach 
the EU has developed – in terms of power and influence – a prominent role in some of 
the driving sectors of contemporary international relations, first and foremost the 
economic sphere. However, more recently, the EU approach based on its constitutive 
identity and actorness as a Civilian and Normative Power has been complemented by 
growing capabilities in the defence and security sectors aimed at strengthening its 
“strategic autonomy” and, in the longer run, its comprehensive power.  
In this perspective it is fair to admit that the coherence of the multilateral and 
supranational approach of the EU as an unitary actor had to be sometimes reconciled with 
the power-politics and multipolar impulsions of some member states which - still 
operating their own external foreign policies within varying degrees of common 
European positions - can impact the multilateral dimension of the EU external relations. 
This aspect has also been relevant, to some extent, for the EU-China interaction within 
the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, as in the case – as Scott has underlined - of 
“Franco-Chinese rhetoric [which] frequently deployed ‘multipolarity’ in Joint 
Statements” about the self-proclaimed “strategic partnership” between Paris and 
Beijing.743  
More importantly, as we will see in the next chapter, this logic has been used by 
the PRC – through initiatives such as the BRI and the 16+1/17+1 format – in order not 
only to usefully interact with “smaller poles” but also to advance a nascent 
“multilateralism with Chinese characteristics” in its relationship with Europe, as a EU 
policy planner has observed.744  
Overall, for the EU multilateralism has represented the formally preferred option, 
as the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly stipulates:745 this preference has been underlined by the 
development of a network of relations between the EU and other multilateral frameworks 
(“intersecting multilateralisms”) and with other regional actors on the basis of the EU 
“interregionalist agenda”.746 In its peculiar power projection multilateralism has been not 
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only a key component of the EU in terms of values and principles but it is a norm that has 
been constantly emphasized by the Union as a significant emanation of its civilian and 
normative power. In this perspective it has been argued that multilateralism as an 
expanding  norm by means of the  value and stress placed on it by the EU can “provide a 
different paradigm to balance of power (multipolarity) frameworks”.747  What is clearly 
relevant for our research is to assess now the role which the practice of such a multilateral 
norm has played in the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 
The central place of “effective multilateralism” in the evolving dynamics and 
structure of the international system is significantly present in the EU’s 2003 European 
Security Strategy-ESS (approved the same year of the establishment of the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership) which   avoided any reference to multipolarity but 
mentioned multilateralism five times.748 In the ESS section entitled “An International 
Order Based on Effective Multilateralism” it was posited that “the development of a 
stronger international society, well-functioning international institutions and a rule-based 
international order is our objective”.749 In this respect the EU’s approach as “a normative, 
values-fostering and multilateralism-orientated actor”750 was well expressed by the High 
Representative Javier Solana: “Europe is a new form of power. A force for good around 
the world. A promoter of multilateralism, international law and justice” and for these 
reasons “at a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order”.751 
The EU position was further elaborated in a substantive 2010 policy paper The 
European Union and Multilateral Global Governance in which the President of the EU 
Commission Barroso argued for “the EU’s role in reinforcing multilateral rules and 
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institutions at the global level. Multilateralism is the right mechanism to build order and 
governance in a multipolar world, and the European Union is well-placed to make a 
decisive contribution”752  in order “to create a normative framework” and “stimulate the 
reinforcement of multilateral institutions”.753 The reference to multilateralism as a 
“normative framework”  was aimed at stressing the role of Europe as an example for 
partners such as China:754 “the creation of an institutional multilateral order in Western 
Europe” meant that the European Union could “play an important role in the 
reinforcement of multilateral global institutions”755 and be an “indispensable partner for 
global multilateralism”, on the basis of the European “experience with multilateral 
reciprocity, the core of European politics”.756   
The 2016 Global Strategy fully confirmed the EU position on multilateralism by 
stating that the EU is aware that its “priorities are best served when we are not alone. And 
they are best served in an international system based on rules and on multilateralism”.757 
For this reason “the EU will promote a rules-based global order with multilateralism as 
its key principle and the United Nations at its core”758 considering “a strong UN as the 
bedrock of the multilateral rules-based order”.759   
All these principles were, once more, underlined by the 2019 EU-China Strategic 
Outlook which not only stated that: “the EU is committed to supporting effective 
multilateralism with the United Nations at its core” but meaningfully added that “as a 
permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a beneficiary of the 
multilateral system, China has the responsibility to support all three pillars of the United 
Nations, namely Human Rights, Peace and Security, and Development”.760   
These expectations – as we have anticipated – have found a remarkable degree of 
reluctance in the international behaviour of China which, like other EU strategic partners, 
does not share the EU’s stated aim to strengthen a multilateral, rule-based order and 
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delimit their national sovereignty in the process. As it has been noted,761 “a deeper 
understanding of multilateralism, as entailing mutual and binding obligations for large 
and small countries over the long-term, is not the prevalent one in countries whose room 
for maneuver in international relations is expanding”. It is also true that in the present 
phase of evolution of international relations the American approach to multilateralism has 
been increasingly selective and pragmatic and in this sense - albeit for different reasons 
– “in many ways closer to that of large emerging powers than to that preached by the 
EU”.762 
The normative disconnect between the EU and the other two poles of the “strategic 
triangle” is, however, very uneven: notwithstanding the unilateralist approach of Trump’s 
“America first”, Europe and the US continue to be structurally linked by a network of 
multilateral relations, as the steady strengthening, for instance, of the EU-NATO 
interaction has underlined. On the contrary, with the PRC this disconnect materializes in 
an “impediment to engaging at the multilateral level” and in this way hampers 
significantly the strategic development of the Partnership. The degree of divergence has 
not in fact been bridged by China’s ‘‘turn to multilateralism’’763  which began in the 
1990s, mainly with the aim, as we have seen, of ‘‘promoting ‘multipolarization’ in an 
attempt to counter U.S. preponderance rather than adopting multilateralism per se’’764 and 
then gained in the 2000s some more prominence with a corresponding decline of the use 
of the term ‘‘multipolarity’’ in the government’s official discourse.765 As Scott has 
written, “advocacy of ‘multilateralism’ (duobian zhuyi) has been a relatively slow 
development for the PRC”, surrounded by a “somewhat ‘conditional’ hesitation”:766 even 
though in several official documents – such as the China’s Defense Review – the 
references to multilateralism overshadowed those to multipolarity, China’s “embrace of 
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multilateralism” was driven by the interest of Chinese leaders “to show that China is a 
big responsible country on the multilateral stage”.767 
In this perspective “the PRC’s practical multilateralism of the 1990s (in which 
the PRC joined existing Western-shaped organisations on their terms) gave way to a 
more strategic multilateralism in which China has sought to adjust such organisations 
and set up new structures”.768 This approach was reflected in Chinese assertions that 
“multilateral participation will benefit China in its strategies gearing up to a peaceful rise” 
for “only through partaking in the multilateral institutions, can emerging economies 
possess the likelihood to alter the existing international power structures and operating 
rules”.769  
From a theoretical point of view these variants of multilateralism within the 
Chinese discourse have been defined by Shambaugh770 as follows: selective 
multilateralism in which multilateralism is tactical not philosophical: on the basis of this 
realist view authors such as Huang Weiping and Song Xinning have argued that “for 
China, multilateralism is more like a kind of diplomatic tool rather than a mechanism for 
international order”. At the same time a multilateral regionalism based on an Asia 
First approach which “emphasizes normative behavior”771 and a “globalist” 
multilateralism “interested in diplomacy and pan-regional partnerships”772 has emerged 
in the Chinese discourse and practice. In this context – as Zhongqi Pan has observed – 
“the transformation of China’s diplomacy … from bilateral engagement to multilateral 
engagement … is closely related to China’s image of world order and the dynamic change 
of its image gap”.773 It also reflects, as a EU policy planner has pointed out774, “China’s 
growing confidence in its normative power which is a component of the evolution of 
strategic initiatives such as the “one belt, one road” in its connotation of a peculiar 
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6.4 The persistent divergence on multilateralism/multipolarity in the framework of 
the EU-China Partnership 
 
China’s approach to multilateralism has not chosen - as a matter of fact - the 
Strategic Partnership as a privileged framework of interaction but – in its shift “from 
bilateralism to regional-multilateralism”775 has focused on the UN Security Council - 
where China’s veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council can maintain 
the paramount principle of Chinese sovereignty – and on new forms of “multilateralism 
with Chinese characteristics such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In this perspective the conceptual and operational gap 
within the EU-China Partnership partly stems – as in the case of human rights – from the 
imperative of entirely safeguarding its sovereignty (zhuquan) and resisting any outside 
“interference”.776 The rise of “sovereignism” in Europe has probably made less true the 
idea that while “historically, sovereignty is what Europeans invented and what the 
Chinese were forced to accept” it has become what the Europeans have tried to bury “and 
what the Chinese hold dear”.777 Yet is it undeniable that in the Chinese view “sovereignty 
reigns supreme in a rebalanced world order”.778 This view impinges not only on the 
structural dimension of the Partnership, preventing cooperation on global multilateral 
issues, but also on other multilateral forums like ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS), as the contentious sovereignty and territorial 
questions in the South China Sea have made clear.  
This broader dimension of the Chinese approach to multipolarity/multilateralism 
has implications for Europe´s global strategic interests, beyond its relationship with 
China. We can see a significant example of these implications and of the “divergence 
between the EU and China on the intrinsic value of multilateral institutions” in the case 
of “one of Europe’s most significant foreign policy goals in the field of nuclear non-
proliferation, namely the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT)”.779 While all EU member states have ratified the treaty given that the EU is “one 
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of its staunchest supporters”, China’s position has made it ‘‘a de facto participant in the 
regime’’: since joining the CTBT Beijing has been committed to a voluntary moratorium 
on nuclear testing but the Chinese approach continues to be “highly influenced by the 
actions of the United States, as Beijing is adamant on not ratifying the treaty before 
Washington does”.780 The case of China’s position vis-à-vis a multilateral regime such as 
the CTBT underlines interestingly how the Chinese approach to multilateralism 
reverberates on the EU-China Partnership through broader dynamics which affect its 
“structural” strategic dimension and are key in the “strategic triangle”. It also underscores 
that - as Finamore has pointed out781 -  when “Beijing has accepted to be restrained by 
multilateral rules it has only done so out of the realization that these arrangements best 
guaranteed its own security” and national interests. 
 If China’s involvement in multilateral arrangements was at the beginning mainly 
focused on the economic sector, it has in fact gradually expanded to other fields, with a 
preference for formats where the PRC can enjoy a “particular position as the sole 
representative of developing, culturally non-European and non-democratic or 
protodemocratic states”.782  
This pragmatic approach by China has made it possible, however, that “the notion 
of multilateralism has become firmly embedded” [also] in the rhetoric of EU–China 
relations, “becoming a staple element of EU–China Summit declarations”.783 If the first 
references were related to multilateral trade they “quickly expanded to the field of 
international security to include ‘‘multilateral non-proliferation, arms control and 
disarmament’’ and the need for a multilateral approach to the fight against terrorism.784 
If we examine the joint summit declarations we can see that there have been references 
to ‘‘strong support for a fair, just and rules-based multilateral international system with 
the UN playing a central role’’, ‘‘effective multilateralism” and – as the 2018 and 2019 
summits statements have reiterated – to the renewed commitment to multilateralism, the 
rules-based international order, the respect for international law and for fundamental 
norms governing international relations “with the United Nations at its core”. It is 
meaningful that the joint statement of the 2018 summit also includes in this list the 
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“principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders”, with a 
connection of multilateralism to a set of key priorities for the PRC. Furthermore the EU–
China 2020 Strategic Agenda has described multilateralism as ‘‘crucial to ensure 
effective, coordinated and coherent responses to pressing global challenges’’.785  
The language of summit joint statements and of other EU-China documents 
indicates a trend in the increased use of the concept of multilateralism while that of 
multipolarity has been “left unused”.786 After China’s attempt to insert common language 
into the concept of multipolarity on the occasion of the first EU-China summit in 1998, 
in the following EU-China joint statements - as we have seen -  references to 
multilateralism appeared on a regular basis. If the term multipolarity has never been 
adopted in the EU-China terminology the PRC has continued to make references to it in 
its relations with other major partners. However, in the last decade the Chinese leadership 
has ceased to explicitly describe the strategic relationship with the EU as a potential force 
in a process of multipolarization: Li Keqiang had indeed argued that “both China and the 
EU are the motivators of world multipolarization”787 while Wen Jiabao had stated that 
both EU and China stood for “world multipolarity  [in which] we believe Europe is an 
independent pole in the world”.788  Yet Xi Jinping’s PRC seems less interested in referring 
to Europe as a pole in the evolving balance of power of the 21st century. As Scott has 
rightly pointed out, the ironical thing is that the EU leadership has been doing “a similar 
but opposite thing, claiming that they share a common multilateral vision with the 
PRC”.789  
Europe’s aspiration to be a normative power has indeed translated into several 
statements – since the establishment of the Partnership – expressing hope that 
multilateralism would be increasingly in play in China’s foreign policy. This was in line 
with the EU’s “official rhetoric with other major states, potential Great Power partners in 
a multipolar world” which has generally and deliberately evoked multilateralism rather 
than multipolarity. In the framework of the EU-China Partnership European declarations 
stated that “EU and China share views on the importance of multilateral systems and rules 
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for global governance”; “multilateralism and respect for international law are 
fundamental tenets of the EU’s foreign policy. And…the same is true for China”; “in a 
world governed by rules created and monitored by multilateral institutions China shares 
this approach”; at the highest level the President of the EU Commission Barroso told Wen 
Jiabao of “our shared belief in multilateralism” while his predecessor Romano Prodi was 
convinced that China and the EU had “a common vision of the principle of 
multilateralism”.790 Later statements on convergence on multilateralism have been 
basically limited to the summit joint statements. Even if the two strategic partners have 
asserted that within their relationship ”both sides stand for multilateralism”, it seems clear 
not only from their interaction in this framework  that the “EU’s more normative sense 
and commitment to multilateralism” diverges from China’s more instrumental–tactical 
sense and commitment to multilateralism.791  
The increasingly less frequent usage of multipolarity language in relation to the EU-
China Partnership seems to indicate something of China’s own perplexity on the real 
potential of the  EU as a “multipolar” partner, in stark contrast with past arguments 
underlying that China had “very strong soft-balancing motivations to invest in the 
relationship with Europe”.792 
In the last decade – apart from some degree of apparent similarity in European and 
Chinese discourses – true normative convergence seems to be “dubious, and contested at 
best”.793 Even though both actors have evoked “multilateralism when appearing on their 
common public platforms”, China’s approach to multilateralism seems to have been 
motivated by a number of diversified concerns such as anti-hegemonism, economic 
development, international status as a responsible stakeholder.794 These trends seem to 
indicate – as we have argued – that multilateralism is becoming part, through specific 
initiatives, of the strategic design of an increasingly assertive Normative Power China. 
Such an approach problematizes the EU’s traditional hope that its “strong advocacy” of 
effective multilateralism may have a socializing effect on China through  a process of 
“normative identity change shaped through international [‘social’] encounter situations 
where language is being deployed”.795 The evolution of China’s approach to 
 
790 All quoted in Scott, “Multipolarity, Multilateralism and beyond…?”, 41. 
791 Ibid. 
792Chen Zhimin, “Lecture by Prof. Chen Zhimin, Fudan University, on China’s Evolving Strategic 
Partnerships”, 8 March 2010. http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/index.php?id=149. 
793 Finamore, “Normative Differences in Chinese and European Discourses”, 172. 




multilateralism does not seem in fact particularly interested in grounding a broader 
adoption of multilateralism rhetoric in a process of converging normative beliefs with 
Europe. The PRC’s process of internalization in this context appears to be limited by 
dynamics which characterize a Chinese approach summarised by Song Xinning as 
follows: “we are still uncomfortable with multilateralism, and prefer bilateralism and 
multipolarity”.796 This seems true if we consider the PRC’s stance on key multilateral 
issues ranging from its position in the negotiations on Climate Change to the territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea. 
More positive views have been expressed on the Chinese evolving approach to 
multilateralism and its impact on the further “deepening” of the EU-China Partnership by 
authors such as Mario Telo’ and Zhou Hong.797 In particular Zhou Hong - the Director of 
the European Studies Centre at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) –  has 
assumed that “China and the EC/EU developed their relations with a clear strategic goal 
of balancing world powers, and both mentioned multipolarity as a possible world 
structure”:798 their current position on the world order - she has argued -  should be based 
on the “shared commonality” in terms of global governance that Beijing and Brussels can 
express through their interaction in international institutions such as the UN, the WTO 
and the G 20. Telo’, in turn, regards the EU-China Partnership as an important example 
of a “gradual process of bilateral and multilateral institutionalisation” which defies the 
multipolarity/multilateralism dichotomy by keeping a strong potential for cooperation on 
global issues.799 
These neo-istitutionalist perspectives need to be evaluated, however, in light of the 
problematic record of the EU-China interaction on issues of global governance, as we 
have tried to underline in previous chapters.  
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If we consider James Rosenau’s definition of governance as “a system of rule that 
works only if it is accepted by the majority or at least by the most powerful of those it 
affects”,800 we can understand the relevance for its functioning of the degree of 
convergence/divergence of the main international actors with regard to their approach to 
multilateralism/multipolarity. As Gross and Jian have argued , “the concept of global 
governance and the collective management of global challenges through multilateral 
institutions inherently resonate with the EU” while China’s approach to 
multilateralism/multipolarity – which has prioritized so far sovereignty and stability – 
makes its conception of global governance “differ significantly from the EU’s, whether 
on a normative, institutional or policy level”.801 
 Barry Buzan has defined China as a revisionist but reformist power which accepts 
existing international institutions for “calculated and instrumental” reasons but also 
resists political, liberal institutions and wants to reform others (as well as raising its own 
status):802 this implies, as Gross and Jian argue, that “in terms of reflexive commitment 
to multilateralism and a rule-based international system, EU and Chinese views on global 
governance” have not been converging.803  
The different concepts of multilateralism and multipolarity of the two strategic 
partners reflect also their ambitions as global actors and normative powers which try to 
influence key issues of international governance such as peace-keeping, reform of the 
international economic institutions, development assistance, engagement in international 
regimes and regional security arrangements. In this sense the EU and Chinese approaches 
to multipolarity and multilateralism need to be set in the context of “systemic changes in 
the international system itself [which have] generated further adjustments” of the two 
concepts.804  In this sense we have seen a Chinese trajectory from strategic multipolarity 
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towards a kind of normative multipolarity compatible with a “multilateralism with 
Chinese characteristics”.805  
At the same time the evolution of multilateralism806 has problematized the EU’s 
approach aimed at “effective multilateralism” because not only China but also some of 
its own member states are “perhaps not ready yet for such a move” while the United States 
under President Trump has significantly scaled down its traditional support to multilateral 
institutions.807 In this sense the sovereign-state “fixation may then be a problem” for both 
Brussels in its interaction with some member states and for Beijing seeking to assert a 
vision of the international system still centered on sovereignty and national interests.   
However, in a framework of dynamics variously described in terms of interpolarity, 
asymmetrical multipolarity, region-polarity, multilateralising multipolarity and “multi-
multilateralism”,808 it is interesting to consider that a “multilevel and often untidy EU that 
blurs the national-regional-transnational boundaries may be more easily able to operate 
in such untidy cross-cutting international settings than a national-level tighter 
sovereignty-bound PRC”.809  
Against this evolving background, the EU-China Partnership is in any case affected 
by the existing ideational - and increasingly normative - disconnect between the two 
partners on multipolarity/multilateralism, which weakens its function of framework 
where to address key issues in terms of global governance.  
As Christiansen, Kirchner and Wissenbach have written, “ in terms of perceptions 
the different meanings the EU and China attach to the principle of sovereignty, to 
multilateralism and to other concepts indicate that disagreements are not merely the 
reflection of different interests. The EU and China…have fundamentally opposed 
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attitudes to these key aspects of global politics, and these differences are bound to create 
further tensions in the development of global governance regimes in the future”.810 
In this perspective, the development of the strategic structural dimension of the 
Partnership is confronted with two major challenges: on the one hand, the intermittent 
disunity between Europe and United States on the respective approaches to 
multilateralism, which might be the more contingent factor; on the other, the increasing 
strategic inclination of the PRC of advancing its own model of multilateralism through 
evolving initiatives such as the Belt and Road, a process which can have complex 
implications for the interaction with Europe and for the coherence of the Partnership 
itself, as we will see in the next chapter. 
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The bilateral dimension in relations between Europe and China: a challenge for the 
coherence and significance of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
 
This chapter addresses a key issue that we have often mentioned in our analysis: 
the impact and the implications of the national “China policies” of the EU member states 
and of the PRC’s “European policies” for the coherence and effectiveness of the 
interaction between Brussels and Beijing in the framework of the Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership. This dimension is significant because it amplifies the conceptual 
gaps between Brussels and Beijing by introducing further elements of complexity: on the 
one hand it weakens the role of the EU as a unitary actor and makes more challenging the 
elaboration of a coherent China policy-making. On the other hand, the fact that China has 
developed its “European policies” - through initiatives such as the One Belt One Road 
and formats of cooperation such as the 17+1 - seems to indicate not only a decreasing 
Chinese commitment to the Partnership as the main framework of interaction with Europe 
but also a strategic approach which reflects the objectives that an increasingly assertive 
Normative Power China seeks to advance.  
In this context the advancement of political values in the EU’s interaction with the 
PRC is problematized not only by the dynamics between the Union and its member states 
but first and foremost by an ideational and normative disconnect between Brussels and 
Beijing: both strategic partners tend to assert normative goals which reflect diverging 
“role conceptions” and “relational identities”. If a “normative project” has been an 
intrinsic component of the EU identity and actorness, China has recently reversed the 
assumption that it can be a rather passive “learner” of international norms and has thus 
deconstructed - as Pan Chengxin has argued – the “rhetoric of dialogue and partnership” 
which supposedly afforded it “some measure of equal agency” in this respect.811     
This set of issues impinges on the theoretical assumption that the EU is a “unitary 
actor” in a framework of coexistence with other “sub-systems” which are part of the 
broader picture which characterizes the relations between Europe and China. As we 
know, the Union’s member states and the intergovernmental dimension in which they are 
directly represented, through the meetings of the Council, are one of these sub-systems. 
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In this respect we will argue that these dynamics of diversified interaction between 
Europe and China pose a challenge for the coherence and effectiveness of the EU policy-
making in the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. A stronger 
“ownership” by all the components of the process - with agreed objectives delineated by 
the Union as a unitary actor – needs to take into account this multifaceted dimension: the 
“internal” which is based on the role of the sub-system represented by the 
Commission/EEAS and the “external” which is represented by the relations developed 
with the PRC on a bilateral basis by single member-states. 
Against this background we will firstly analyze how, on one hand, the national 
policies of the EU member-states – and their competition - influence and interfere with 
the development of the EU-China Strategic Partnership; on the other, how the complex 
dynamic Union-member states and “core-periphery” is instrumentally used by the PRC 
to support and advance its interests not only within the Strategic Partnership but also in 
the framework of the bilateral relations that Beijing has been actively developing with 
European countries.  
Secondly we will examine how the recent complex reality of “China in Europe” 
reflects the changing identity and actorness of China as a global power. Finally we will 
focus – by analyzing the issue of converging/diverging political values expressed by the 
EU and by single European countries in their interaction with China – on the growing 
divergence in terms of normative approaches and worldviews between Brussels and 
Beijing. We will conclude by underscoring that the analysis of these issues – which link 
internal and external dynamics affecting the coherence and significance of the Strategic 
Partnership – seems to confirm how the ideational and normative disconnect between the 
two partners is a key element which influences, as we have argued in the case of human 
rights and multilateralism, the development of a structural strategic dimension within the 
Partnership. 
 
7.1 The bilateral relations of European countries with China and their implications 
for the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 
 
As we know, the bilateral relations of the major European countries have always 
played a significant role in the evolving relationship of an increasingly integrated Europe 
with China. In this sense the “weight of History” has been and is – as we have argued - 
not only a quintessentially Chinese problem but also a fundamental component of the 
background of the relations between the Old Continent and China.  
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On the Chinese front there has been, at the same time, a sort of constant double-
track in the development of a more comprehensive and strategic relationship with Europe. 
The case of Franco-Chinese relations is in this respect paradigmatic:812 the ambitions and 
search for status of France - deeply rooted in the Gaullist DNA of the Fifth Republic -  
have frequently supported a national “China policy” aimed at defining the bilateral 
relations between Paris and Beijing as strategic. The fact that both France and the PRC 
are  permanent members of the UN Security Council have facilitated these attitudes but 
such an approach can be ascribed to the sensitivity of French foreign policy - in the post 
WWII context - to the political, cultural and economic leadership of the United States and 
to the “quasi-hegemonic” role of the “anglosphere”. President De Gaulle’s imprint in this 
regard on French foreign policy is a lasting legacy and has made France the only major 
European country to have been, to some extent, sensitive to the Chinese discourse on 
multipolarization of the international system.813 The search of a strategic bilateral 
relationship with China was a clear objective in particular during the neo-Gaullist 
presidency of Jacques Chirac. However, the institutional role of the President in shaping 
France’s foreign policy has led to fluctuations in Paris’s strategic view of its relationship 
with Beijing: more recently – as President Macron’s approach seems to confirm – there 
has been a trend of Europeanization in France’s “China policy”. 
In a completely different but equally important way the historical legacy has had an 
impact on the “China policy” of the United Kingdom, mainly through the complex 
problem of Hong Kong, whose partly unresolved issues in terms of rule of law, 
democracy and human rights are at the root of the present serious crisis in the territory 
which undermines the principle “one country two systems”. In the past the UK has tried 
to develop a China policy – as James Gow has argued814 – centred on concrete trade and 
economic priorities which needed to be reconciled with the “ethics dimensions” of a 
historically complex bilateral relationship.  The Cameron Government’s plans for a 
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“golden era”815 of cooperation with the PRC turned out to be drastically problematized 
not only by an emerging crisis in Hong Kong but also by a growing US strategic 
competition with Beijing which implies for London “a rethink of the trade-offs between 
economic interests and political values in its relations with China”.816 Certainly  Brexit 
has opened a new phase for Britain’s interaction with global players such as China: in this 
sense the UK - acting on a bilateral basis without the “critical mass” granted by its former 
membership in the Union – seems to need a new policy of closer coordination with its 
allies and partners in the interaction with an increasingly assertive global China.  
As for Germany – and Italy – the prominent economic component in their bilateral 
relationship with China has found in the EU policy of “constructive engagement” a long-
lasting functional framework, even though this has gradually changed, in particular with 
regard to the cooperation on sensitive issues in terms of global competition such as the 
BRI and the 5G networks.817 In this sense Germany and Italy are a good example, as a 
EU high official has observed, of the increasing difficulty for major European countries 
of having a China policy which “does not take sides” in the context of growing global 
competition. In the past, notwithstanding the intense competition of the European 
countries in the Chinese market, the effects of the national policies and priorities were 
balanced by the fact that, to a large extent, this intra-European competition was inscribed 
in the paradigm of constructive engagement”.818 
As we have seen, The PRC has always had a strong interest in “the balance of power 
among nations and the international system that emerges from that balance at a given 
point in time”, a concept that Chinese scholars define “international configuration”, as 
Cui Liru points out. 819 For this reason Beijing has seen in Europe a potential counterpart 
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for its efforts of multipolarizing international relations not only in its relationship with 
the Union but also with its member states. The growing perception in the Chinese 
leadership that the role of an integrated Europe as a pole has been weakening – compared 
to the early 2000s when the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was 
established – has militated in favour of a very active policy of cooperation (mainly 
through the penetration of economic markets) with single European countries or in the 
framework of groupings – such as the 17+1 (formerly 16+1) – aimed at strengthening the 
overall Chinese presence and influence in Europe. This action has been reinforced by the 
PRC’s exploitation of all the advantages that the national competing interests of the 
European countries for the Chinese market have offered. As  has been noted in this 
respect, “the density of government and related exchanges between China and the EU, 
and through mutual visits at the member states level, is almost overpowering. It reflects 
the Chinese preference for bilateral interactions but also Europeans’ eagerness to compete 
– with each other – for the attentions of China”.820 This “density” has been underscored 
by the number and level of the meetings at a bilateral level between the PRC and some of 
the major EU member-states.821  
On the Chinese side the amount of resources and political energies devoted to the 
strengthening of these relations has been considerable and denotes the importance of this 
dimension for China’s overall relationship with Europe. Yet, in parallel, the level of 
convergence and “productivity” of the main strands of cooperation within the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (Foreign Policy and Security Dialogue, High Level 
Economic Dialogue, Human Rights Dialogue) has not been increasing, as we have seen. 
China’s “investment” in parallel relations with European counterparts is a factor which 
clearly can at least reduce - if not undermine - the structural engagement and the strategic 
potential of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. In turn, the economic competition 
of the European national systems in China has been a factor with a constant impact on the 
EU’s China policy-making. For Europe, at the intergovernmental level, possible liabilities 
stem not only from the internal competition of major member states in China but also 
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205 
 
from “the potential divergence of interests between its core and the periphery – whether 
this periphery is the austerity-marred south, the under-regarded east, or the somewhat 
complacent north”.822  
This “double-track” in China’s strategic relations with Europe has provided it with 
a better range of policy options: “by focusing on its direct interests, and often ignoring 
EU norms in its proposals” the PRC has developed a growing network of bilateral 
relations with EU member states, “putting special emphasis on Europe’s periphery”.823 A 
significant example of this trend is the Cooperation between China and Central and 
Eastern European Countries (China-CEEC) indicated by the 17+1 format. As Hillman 
and McCalpin have written,824 this format is a Chinese initiated-platform established in 
2012 with the aim of expanding “cooperation between Beijing and a group of EU member 
states and Balkan countries: although the initiative pre-dates the formal announcement of 
China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI), the 17+1 cooperation has been widely seen as an 
extension of the BRI. The three priority areas that China has identified for increasing 
cooperation under the formerly 16+1 include infrastructure, advanced technologies, and 
green technologies”. As it has been pointed out, “although the grouping gives the outward 
impression of multilateralism, it is mainly a forum for China to strike bilateral deals”.825 
  The strengthening of this complementary dimension to the EU-China 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership was facilitated by the consequences of the  
European economic crisis and long recession which made possible very important 
Chinese takeovers, in particular in Southern Europe, and raised in Central and Eastern 
European countries the expectations for the advantages which might flow from the 16+1 
format.  The dangers of this Chinese initiative for the coherence of the Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership have not been underestimated by the EU: as Hillman and McCalpin 
have underlined, EU officials have been “increasingly critical of the 16+1 and worry the 
mechanism could further undermine EU unity on policies toward China”.826 In 2016, The 
European Commission’s Joint Communication on Elements for a new EU Strategy on 
China had insisted that any bilateral relations with China - including in group settings 
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such as the 16+1 format - should be coordinated with the European Union to ensure that 
relevant aspects are “in line with EU law, rules and policies, and that the overall outcome 
is beneficial for the EU as a whole.” The European Parliament reiterated this stance in 
a resolution on the state of EU-China relations in December 2018.827  
Even though China responded to these statements by insisting that it firmly 
supports European integration and unity, these trends epitomize the structural change in 
the “balance of power” between Europe and China which has characterized the strategic 
relationship in the last decade. When the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
was established the focus was indeed on “Europe in China” because of the opening of the 
Chinese market and the massive process of manufacturing delocalization from the West 
to the Asian country. This process was driven by the reassuring paradigm of “constructive 
engagement” which minimized the implications for the EU of the competition among 
single European countries in the Chinese market. 
Conversely, China is now inside Europe – as it has been rightly pointed out – and 
“if one were to select just a single example to show how issues have shifted in the last 
decade from the question of Europe’s presence in China to China’s involving itself 
directly in Europe and its neighbourhood, it would be the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI)”.828  
 
7.2 The BRI as a manifestation of China’s shifting vision of its long-term relations 
with Europe 
 
The BRI can be regarded as a significant manifestation of China’s search for a 
“grand strategy” in the framework of a comprehensive power projection aimed at shaping 
its external environment and advancing its long-term interests. Vis-à-vis Europe it has 
been described as the “dominant popular narrative for EU-China relations”,829 supported 
by all the means of Chinese “hard and soft power mobilized from the top”830and aimed at 
appealing to Europe on different fronts. Even though the Chinese debate on a “grand 
strategy” is still open and no official document has so far delineated it, the strategic 
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approach embodied by the BRI, as Rolland has argued, reflects the vision that the PRC 
“has for itself and for its desired position in the international system” and is “meant to 
shape the international environment in a way that benefits [its] long-term strategic 
objectives by seeking “to mobilise and integrate all the available domestic resources and 
instruments of national power”.831 The BRI reflects also a meaningful change in Chinese 
strategic thinking in terms of its normative and ideological characteristics: as Chang and 
Pieke have noted, this initiative is the practice of the “concept of a community with a 
shared future for mankind” delineated by Xi Jinping in 2017.832 It is also, as we have 
argued, the concrete implementation of a new approach of pragmatic “multilateralism 
with Chinese characteristics”. 
The perception has grown in Europe of the BRI as a key component of a Chinese 
“offensive” designed to shape the international environment in ways that promote China’s 
national values and interests and as a possible alternative model of governance. In 
particular, the concept of “connectivity” propounded by the Chinese authorities through 
the BRI - based on “Europe’s until-recent openness to Chinese activity behind its own 
member states borders” - has become matter of closer scrutiny on the real added-value 
for the European partners of this cooperation. Growing concerns have been expressed that 
“China’s trade advantage is moving upstream, into logistics, finance, cyber, and 
technology”.833 In this perspective it has been argued that: 
the BRI, elevated to the constitutional rank by the Chinese Communist Party 
as a part of Xi Jinping’s ‘China’s Dream?, is an open competition for global 
leadership, and a way to reshape the international system, putting China at its 
center.834 
 
The BRI is increasingly perceived as part of the strategic ambitions of China as a 
global power which have been underscored by its systematic bid to take over the 
management of infrastructure such as European ports and by its interest in key activities 
from aerospace to grid networks and data storage. The Chinese expansion into European 
markets has been fueling, however, greater investment screening, as was underlined by 
the change of Germany’s position in this regard “after the 2016 Chinese raid on German 
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high tech firms”.835 The complex implications and overall compatibility  of this strategic 
initiative for a EU coordinated China policy have been underlined by Italy’s decision to 
sign - the day after the EU Council meeting of 22 March  2019  which approved the 
common EU strategy toward China in preparation of the EU-China Summit - a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Beijing to become an official member of the 
BRI. The signing of this MoU produced strong reactions in both Europe and the United 
States because Italy is the first big EU country to become a member of the BRI and also 
the only G-7 member which has decided to join the Chinese initiative.836 
The fact that a country like Italy – the third largest economy of the Eurozone – has 
joined the BRI was perceived in Brussels as an intrinsic weakening of the credibility of a 
EU China policy based on the “wider understanding that while the BRI promises global 
development, at the same time it carries daunting challenges” running counter not only to 
the “EU’s agenda favoring trade liberalization” but also to the Union’s concept of 
multilateral cooperation. In direct response to the BRI, “the EU Commission published 
its Strategy on Connecting Europe and Euro-Asia, based on Western economic and 
institutional norms and principles, a document that completely ignores the BRI”.837 
The growing awareness of the complex implications of the BRI for Europe has been 
underscored by a certain “turn of the tide” in the national China policies of several 
European states with regard , in particular, to their projects of cooperation with the PRC  
on the issue of fifth-generation (5G) telecom services, one of the most sensitive aspects 
because of its structural security implications in key areas. The Chinese telecom giant 
Huawei is regarded as the world leader in high speed 5G equipment and the US has 
expressed “fears that this new technology could contain security loopholes that allow 
China to spy on global communications traffic, and has been lobbying European countries 
to stay clear of it”.838 The US diplomatic offensive on the Chinese “predatory approach” 
to trade and investment and its connected security risks has been met in Brussels and other 
European capitals in a changing context characterized by an in depth reflection on the 
 
835 The European response to Chinese strategic acquisitions has been driven by the countries which 
have received the largest share of Chinese investment: Germany and France, which coordinated with Italy 
through bilateral demarches and the common drafting of a non-paper on investment screening addressed to 
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strategic relationship with China.839 After the UK and France,  Germany and Italy have 
also decided to substantially limit the cooperation with China in the 5G sector. 
In the context of dynamics of growing strategic competition with China, 
dramatically fueled by the pandemic crisis, the endorsement by European countries “of 
Chinese President Xi Jingping’s signature foreign policy initiative” has been regarded not 
only as undermining the renewed EU’s “efforts at finding a common stance vis-à-vis 
Beijing”840 but also as a significant factor of friction with Washington “in its tug-of-war 
with China over trade and global leadership”841. In this context there has been an 
increased awareness in Europe that the set of more fragmented bilateral relations 
supported by initiatives such as the BRI and the 17+1 and the stalemate in the 
development of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership have not reinforced the 
cohesion of the EU’s attempt to forge a unitary approach to China. 
If the policies of the Trump administration toward China and the EU might have 
offered – as Nordin and Weissmann have argued842 - a “window of opportunity that 
Beijing has used skillfully to promote its claim to international leadership”, the pandemic 
crisis has also represented in this respect an inflection point for a European rethinking of 
the strategic relationship with China. 
 
7.3 The role of economic bilateral interests in Europe-China relations: growing 
signs of divergence.  
 
The “parallel” Europe-China relations which have been developed by Beijing 
through a network of bilateral/multilateral strands of collaboration have been defined “a 
mismatch in rules, culture and expectations”843 which not only has prevented cooperative 
positions on a wide set of economic issues “ranging from business arbitration to telecoms 
norms and public-private partnerships” but also normative convergence between the EU 
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and China on multilateral issues, for which Europe had high hopes in order also to 
broaden and strengthen the structural strategic dimension of the Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership.  
In this evolving context, if “the age-old questions of European division versus 
European unity remain unanswered on many issues”,844 the strategic approach developed 
by the Union and several member states has problematized not only the traditional policy 
of “constructive engagement” but also the “bilateral dimension” of  European relations 
with China, which has been regarded as a factor weakening the EU’s comprehensive 
strategic approach towards Beijing mainly given the short-term national priorities and 
fragmented objectives it implies.  
This is a very important aspect of the problematique that we are examining: on 
strategic priorities and political issues and values - as we will see in the second part of the 
chapter - attitudes  have been changing in Europe not only between different governments 
but sometimes also within the same party, as the case of the British Conservatives tends 
to underscore.845 At the same time this process has been influenced in a significant way 
by the core-periphery dynamics which have been taking place within Europe. The crisis 
of the Eurozone and the long recession which followed amplified the gaps that separated 
Northern from Southern Europe: this left China with considerable room for manoeuvre 
in taking advantage of its bilateral relations with single European countries. In light of 
the tensions related to the pandemic crisis the strategic reflection underway within the 
Union has refocused on the necessity that the “EU core” can reinforce commitments with 
its “periphery” in order to avoid the risk that divisions in the membership can be used by 
external actors as a means of increasing influence to the detriment of broader European 
strategic priorities. In parallel, a new debate has addressed the complementary key 
question of the European economic presence in China in a framework which, for the first 
time, has taken into account - as we have seen - the issue of “decoupling”: this debate is 
still in a nascent phase but constitutes a significant element of novelty in the interaction 
between Europe and China. 
 
844 If the very concept of “periphery” is generic, as Godement and Vasselier argue, because it is 
hard to define a “single European periphery”, it is also true that Chinese bilateral cooperation initiatives 
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economic interest is a necessary response” to these tactics of “divide and impera”. Godemont and Vasselier, 




In this perspective the “principled pragmatism” that the EU has delineated as a 
general “norma agendi” in its new Global Strategy also needs to be supported by “core 
countries” in terms not only of economic priorities but also of advancement of values, 
norms and international standards in the key strategic relationship with China.  
China’s fluctuating behavior within the Partnership has been influenced also by the 
realistic acknowledgement of the many obstacles which characterize the development of 
the “relational dimension” (that is, the economic component) of the Strategic Partnership. 
While an EU-China investment agreement has been delayed for a long time because it 
would require – if implemented in a thorough way - significant changes and reforms in 
the PRC’s economy, China “has rather sought a guarantee against anti-dumping by 
proposing a free trade agreement” and has also used “every bilateral opening with 
member states and beyond”846 to protect and promote its interests. This approach was 
facilitated by the fact – as we have underlined – that it coincided with the period of 
greatest difficulty for the EU, following the 2011 public debt crisis. This phase of 
particular EU weakness seems to have been overcome by the determined response of the 
EU to the economic implications of the pandemic crisis and the unity and lessons learned 
by the EU and its members in facing Brexit seem to have had an impact even on European 
governments led by “sovereignist” parties which have limited their polemics vis-à-vis the 
EU’s lead on economic issues.  
China’s bilateral activism with single European countries on the economic front has 
implicitly undermined the prospects of re-launching the EU-China Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership as the primary framework for the two actors’ interaction. The need 
of a comprehensive approach sustained by the two sides seems to be a prerequisite for 
addressing the pending contentious issues, as the EU leaders have underlined on occasion 
of the last EU-China summit and the subsequent Leaders Meeting in September 2020. On 
those occasions a higher degree of reciprocity has been indicated as a key objective by 
European leaders: “the reality is that this relationship has advanced in areas of direct 
interest to China, including some which are not shared with Europe” and for this reason 
a set of serious unresolved problems continues to affect a balanced and substantial 





In a phase characterized by growing ideological tensions,847 the question of 
reciprocity needs also to be addressed from an ideational point of view, on the basis of 
the reciprocal awareness that some structural changes are required in the strategic 
approach of the two partners. On the EU side the limits of its normative power strategy 
vis-à-vis China are being recognized along with the rethinking of the “constructive 
engagement” policy on the basis of its inconsistencies; on the Chinese side any strategic 
reflection on the implications of the “dual approach” implemented through initiatives 
such as the BRI for the role and potential of the Partnership as the main framework of 
interaction with Europe is still limited. China’s recent “sub-regional focus”848 - more 
centred on the bilateral interaction with single EU countries - seems indeed to be driven 
not only by real-politik and “economic opportunism” but, more importantly, by an 
ideological and ideational vision of the role of China in the framework of an evolving 
“international configuration” (guoji geju).849  
What it is important to consider is that the European response to this Chinese 
approach is being driven not only by a logic of economic needs – as happened during the 
worst period of the post-2008 recession – or a predominant focus on national priorities 
but also by the consideration of a set of political values which link – even though not in 
a linear way - the individual behaviour of EU member states with the action and objectives 
of the Union within the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  
 
7.4 The role of political values in the bilateral relations between China and EU 
member states   
 
The picture which emerges from the diversified set of bilateral economic relations 
between China and single EU member-states is twofold: if these relations often add a 
further element of complexity to the search for an effective and coherent EU approach to 
its Strategic Relationship with the PRC, we have also seen that there is a growing 
awareness in Europe of the Chinese determination to take advantage of uncoordinated 
and sometimes short-sighted national “China policies”. This process is further defined 
and nuanced if we consider how political values – in connection and beyond the economic 
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interests and priorities - shape the attitudes of the EU and of its membership towards 
China. 
The multifaceted role of political values in the relationship with China of most 
European countries has been in fact regarded as a crucial ideational factor which 
contributes to the definition of the EU’s interests-values continuum and its 
implementation in the interaction with Beijing. Since the Treaty of Lisbon envisages that 
all EU member-states are committed to the external promotion of democracy, human 
rights and the rule of law, it is relevant to analyze how “the EU member-states promote 
these values in their relations with China…and what importance do EU member-states 
place on political values when they conflict with other interests, such as those in the 
economic field”.850 In this sense we will see that “promoting political values and 
protecting economic interests are not necessarily mutually exclusive, but trade-offs 
between different objectives often arise”.851  
At the same time it is important, in line with our epistemological premises, to 
understand how - as Michalski and Pan Zhongqi have argued852 - in the specific context 
of the Strategic Partnership the two partners “engage in role-playing to assert their 
international identities and enhance their status and prestige as global actors”. The 
character of the interaction between Brussels and Beijing on political values “depends on 
the degree of congruence in norms and worldviews between the partners and their relative 
position in the international system”: in this sense the increasing divergence on political 
values is reflected by the “competitive role-play that emerges between China and the EU 
in the Strategic Partnership” which underlines the complexity of socializing “a significant 
Other to norms and worldviews that are central to their respective identities in the 
evolving international system”.853 
On the European side, it is important to focus on the diversified elements which 
define the approaches developed by European countries in their interaction with the PRC: 
the historical legacies which, as a fundamental background, influence, through national 
identities and actorness, political values;  the level of economic relations with China in 
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quantitative and qualitative terms; the degree of Chinese pressure exerted in the 
interaction with the single European partner.854  
The role of political values in the behavior of the European countries with China 
tends to underline a set of dynamics which is diversified and multi-directional. If there 
has been a general trend of downgrading “the importance of political values in the 
approaches to China” - with the younger European democracies “more affected by this 
trend”855 - it is worth noting that “Chinese pressure has led some European states to 
reconsider their level of activity in promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law” but has not been able to convince them to take “political values entirely off the 
agenda”.856 On the economic front the interaction between trade and investment interests 
and the promotion of political values is sometimes counter-intuitive; as Rühlig has 
written857 “states with a higher per capita gross domestic product tend to be more active 
in the field of political values” and “close trade relations with China also correlate with a 
higher level of activity in this field”.  
If analytical evidence does not indicate “strong correlation between absolute or 
relative amounts of incoming Chinese investment and the active promotion of political 
values by European states” there have been individual cases which demonstrate that 
Chinese investments, or the expectation of such investments, have had an impact in 
“periphery countries” such as Portugal, the Czech Republic and Greece858 while “core 
countries” such as Netherlands and the UK, for example, “are openly critical of China’s 
political values but welcome investment projects”.859 The case of Italy, again, has been 
peculiar because Italian governments before the decision to join the BRI - had been much 
more sensitive to “the economic dimension of China’s growing influence in Europe than 
on issues related to democracy, human rights and the rule of law”.860 This approach 
mirrors the behavior that countries such as Italy - but also Germany – followed when the 
economic interaction with the PRC was mainly centred on European interests in the 
Chinese market.  
 
854 Rühlig, Jerdén, van der Putten, Seaman, Otero-Iglesias, Ekman, Political values in Europe-
China relations, 9. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Rühlig, Jerdén, van der Putten, Seaman, Otero-Iglesias, Ekman, Political values in Europe-
China relations,10.    
857 Ibid. 
858 Rühlig, Jerdén, van der Putten, Seaman, Otero-Iglesias, Ekman, Political values in Europe-





All these trends are relevant for the overarching action and position of the EU as an 
unitary actor in this field. As we have already seen in the case of human rights, structural 
engagement at the EU level on issues related to political values has also had the negative 
side-effect of serving “as an excuse for inactivity in this field in many member states”.   
These attitudes have inevitably weakened the EU approach in the framework of the 
Partnership: notwithstanding Brussels’ constant focus on these problems the results have 
indeed been sporadic, apart from “some impact in individual human rights cases as well 
as with regard to legal reform in areas with direct economic implications”.861 The lack of 
a process of normative convergence in this area has made the EU’s impact on China’s 
political values substantially limited, while China has been significantly promoting its 
“new ideational position” which is supported not only by “harder sources of power” but 
also by soft power and actions of influence. As Joshua Kurlantzick has argued, “as China 
has built a global strategy, it has also developed more sophisticated tools of influence, 
which it deploys across the world”.862 The instruments of China’s soft power have been 
also deployed in support of initiatives such as the BRI which have projected not only 
China’s growing economic might through appealing images such as the “new Silk Road” 
but also a new Chinese model of multilateral governance. In this regard it is interesting 
to note - as Zeng Jinghan has argued 863- that the current Chinese “narratives of both ‘new 
type of great power relations’ and ‘one belt one road’ suffer from the problem of being 
overloaded” and they have become “far too broad to be meaningful”. 
Despite China’s increased efforts of soft-power projection aimed at promoting its 
image and perception abroad - in most European countries “the general public and large 
sections of the political élite and media hold largely negative views of China’s  system.864 
Although these polls “do not explicitly measure European support for China’s political 
values, they do indicate largely negative general views on China”, notwithstanding the 
intensified Chinese public diplomacy and foreign “propaganda in the past decade”.865  
 
861 Rühlig, Jerdén, van der Putten, Seaman, Otero-Iglesias, Ekman, Political values in Europe-China 
relations, 10. 
862 Joshua Kulanztick, Charm Offensive (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 62;  
Democracy in Retreat: The Revolt of the Middle Class and the Worldwide Decline of Representative 
Government  (New Haven:Yale University Press, 2013). 
863 Zeng Jinghan, “Does Europe Matter? The Role of Europe in Chinese Narratives of ‘One Belt 
One Road’ and ‘New Type of Great Power Relations”, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 55, n° 5., 
2017, 1162–1176. 





These findings are interesting because they problematize a fairly widespread 
narrative on the increasing Chinese influence in its relations with Europe. As we have 
seen, during the pandemic crisis, China’s assertive participation in the “battle of 
narratives”, through information campaigns and “wolf warrior diplomacy”, has back-
fired in terms of European perceptions. 
However, a generally negative image has not prevented China from “increasingly 
seeking to align Europe with China’s own interests and values” in order to gain “influence 
over decision making in some sensitive fields”.866  
Another interesting trend that is underscored by survey data is that the political 
élites with an acceptance of China’s political system are for the most part Eurosceptic but 
not all Eurosceptics have a favourable view of China. If Chinese political values mostly 
meet opposition in European political élites, China’s growing footprint does however 
serve the interests of some of them, in particular of those EU political actors which are 
critical of the EU and tend “to use China as leverage vis-à-vis the EU institutions and 
other EU member states”867. 
If it is true, for instance, that the Hungarian sovereignist and Eurosceptic 
government is “alone in expressing ideological interest in China’s political values” – with 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán praising China’s “efficient, labour-oriented society in 
comparison to the lengthy processes of the EU” – it is also true that the Hungarian people 
continue to be “highly sceptical of the Chinese Communist Party” and regime.868 In this 
attitude the historical legacy of the Communist period in Hungary is undoubtedly a 
significant factor in shaping the people’s perceptions and opinions vis-à-vis the PRC in 
terms of political values, as similar dynamics are evident in former communist countries 
such as the Czech Republic, Romania and Poland.869  
The case of Italy is interesting for being an anomaly in this respect: it indeed tends 
to suggest an opposite dynamic if we consider the influence of historical legacy on the 
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Europe and this made possible not only the development of structured relations with the 
PRC but, more importantly, produced - through an effective implementation of the 
Gramscian concept of “cultural hegemony” - a lasting benign perception of the Chinese 
regime in significant parts of the intellectual and political class. 
In addition to the importance of historical legacies for the role of political values 
vis-à-vis China we also have to consider the impact of changing domestic political 
dynamics. With the same historical background stemming from the Fifth Republic’s 
ambitions to be a strategic partner of China on a bilateral basis, Emmanuel Macron’s 
China policy seems to indicate a shift towards an increasing importance of the political 
values in French-Chinese relations compared to his predecessors.870 In Germany if the 
legacy of the Nazi period has remained a crucial component of the Federal Republic “self-
identification and has a big impact on its policy regarding democracy, the rule of law and 
human rights”, we can see that the “former Social Democrat government under 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder paid less attention to promoting democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law in China than Angela Merkel’s subsequent administrations”.871  
An important indication which stems from the analysis of these components of the 
behavior of the EU member-states towards China is that historical references often 
“appear in discourses on the role of democracy, human rights and the rule of law and 
while this may be a discursive strategy to some extent, all politics start with words. Hence, 
such discourses should not be ignored”.872  
The necessary focus of the EU on these bilateral dynamics also requires a coherent 
perspective on the connection between bilateral economic interests and the promotion of 
political values. Recent research in this respect seems to underline that   “richer countries 
- but not necessarily big economies - adopt a more active stance on the promotion of 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law in China. Of course, in many cases richer 
countries are also older democracies, which makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
relative effects of historical legacy and economic performance”. This counterintuitive 
finding in any case contradicts the “common belief that extensive economic cooperation 








Notwithstanding the lack of attractiveness of the Chinese political model and the 
growing European criticism of it, the degree of influence of China’s outreach is not easily 
measurable in its effects because it is meant to produce its main returns in the long run. 
What is directly relevant for the EU approach within the Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership is that “China has gained in influence in particularly sensitive fields of 
decision making” as the cases of the “watering down of the EU’s position on adherence 
to international law in the South China Sea dispute in 2016 and the Greek veto of the 
EU’s condemnation of China’s human rights violations in the UNHRC in 2017” underline 
in a clear way.  
Even though Chinese pressure on member-states to make them reconsider their 
level of active promotion of democracy, human rights and the rule of law in China has 
been a growing element in the last years, it is unlikely that any EU member-state could 
take political values entirely off its agenda: nevertheless it is an important goal for the 
Union to reinforce convergence in this regard by supporting European countries which 
are put under pressure by Beijing, in particular if they belong to the “periphery” of the 
Union. This is also an essential prerequisite for strengthening the coherence and 
credibility of the EU as a unitary actor in particular in a phase when it is reassessing its 
policy-making on China, as we will see in the next section. 
 
7.5 The role of the EU as the main actor for the promotion of political values with 
China: Normative Power Europe versus Normative Power China?  
 
The analysis developed in this chapter confirms that, even though the EU’s 
interaction with China has been significantly based on its political values because they 
stem from its peculiar identity and actorness, this approach needs also to mirror “the 
diversity of perspectives and interests of its member states” particularly in the area of 
foreign and security policy, which remains an intergovernmental competence.874  
The introduction respectively of the Bilateral Political Dialogue in 1994 and the 
EU-China Human Rights Dialogue in 1995 underlined the importance for the EU of the 
political dimension in the strategic relations with the PRC. As Christiansen, Kirchner and 
Wissenbach have pointed out “the 2003 partnership agreement demonstrates that both 
parties were willing to engage in a high degree of political cooperation, resulting in one 
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of the most extensive institutional bases of EU strategic partnerships – all that despite the 
effects in the partnership of different histories, state traditions, values and norms 
orientations, as well as different geopolitical interests”.875 
Since the political values are constitutive of the EU’s “historical emergence and 
development, and are thus at the heart of the self-identification of the European 
institutions… the agency of the EU strengthens a China policy that aims to promote 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and all member states to varying degrees 
share a belief in these political values”.876  
As we have argued, however, this process is the outcome of the interaction of the 
“sub-systems” which contribute to the agency of the Union as an international actor and 
in this context the role of the Commission/European External Action Service - the EU’s 
bureaucracy - has a “significant impact on foreign policymaking even though it lacks 
formal decision-making power”.877 The fact that the EU operates on the basis of this 
multilayered structure composed by its sub-systems poses a clear challenge for the 
strategic coherence of the EU’s China policy within the Comprehensive Partnership in a 
phase where the PRC has been actively interacting with the components of one of these 
sub-systems, namely the EU member-states.  
The coherence and unity of the EU’s approach to China based on democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law has been traditionally promoted by this bureaucratic 
framework which - by providing constant coordination - has worked to harmonize 
European foreign policy and external relations. At the same time, part of the reason why 
the EU has not been more successful in advancing this political dimension is due, in 
addition to internal coordination problems “to an uneasy coexistence between normative 
concerns and material interests”.878 While the EU-China Partnership enhanced the 
European focus on this political dimension, “competing strategies within the EU, 
particularly between the European Commission/European Parliament, and with/between 
member states on relations with China have continued”.879 
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This dual approach – based on an EU policy with a strong emphasis on political and 
human rights issues and on traditional state-to-state relations predominantly focused on 
economic matters – affects “the extent to which the EU can speak with a single voice in 
its relations with China and/or is able to leverage the Chinese partner for greater 
commitment to the Partnership”.880 
The active ownership also by the member-states of the objectives of the EU in terms 
of political values is therefore a necessary condition to strengthen the EU’s leverage in 
this respect and to support its strategic role as an advocate of democracy, human rights 
and the rule of law within the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.  
In preserving the fundamental ideational component of its identity as a 
civilian/normative/ethical power the EU seems to be, however, realistically aware that its 
effectiveness and recent impact on “China’s treatment of political values has been 
limited”881 because the PRC has rejected the normative goals intrinsic in the EU China 
policy. The severe backlash that political values are suffering in China and the growing 
difficulties in the EU-China Human Rights Dialogue put indeed in question the “EU’s 
treatment of political values” aimed at shaping Europe’s self-identification and signalling 
“to the rest of the world what Europe stands for and that China’s attempts to redefine 
concepts such as democracy and human rights do not go uncontested”.  
As Pan Chengxin has argued, the EU approach to political values aimed at shaping 
the normative framework of the Partnership has been opposed by an increasingly assertive 
Normative Power China as a manifestation of “lingering Eurocentrism” based on a policy 
characterized by “inconsistencies and double standards”.882 
If the ability or, at least, the willingness to significantly contribute to shape “the 
normative framework of the international order” is a key component of the peculiar 
strategic role that the EU aspires to play in its relations with the other main actors on the 
world’s scene, Brussels is increasingly aware - as Zeng Jinghan has pointed out  - that 
“the creation of ‘new type of great power relations’ and ‘one belt one road’ demonstrates 
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881Ibid.  See also Katrin Kinzelbach, Quiet Diplomacy and Its Limits, (New York: Routledge, 2015); 
Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, Europe, China, and the Limits of Normative Power (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
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China’s determination to move from a norm/system taker towards a norm/system 
shaper”.883  
The interaction within the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership on 
political values is a benchmark not only for assessing a structural strategic dimension 
which reflects diverse approaches to China across Europe but also for better 
understanding the Chinese approach vis-à-vis Europe in this respect. In this sense this 
process is, as Zeng Jinghan has argued884, “a two way street” which underlines also “a 
decreasing interest in the EU within China’s strategic community [as a] reflection of the 
relative decline of the EU and the effects of the ‘Capability-Expectations Gap’”.885  
If the EU has considered the promotion of political values a core component of its 
identity and normative ambitions Brussels needs to be aware that “the shifting 
international identity of China has further changed its evaluations of the EU’s global role” 
in this regard.886  
As Michalski and Pan Zhongqi have written, since the establishment of the 
Partnership “the EU and China have engaged in a competitive role-play attempting to 
influence the role conceptions, role enactments and foreign policy behaviour of the 
other”. If the socialization “was first driven by the EU which strove to introduce China 
into the multilateral world order and induce China to adopt the EU’s norms and principles 
on international engagement” the weakening “of the EU’s position in the international 
system” has severely diminished its “ability to influence China” and has made necessary 
“to adjust its role conceptions and enactment” in light “of China’s refusal to acquiesce to 
liberal values and principles”.887 
The analysis that we have developed in this chapter underlines some relevant 
aspects to assess both the prospects for development of the Partnership and some 
significant conceptual gaps stemming from the set of parallel bilateral/multilateral 
relations which affect the institutional framework of interaction between Brussels and 
Beijing. 
 
883 Zeng Jinghan, “Does Europe Matter? The Role of Europe in Chinese Narratives of ‘One Belt 
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On the one hand, we have seen how the gaps among member-states on Europe’s 
“China policies” need to be bridged in order to strengthen the coherence, credibility and 
effectiveness of the EU approach in its strategic relationship with the PRC and to 
overcome a stalemate that has been vividly described as follows: “an array of documents 
detail the EU’s relations and ambitions with China; the pile sits atop a mountain of 
bilateral relations that European countries maintain with China”.888 
On the other hand, the consideration of the issues analyzed in this chapter has 
confirmed the increasing normative divergence between the EU and the RPC which – 
with regard to the “political” dimension of the Partnership – is significantly driven by 
ideational elements such as the partners’ identities and worldviews.  
In this perspective the relevance of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership is put under scrutiny by the impact of the European and Chinese “dual 
approaches” described in this chapter: the response to this challenge implies, on the 
European front, the awareness of the need of a policymaking, based on a coherent 
interaction between the Union’s sub-systems, which can define its strategic objectives on 
the basis of a realistic consideration of the limits of the EU’s normative power.889  
On the Chinese front, Beijing’s critical view of the Eurocentrism inherent in the 
EU’s normative approach could lead to a mirroring form of Sinocentrism driven by a 
“grand strategy” - based on initiatives such as the BRI and the 17+1 - which implicitly 
undermines not only the role of the EU as a strategic counterpart890 but also that of the 








889 Zsuzsa Anna Ferenczy, Europe, China, and the Limits of Normative Power (Cheltenham: 
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not a sovereign country itself”.  This underlines “a vision of the international order which is substantially 
at odds with the EU view of itself as a unique and innovative international actor”. Rühlig, Jerdén, van der 




CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUSIONS 
 
8.1 The diverging strategic identities, behaviours and objectives of China and the 
EU: still an aspirational Strategic Partnership?  
 
It is not easy in a phase driven by significant elements of novelty to draw 
conclusions which can address not only the obstacles and unresolved issues which affect 
the EU-China Partnership but also its prospects of further development, as the title of this 
thesis reads. Nevertheless, the analysis that has been developed here allows us to delineate 
some concluding considerations on the past evolution and present dynamics of change 
which characterize the EU-China Strategic Partnership. The first two sections of the 
conclusions will focus on a set of broader theoretical and practical questions to which the 
thesis has responded by analyzing how our subject of research has evolved through an 
interpretive approach whose validity - it is supposed – will be confirmed in the future. 
The section more specifically devoted to the main analytical findings will offer some 
concluding remarks also on the issues which are going to influence the prospects of 
further development of the Partnership.  
In this perspective a first conclusion that can be drawn is the importance of the 
broader context for the Partnership: this was true when it was established in 2003, was 
confirmed by the impact of the 2008 crisis and its lasting consequences on the EU-China 
strategic relations and has been underlined by later trends.  
The conceptualization and operationalization of the Strategic Partnership has taken 
place in a dynamic environment characterized by a “changing state and status of the EU 
and China”. It has been therefore important to recognize the impact of evolving 
international relations on the concept and practice of strategic partnerships in general and 
of the Strategic Partnership between China and the EU in particular.  
This has been a challenging but also stimulating aspect of this research and 
hopefully an element which has allowed us to bring a more original contribution to an 
area of study already widely investigated. The EU-China Partnership is indeed inscribed 
in a strategic context which has been characterized by evident “fluctuating trends”, 
influenced not only by some key material and ideational “open issues” but also by a 
broader process of strategic re-orientation in the international system.  
By taking into consideration the fundamental implications of the evolving context 
for the EU-China strategic relations we have come to the conclusion that the 
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Comprehensive Strategic Partnership has been increasingly influenced by a phase of 
growing international competition which has contributed to push European strategic 
thinking about China, already shifting, past a tipping point with regard to its traditional 
paradigms of interaction.  
If an internal logic had tried, to some extent, to insulate the Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership in conceptual and operational terms from the multidimensional 
consequences of an epochal phenomenon such as the rise of China, the increasing 
complexity of the EU-China interaction has gradually put under scrutiny the main tenets 
of the predominant paradigm of interaction between Brussels and Beijing. The thesis has 
underlined the necessity of overcoming the limits of this “internal logic” which has guided 
the development of the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in the framework 
of an impressive institutional architecture of summits, dialogues, and initiatives of 
cooperation. 
In this context-driven process for the EU and China the other key relationship 
within the “strategic triangle” – that with the United States – will continue to be a crucial 
factor in shaping the opportunities and the limitations of the Strategic Partnership. In a 
perspective of possible protracted international competition the EU needs also to be aware 
that it has not been so far able to influence the US strategic thinking on China while the 
“new era’s grand strategy” for China seems implicitly to consider the Partnership with 
Europe to be a secondary relationship.    
In this perspective a renewed analysis of the development and prospects of the 
relations between Brussels and Beijing is even more important because the concept of a 
strategic partnership – which has been often criticized for its lack of definition and 
“questionable results” – has indeed attracted “considerable support with limited critical 
reflection” becoming more than just a descriptor…an interpretation of China’s rise in its 
own right”.891  
For this reason the thesis has delineated a concept of strategic partnership by taking 
advantage in particular - amidst the vast literature that has investigated this theme - of a 
conceptualization proposed by Giovanni Grevi which differentiates its relational, 
structural and reflexive dimensions. This conceptualization has proved to be functional 
to address the different aspects which characterize the present complex phase of evolution 
(or involution?) of the Partnership: the important relational dimension driven by the 
 
891 Scott A.W. Brown, Power, Perception and Foreign Policymaking, 129. 
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economic cooperation between Brussels and Beijing and the structural dimension which 
addresses those political, multilateral and global issues which should make this 
relationship truly strategic for their broader impact on the international system. This 
conceptualization - based on two dimensions which reflect the material and ideational 
elements constitutive of the Partnership – has been analytically productive because it is 
in line with the epistemological /hermeneutical premises of this research.  
The overarching analytical finding and, hopefully, contribution of this thesis is an 
in depth reflection on how the “ideational divergence” between  the EU and China 
continues to affect in a “structural” way the development and prospects of the Partnership 
also through its declination in terms of conflicting normative ambitions.  
On the basis of the thesis’ epistemological/hermeneutical premises - which have 
been defined in a pluralist perspective considering the analytical contributions of Chinese 
political theorists such as Qin Yaqing as well European concepts – the thesis has 
broadened the interpretive potential of the analytical instrument represented by the 
category of “conceptual gaps” - developed by Pan Zhongqi - by linking the “ideational 
disconnect” from which the gaps stem to their practical and normative implications for 
the development of the Partnership.  
The focus of the thesis on some prominent ideational/political issues - human rights, 
political values, multilateralism/multipolarity - has been functional to explore how these 
unresolved problems affect the structural dimension of the Partnership. In line with the 
post-positivist epistemological approach of the research the analysis of the discourse 
mechanisms that Europe and China have been using to develop their political language 
within the Strategic Partnership seems to confirm “the gaps, inconsistencies, and 
slippages between what is being said and what is being understood”.892 Policymakers and 
scholars alike have indeed had increasing difficulties in developing shared concepts that 
can support and serve common goals of the two strategic partners.  
As the thesis has underlined, the fact that the concept of strategic partnership has 
not been fully defined by either side since its inception is at the root of its persistent 
vagueness in terms of conceptualization which – coupled with a lack of in depth 
historical/cultural awareness and full understanding of the “other” – has contributed to 
the increasing frictions and frustration in the Sino-European relationship.  
 
892 David Kerr and Liu Fei (eds.), The International Politics of EU-China Relations, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 4. 
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In the context of the structural dimension, another important conclusion is related 
to the awareness that “Europe’s posturing as a liberal normative power has resulted in a 
strategic disconnect with China” which, in turn, has increasingly developed normative 
ambitions at the international level.893 The different backgrounds which shape each 
actor’s perspectives, paradigms and actorness have been contributing to diverging 
strategic identities and behavior of the two partners because of a fundamental lack of 
comprehension of all the different factors and processes which influence not only each 
strategic partner’s shaping of its “self” but also the values and norms that have either been 
referred to or rejected in the framework of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. 
This process still underway leads us to conclude that there are not only persistent 
conceptual gaps with regard to the conceptualization of the Strategic Partnership but also 
a broader and more profound disconnect which pertains to how China and the European 
Union define their interests-values continuum. This situation makes the Partnership still 
largely aspirational in its structural strategic dimension and it also reverberates in a 
negative way on its “reflexive” dimension by exposing the present limits of the 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership: in this sense the Union and China risk being “put 
on the map” of a new global  order in a dysfunctional manner. 
 
8.2 A reality and ideational check for the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership 
 
Another overarching concluding consideration which emerges from the analysis of 
our subject is therefore that the recognition by both partners of the deeply rooted problems 
within the Partnership is a prerequisite for avoiding the pursuit of a strategy of interaction 
without substantive reflection on the part of the main policy players. This recognition 
would operationalize a conceptualization which considers the process of development of 
the strategic relations between Brussels and Beijing as driven - as we have argued - by 
the evolving identities, actorness and normative objectives of the two partners which have 
gradually problematized the interaction within the Partnership. 
In this perspective the thesis has argued that - if it is undeniable that the EU-China 
Comprehensive Partnership needs a “reality check” - it is important to recognize that it 
also needs an “ideational check”.  
On the basis also of an analytical debate which has been developed in the last 
 
893 Jonathan Holslag, “The strategic dissonance between Europe and China”, Chinese Journal of 
International Politics, vol.3, no.3, 2010, 325-45. 
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decade, the thesis has argued that the “ideational disconnect” between Brussels and 
Beijing has produced persistent conceptual and normative gaps between the partners. This 
implies for the EU a “reality check” aimed at acknowledging not only the shifting realities 
and growing global uncertainties which affect the material elements of the Partnership 
but also its ideational dimension as a basis for rethinking a EU’s China policy “still 
premised on the idea of exerting normative power to mould China in its own image”.894 
The thesis has therefore argued that this EU reality and ideational check emerges from a 
realistic need for Europe to rethink “the viability and practicality of existing policies of 
projecting European ‘core values’” onto the Chinese system.  
At the same time the challenge of a paradigm shift from “constructive engagement” 
to “principled realism” is related to the Union’s unique interests-values continuum whose 
preservation and promotion continues to be its fundamental raison d'être In this sense the 
Partnership with China is a litmus test not only for the EU’s normative role but also for 
its internal unity and external effectiveness. 
The necessary process of resetting of the Partnership depends, in turn, on China’s 
recognition that the strategic dimension of its relationship with the EU is not a mere 
problem of effectiveness of action or of a more efficient management of sectoral issues, 
selectively chosen in a pragmatic perspective: this is a fundamental conclusion that we  
have drawn from our analysis by arguing that an interaction mainly focused on the 
“relational” dimension of the Partnership cannot be conducive to a truly strategic 
relationship. The ambition of Xi Jinping’s China of being an active norm-shaper and not 
just a norm-taker in an international system still shaped by Western ideational hegemony 
is therefore a key factor which problematizes the paradigm of interaction between 
Brussels and Beijing.  
If in a context of changing “US approaches to a rules-based multilateral global 
order…the incentives for EU–China collaboration across aspects of global governance” 
have changed:895 the EU-China lack of convergence within the Partnership reflects in this 
sense dynamics driven by competitive models that denote, once more, the present 
transformative phase of the international system. In this framework state-centric visions 
put under pressure the peculiar model represented by the EU and its strategic partnerships.  
 
894 Mikael Mattlin “Dead on arrival: normative EU policy toward China”, Asia Europe Journal 
10(2) 2012, 181–198.  
895 Jing Men and Wei Shen, The EU, the US and China – Towards a New International Order? 
(London: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2014). 
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The challenge for a 21st century international system “under construction” is related 
not only to redefining a hierarchy of power but, more importantly, to a functioning model 
of enlarged leadership and governance for a globalized world. The shared objective of 
contributing to this process continues to be part also of the future interaction within the 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership but – as the thesis has argued – it is being made 
more challenging by the process of necessary clarification of the still uncertain paradigm 
that the EU and China want to define for their strategic relations and for their roles in an 
evolving international system. 
 
8.3 Review of the main findings 
 
The conclusions to be drawn from this research should be regarded as being at the 
crossroads of two analytical periods: as we have argued, the Partnership has reached an 
inflection point which underlines the importance of finding a new paradigm for the 
development of the strategic relations between Brussels and Beijing. In this sense these 
conclusions take stock of some key findings which emerge from the analysis of the  
development, problems, dynamics which have so far affected and influenced the material 
and ideational dimension of the Partnership. On this basis - and at the beginning of a new 
more complex phase of the strategic relationship - these conclusions can hopefully 
indicate further analytical perspectives for better understanding a key component not only  
for the external relations and foreign policy of the two partners but also for the evolution 
of the international system in the 21st century. The connecting element which links these 
two analytical periods is the epistemological/hermeneutical approach that this research 
has elaborated for the study of this subject and which can be a good theoretical basis for 
the analysis of this problematique also in the framework of future scenarios. 
These conclusions try therefore to offer some elements for theoretical reflection 
without neglecting the possible implications in terms of policy-making for a subject 
which continues to be a “shifting platform” in analytical terms. 
 
8.3.1 Linking theory to praxis: in search of  “coherence in action” 
 
The first conclusion that we draw from the analytical findings of this research is 
that the epistemological awareness that we have considered as an indispensable 
prerequisite for addressing our subject needs to be consequential in terms of the 
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hermeneutical approach for which we have argued. This means linking the dimensions of 
theory to that of praxis: the interpretation of the elements of significant “conceptual 
disconnect” which affect the interaction of the two partners on key aspects of their 
strategic relationship needs to be connected to the implications for the Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership of this situation in terms of practical responses and effective policy-
making.  
In order to respond to the challenges stemming from the elusive EU-China strategic 
dimension we need to address not only the overarching problem of “ideational and 
normative divergence” which divides the two partners but also the key question of 
“coherence in action” as well. This is what we have called in our epistemological premises 
the need for a “subtilitas applicandi”, the consequential practical application of an 
interpretive approach to a theoretical problem.  
If the recognition of the role played by the significant conceptual gaps affecting the 
EU-China relations has become part of the discourse on the EU-China Strategic 
Partnership the thesis has tried to demonstrate that what seems to be missing at present is 
a broader reflection conducive to operational follow-ups on how to respond to the 
growing trends of “ideational and normative divergence” in the behavior of the two 
partners.  
Against this background the logic driving the development of the EU-China 
Partnership has been based, as we have underlined, on the tendency to insulate the 
interaction of the two partners inside the framework of the bureaucratic architecture that 
has been developed over the years,instead of addressing the potentially contentious debate 
on the diverging approaches to key issues for the “structural” dimension of the Strategic 
Partnership - such as human rights, political values and the cooperation on global “post-
material” issues - which could foster effective multilateralism and international 
governance. 
This method and practice of interaction has in fact led to the current stalemate in 
the development of the Partnership which has been based on a rather formulaic repetition 
of summits, dialogues, meetings which have not addressed the elements at the root of the 
increasing divergence between Brussels and Beijing. In this respect the EU-China Human 
Rights Dialogue epitomizes the structural difficulty of addressing in a productive way 
contentious issues which are inevitably an important component of the structural 
dimension of the Partnership. To reverse this situation, the thesis has argued, two essential 
elements are needed: first, an “epistemological awareness” of the process which has 
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increased the degree of divergence of the interests-values continuum of the EU and China 
respectively; and second, a renewed political commitment to the Partnership as the 
framework of reference for the development of a “primary” strategic relationship between 
Brussels and Beijing.  
 
8.3.2 “The leadership gap” in redefining the commitment of the EU and China to 
the strategic dimension of the Partnership. 
 
The main arguments developed in the thesis problematize the approach to the 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership “from within”, that is an approach merely aimed at 
guaranteeing a constructive interaction in the framework of the existing mechanism and 
practices. The limit of this approach is that the EU-China agenda should also include a 
more substantial debate related to the diverging views on key issues that the two partners 
manifest through their international behavior outside this format of cooperation.  
The rationale for this pragmatic but implicitly “minimalist” view of the 
Partnership’s potential has been based by authors such as Pan Zhongqi (who expresses a 
widely held  position in this regard) on the argument that a “bottom-up” cooperative 
approach on issues of common interest can contribute to the development of the Strategic 
Relationship despite significant conceptual gaps and diverging positions between 
Brussels and Beijing on strategic problems such as human rights, political values, climate 
change, global economic governance, key relations with other strategic actors, etc.   
This approach – which is a kind of facile realism – has perpetuated the idea that the 
development of the Partnership can be driven by the mere search for agreements on issues 
mainly related to its economic dimension in order to secure - instead of debating matters 
of principle - concrete, practical deals on a quid-pro-quo basis so as to move strategic 
cooperation beyond rhetoric and to make real progress. However, “matters of principle” 
are in fact - as the thesis has demonstrated - unavoidable obstacles for relaunching the 
strategic relationship between the EU and China because they stem from constitutive 
elements such as the identities, actorness, normative goals of the two partners. A 
cooperation focused only on the “relational” dimension of the Partnership is not a 
guarantee of progress because key practical issues depend on the clarification of elements  
which stem themselves from the “structural” strategic dimension of the Partnership.  
In a phase which necessarily requires strategic rethinking in Brussels and Beijing 
the thesis has underlined how the development of the Partnership has suffered from a 
“leadership gap” because national decision-makers have had “few incentives to invest 
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political capital into this relationship”.896 In this sense, in line with what Vogt argued, if 
China and Europe are serious about the qualitative upgrading of the relationship “a more 
sustained effort by its decision-makers is called for” in particular in this complex phase 
of evolution of the Partnership.897  
The deconstruction of a “bottom-up” approach to the unresolved issues of the 
strategic relationship militates in favor of a “top-down” process of clarification of the 
commitment of both sides to the Partnership driven by a renewed endorsement at the 
highest political level by China and the EU. If this endorsement is needed in light of 
Brussels’s shifting China policy-making it is equally required if one considers the PRC’s 
strategic approach which has de facto undermined the significance of the Partnership by 
actively interacting with either single EU member states or preferring ad hoc formats such 
as the so-called 17+1. The Chinese diplomatic and economic initiatives along with 
Europe’s re-emerging, traditional fault lines are clearly weak points not only for the EU’s 
role as a key strategic partner but also for its overall credibility. This approach has been 
driven not insignificantly - as we have argued - by widespread Chinese perceptions of the 
potentially declining role of the EU as a global strategic actor.These trends indicate that 
the Partnership has reached in this respect too an inflection point which significantly 
affects the development of its strategic dimension.  
The evolving Chinese strategic vision – of which the BRI is an important example 
– not only weakens the function of the Partnership as the reference framework for Sino-
European relations but implicitly marginalizes the comprehensive political cooperation 
on global issues which is at the heart of the potential strategic relevance of the interaction 
between Brussels and Beijing. 
 
8.3.3 Between “constructive engagement” and “principled pragmatism” 
 
One analytical contribution - hopefully original - developed in the thesis is the 
analysis of the need for the EU to reconsider the paradigm that has driven its China policy 
until the very recent past: “constructive engagement”. The thesis has addressed this key 
issue not only on the basis of European sources but also of the Chinese literature which 
has problematized this staple policy as a constitutive part of the EU normative project of 
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“transforming China”. At the same time it has been argued that the persistence of this 
paradigm has reflected a unidimensional assessment by the European Union of such a 
multifaceted process as the  rise of China. The reconsideration of “constructive 
engagement” has thus been investigated as part of an evolving EU approach to the rise of 
China and its implications in the present international scenario.  
In underscoring the limits of “constructive engagement” for advancing an agenda 
within the Partnership which can preserve the EU’s balance between interests and values, 
the thesis has, in parallel, problematized the implementation of a new policy of 
“principled pragmatism”, as posited in the 2016 Global Strategy. The challenge of an EU 
China policy based on “principled pragmatism” requires, on the internal front, a greater 
unity between the approach of the European Commission and the intergovernmental 
dimension of the EU foreign policy, which is also influenced by the bilateral priorities of 
the member states in their interaction with China.  
On the external front, the approach of the European Union as a normative power - 
founded on the fundamental political values enshrined in its treaties - has been facing an 
increasingly assertive China in normative terms: this growing divergence makes, within 
the Partnership, the traditional EU’s goal of inducing the PRC to internalize norms and 
values which are convergent with those of the EU extremely challenging. For this reason 
a China policy which is “principled, practical and pragmatic” seems bound to conflict 
with that of a “Normative Power China” determined to support Chinese political values 
globally in a process of redefinition of the international order itself.  
 This increasing “normative divergence” between the EU and China constitutes a 
further element of complexity within the Partnership because it stems from the identities 
and value-systems of the two actors - as well as from their increasingly global role and 
ambitions - and shapes in a significant way their actorness.  
The EU-China disconnect in terms of the interests-values continuum is particularly 
evident in some areas which are key for making the strategic partnership structural: 
human rights, political values and the worldviews of the two partners in terms of 
multipolarity and multilateralism, as argued in the last three chapters of the thesis. 
The “paradigm shift” underway is driven by the change in long-standing European 
assumptions about China’s approach to the European project and to the Partnership itself. 
As the nascent stages of a new EU debate about China have indicated and the outcome of 
the EU-China summit and Leaders Meeting held in June and September 2020 has 
confirmed, the notion of China as a “systemic rival” seems to have become a significant 
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component of the European strategic assessment. The complex challenge of defining a 
new paradigm that can reconcile more realism with a renewed values-centred strategic 
approach will need to take this into account. 
The realignment of the EU’s China policy can be therefore regarded as a meaningful 
case-study for the challenging trends which problematize not only the future role of the 
EU as a committed promoter of liberal values but also the configuration of a changing 
international system which is witnessing the rise of authoritarian and semi-authoritarian 
alternative models and an overall weakening of the principles and norms of the 
international liberal order.  
 
8.4 Prospects for further research 
 
This thesis has been developed over the course of seven years, from 2013 to 2020: 
it has inevitably witnessed a significant evolution of its research subject, driven by the 
events affecting the development of the Partnership and by the related complex of debates 
in terms of analysis and policy-making. The search for the “structural strategic 
dimension” of the Partnership has been based on a theoretical, epistemological and 
hermeneutical approach which seems to offer an analytically significant added-value. 
The role of the ideational elements influencing the development of this strategic 
relationship – a relationship now widely researched - will provide also in the future an 
important interpretive “fil rouge”. The thesis has sought to provide a useful contribution 
in this sense by focusing not only on how the interests-values continuum of the two 
partners is shaped by their identity, actorness, historical and cultural background but also 
on how these elements are at the root of the increasing conceptual and normative 
divergence between the EU and China. From this perspective a renewed focus on the 
study of the evolving reciprocal perceptions of the two partners has an interesting 
analytical potential going forward. 
We have argued that the Partnership has reached a crucial inflection point and has 
entered a phase which could be conducive to further development either on a new basis 
of cooperation or on that of possible greater strategic competition.  
The most challenging field for further research – on the basis of the multifaceted 
level of analysis already developed – is therefore related to the implications of the 
paradigm shift which is taking place in the framework of the EU-China Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership.  
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In this context, from an EU’s point of view, the challenge is related to the 
acknowledgement of the limits of the policy of “constructive engagement” and the 
necessary elaboration of a more realist approach which has to take into account the 
dynamics of increasing strategic competition between United States and China but also 
the difficulty for Brussels in finding allies for a values-centred strategic approach. The 
developing dynamics within the “strategic triangle” will certainly be a field of analysis 
given its implications for the redefinition of the EU China policy.  
From a Chinese standpoint the analytical focus could probably further address the 
sensitive question of the compatibility of the strategic objectives of Xi Jinping’s “new 
era” with the development of the Partnership in light of the sustainability, vis-à-vis the 
EU, of initiatives such as the 17+1 and the Belt and Road, which have been fueling 
additional elements of friction between Brussels and Beijing. In this sense the reflection 
already started by Chinese analysts on the increasingly divergent paths of Normative 
Power Europe and Normative Power China is an important subject which deserves further 
analysis in the particular context of the future of the Partnership.  
If the clarification of a “new paradigm” must be a key starting point for any future 
assessment of the structural strategic dimension of the EU-China Partnership, it could 
also revive a broader analytical reflection on the role and functionality of the EU’s policy 
of strategic partnerships as an important instrument for the development of its Foreign 
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